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ABSTRACT
TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE COGNITIVE ETIOLOGY OF 
DEPRESSIVE REACTIONS TO LIFE STRESSORS:
AN EVALUATION OF THE HOPELESSNESS THEORY OF DEPRESSION
by
Nancy L. Asdigian 
University of New Hampshire, December, 1993
Abramson, Metalsky, and Alloy's (1989) theory of hopelessness 
depression Is the most recent model of depression to emerge from the 
learned helplessness tradition (Seligman, 1975). Hopelessness theory 
describes an etiological pathway by which a unique subtype of 
depression-* hopelessness depression-- is believed to emerge.
The most proximal cause of hopelessness depression is the formation 
of a hopelessness expectancy. Experiencing a significant life stressor 
and either making stable and global causal attributions, anticipating 
adverse consequences, or inferring derogratory self-attributes is 
thought to contribute to hopelessness. In turn, generalized tendencies 
to make stable and global causal attributions, expect negative 
consequences, or perceive personal deficiencies in response to life 
stress purportedly increase the likelihood of making hopelessness- 
inducing inferences, and thus increase the risk of hopelessness and 
depressive symptoms.
The present research sought to a.) provide a comprehensive 
assessment of the proposed etiological pathway and b.) evaluate the 
competing predictions made by the hopelessness model and its most 
immediate theoretical precursor, the reformulated theory of learned
xviii
helplessness depression (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). In a 
two-wave panel design, college undergraduates (N - 247) completed 
measures assessing the constructs of both models. Higher levels of 
dysfunctional cognitive styles and event-based inferences predicted 
increases in depressive symptoms only among subjects who experienced an 
upsetting interpersonal stressor that was also perceived as 
uncontrollable. Little support was obtained for the hypothesis that 
hopelessness mediates associations between depressive symptoms and 
either maladaptive cognitive styles or event-inferences.
Consistent with the postulates of hopelessness theory, 
dysfunctional cognition appeared to render individuals vulnerable to 
depressive symptomatology in the face of life stress. However, the 
present findings call into question hopelessness theory's elimination of 
control perceptions in its etiological pathway. Continued study of the 
control construct is encouraged as are future tests of hopelessness 
theory that use more sophisticated assessments of life stress and fine­
grained measures of hopelessness expectancies.
xix
INTRODUCTION
The cognitive approach to depression has emerged over the past 
several decades as one of the leading paradigms guiding the study as 
well as the treatment of depressive disorders (Gilbert, 1984). Although 
numerous theories of depression align themselves with such a 
perspective, (e.g, Beck, 1967; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Ellis, 
1985; Seligman, 1975), the assumption that cognitive structures and 
processes are Intimately involved In the etiology of depressive 
illnesses lies at the heart of each theory.
A substantial amount of theoretical and empirical work on the 
cognitive underpinnings of depression has been inspired by Seligman's 
(1975) influential treatise on learned helplessness. The most recent 
model of depression to emerge from the learned helplessness tradition is 
Abramson, Metalsky, and Alloy's (1989, 1988; Abramson, Alloy, &
Metalsky, 1988) hopelessness theory of depression. Abramson et al.'s 
(1989) model posits the existence of a unique subtype of unipolar 
depression--hopelessness depression--and outlines an etiological pathway 
by which the hypothesized depressive subtype Is believed to emerge. A 
comprehensive assessment of the causal pathway and etiological processes 
specified by Abramson et al. has not yet been undertaken, although more 
restricted tests of specific components of the hopelessness 
model have been generally supportive (e.g., Alloy & Clements, 1992; 
Metalsky, Abramson, Seligman, Semmel, & Peterson, 1982; Metalsky, 
Halberstadt, & Abramson, 1987; Metalsky & Joiner, 1992; Metalsky,
1
Joiner, Hardin, & Abramson, 1993). The present research was designed to 
test the full causal model offered by Abramson et al, (1989) and to 
evaluate the competing predictions made by hopelessness theory and its 
theoretical forerunner, the reformulated theory of learned helplessness 
depression (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978).
The Nature and Prevalence of Depressive Disorders
Mood disorders represent a pervasive form of psychopathology, 
afflicting up to 100 million people worldwide (Charney & Weismann,
1988). Of the different types of mood disturbances, major depression is 
one of the most prevalent. More people suffer from a major depressive 
disorder than all other psychiatric disturbances combined. Using DSM- 
III-R criteria (American Psychiatric Association; APA, 1987), major 
depressive episodes are diagnosed in individuals who experience either 
depressed mood or anhedonia for a period of 2 weeks or more. The 
presence of additional features such as unintentional weight changes 
(i.e., weight loss or gain), sleep disturbances (i.e., insomnia or 
hyposomnia), psychomotor retardation, feelings of guilt or 
worthlessness, is also required for a diagnosis of major depression.
In their review of current epidemiological data, Charney and 
Weissman (1988) reported that as many as 3.5% of U.S. citizens suffer a 
major depressive episode during any six-month period. Substantially 
higher prevalence rates (i.e., 13-20%) have been observed for less 
severe but clinically significant depressive symptomatology as well as 
for major depression in some high risk groups (e.g., women). Moreover, 
up to 6.7% of the U.S. population has experienced an episode of major 
depression sometime during their life and incidence rates of depressive
I
disorders have steadily increased during the last decade (cf. Seligman, 
1990) .
Depression also tends to be either chronic or recurrent (APA, 1987; 
Charney & Weismann, 1988). With respect to the former, evidence 
indicates that as many as one-quarter of major depressive episodes are 
superimposed on dysthymic disturbances. Dysthymia is a moderate but 
chronic form of depression that persists for a large majority of 
sufferers (roughly 60%) after more severe depressive episodes remit. 
Additionally, 20% of major depressive episodes among individuals without 
a history of dysthymia persist for intervals longer than two years.
With respect to recurrence, between 50% and 85% of individuals who 
experience an episode of major depression will have at least one 
subsequent episode in their lifetime.
In addition to the distress and functional impairment experienced 
by those who suffer from it, depression takes its toll in numerous other 
ways. For example, of all individuals diagnosed with DSM-III-R 
disorders, those with mood disorders represent the greatest portion of 
mental health service users (Charney & Weissman, 1988). Furthermore, 
the children of depressed parents are two to three times more likely 
than children of nondepressives to experience a range of pathological 
disorders, especially depression. The former are also at increased risk 
for a variety of behavioral problems including school difficulties, 
social skill deficits, and substance abuse (Charney & Wiessman, 1988; 
see also Hammen, 1991)).
Finally, depression is responsible for a large majority of 
attempted and completed suicides. Weissman (1974) found that 80% of
3
patients hospitialized for a suicide attempt received a diagnosis of 
major depression. Depressives are also more likely than other suicide- 
prone individuals (e.g., those with borderline personality disorder) to 
complete their suicide attempts (Boyer & Guthrie, 1986),
The Classification of Depressive Disorders
Psychopathologists have long regarded unipolar depression as a 
heterogenous disorder with respect to both underlying etiology and 
clinical manifestation (Depue & Monroe, 1978). Researchers have made 
significant advances in uncovering both biological and psychological 
factors that contribute to the onset of depression (Shelton, Hollon, 
Purdon, & Loosen, 1991). In addition, numerous subtypes have been 
proposed for both unipolar major depression (e.g., primary, secondary, 
psychotic, neurotic, endogenous, reactive, familial pure depressive 
disease, depression spectrum disease, sporadic depressive disease) and 
dysthymic disorders (e.g., subaffective dysthymia; character spectrum 
disorder) (Leber, Beckham, & Danker-Brown, 1985; Rush, 1986).
Unfortunately, the correspondence between etiology and depressive 
subtypes has not been unequivocally established (Abramson et al., 1988a; 
Leber et al., 1985; Rush, 1986). For example, stressful life events are 
believed to contribute to the onset of reactive depression whereas 
endogenous depression is thought to arise independently of environmental 
events. Depressives falling in both diagnostic categories, however, 
report stressful life events as precipitants of their symptoms (Rush, 
1986). Conversely, biological correlates believed to distinguish 
endogenous depression have been observed in varying degrees in both 
endogenous and reactive depressives (Leber et al., 1985). Furthermore,
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psychopharmacological treatments for depression are effective in 
individuals diagnosed with a variety of depressive disorders (Shelton et 
al., 1991).
Largely because of the lack of conclusive etiological evidence,
DSM-III-R criteria for the differential diagnosis of depressive
disorders reflect only clinical data (i.e., variability in presenting
signs and symptoms and/or treatment response). The etiology of those
disorders is merely inferred (Leber et al., 1985; Millon, 1991; Rush,
1986). For example, biological dysfunction is believed to underlie DSM-
III-R's category of melancholic depression. The diagnosis of
melancholia, however, is based only on the presence of a variety of
vegetative symptoms (e.g., weight loss, insomnia) (APA, 1987). As Rush
(1986, p. 9) aptly stated:
In our current state of knowledge, psychiatric syndromes are 
nonspecific etiologically... In affective disorder the field is 
replete with ideas, but no current model is specific enough for us 
to understand fully the etiology or pathogenetic mechanisms in any 
given case...In light of these problems, DSM-III diagnoses are 
simply based on the apparent phenomenology (the particular signs 
and symptoms) and do not imply a specific etiology.
An etiologically-based classification system for depressive 
disorders would represent a significant advance over our current 
understanding of the illness of depression. An etiological (rather than 
descriptive) approach to the identification of depression subtypes would 
also be of great value to clinicians in choosing appropriate treatment 
regimens. A model of depression, based on such an approach, has 
recently been offered by Abramson et al. (1989). Abramson and 
colleagues proposed that hopelessness depression is an etiologically 
distinct subtype of depression. According to the model, a series of
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events, occurring in a causal chain, contributes to the development of a 
hopelessness expectancy. Hopelessness is characterized by the 
expectation that undesirable events are likely to occur in the future 
and that there is nothing one can do to prevent the occurrence of those 
events. This hopelessness expectancy is regarded by Abramson et al. as 
a necessary and sufficient cause of a unique constellation of symptoms 
with a distinct clinical course and specific treatment implications 
(i.e., hopelessness depression).
Evolution of the Hopelessness Theory of Depression: Learned Helplessness
Theory
Abramson et al.'s (1989) hopelessness model of depression traces 
its roots to observations made by Seligman and colleagues (e.g., 
Overmier, 1968, Overmier & Seligman, 1967, Seligman & Maier, 1967) over 
two decades ago. Seligman and others demonstrated in numerous 
experimental investigations that organisms exhibit striking behavioral 
deficits after exposure to uncontrollable events. In a prototypical 
experiment, Seligman and Maier (1967) initially exposed mongrel dogs to 
a series of either escapable or inescapable electric shocks. In the 
former condition, each shock presentation could be terminated if the 
dogs made a prespecified panel-press response. In the latter condition, 
however, no response was effective in terminating the shock. Thus, for 
dogs in this inescapable-shock condition, the shock presentations were 
uncontrollable (i.e., the probability of shock offset given a response 
was equal to the probability of shock offset given no response). A no­
shock control group was also used in this initial, training phase of the 
experiment.
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In a subsequent testing phase, the experimental dogs were placed 
in a shuttle-box and again exposed to a series of electric shocks. This 
time, however, all of the dogs could terminate the shocks by hurdling a 
barrier that separated the two compartments of the shuttle-box. Dogs in 
the no-shock control and escapable-shock training conditions quickly 
learned to hurdle the barrier and escape the shock. In marked contrast, 
the dogs previously exposed to inescapable shocks exhibited extreme 
deficits in escape responding. For example, Seligman and Maier (1967) 
reported that 75% of the dogs in the latter group failed to hurdle the 
barrier on nine or more of the 10 test trials and took almost twice as 
long as the other dogs to hurdle the barrier when escape was attempted. 
Moreover, the dogs initially exposed to inescapable shock responded 
maladaptively in the testing phase. They became passive and immobile 
during shock presentations, lying in the corner of the shuttle box while 
the shocks were being delivered. They even failed to escape the shock 
after one or two trials in which hurdling the barrier successfully 
terminated the shock.
Observations such as those described above led to the development 
of learned helplessness theory (Seligman, 1975; Maier & Seligman, 1976). 
According to the theory, organisms are capable of integrating 
contingencies for responding and contingencies for not responding. That 
is, organisms can simultaneously represent the probability of outcome 
occurrence given a response and the probability of outcome occurrence 
given no response. As such, they are able to detect instances in which 
outcomes are as likely to occur when a response is emitted as when a 
response is not emitted (i.e., response noncontingency). Seligman
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(1975) believed that when organisms perceive outcomes as response- 
noncontingent they develop an expectation that future outcomes will also 
occur independently of their responses. He further proposed that this 
expectation of future response-outcome independence is the "causal 
condition" (p. 48) for a state of learned helplessness. The latter is 
characterized by a failure to initiate voluntary responses in an attempt 
to control future outcomes that truly are controllable (motivational 
deficit), difficulty perceiving response-outcome contingencies that do 
exist, (cognitive deficit), and depressed mood (affective deficit)
In explaining the emergence of the motivational deficit among 
organisms exposed to uncontrollability, Seligman (1975) argued that 
organisms remain passive in the absence of an incentive to do otherwise. 
The incentive that underlies voluntary behavior, according to Seligman, 
is the expectation that such behavior will increase the likelihood of 
desired outcomes (e.g., obtaining food, terminating shock). Thus, by 
eliminating the expectation that outcomes are contingent upon responses, 
experience with uncontrollability eliminates the incentive to behave and 
produces response deficits. Seligman (1975, p. 50) summarized his 
reasoning by stating that: "For voluntary responding to occur, an 
incentive must be present in the form of an expectation that responding 
may succeed. In the absence of such an expectation, that is, when an 
organism believes responding is futile, voluntary responding will not 
occur."
Viewed through learned helplessness theory, the extreme passivity 
of the dogs in Seligman and Maier's (1967) inescapable-shock condition 
becomes more understandable. According to the theory, these dogs
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learned during the training phase of the experiment that shock offset 
was response-noncontingent; it occurred independently of their behavior. 
When presented in the shuttle-box, the dogs expected that shock would 
again be uncontrollable and therefore made no attempt to either avoid or 
terminate it. Now devoid of any incentive to attempt escape, the dogs 
sat passively in the shuttle-box and accepted the shock.
In addition to motivational impairments, Seligman (1975) suggested 
that helpless organisms suffer cognitive deficits. The cognitive 
component of helplessness manifests itself as difficulty detecting 
contingencies that do exist between responses and outcomes. That is, 
organisms who expect outcomes to be response-noncontingent have 
difficulty learning that some outcomes are indeed controllable.
Seligman accounted for the emergence of this cognitive deficit using the 
notion of proactive interference. Proactive interference refers to 
instances in which information learned at one point in time inhibits the 
acquisition of contradictory information at a later point in time. In 
the context of helplessness, the representation of response-outcome 
independence simply Interferes with the representation of response- 
outcome dependence. That is, once organisms learn that outcomes are 
uncontrollable, their ability to learn the converse--that outcomes can 
be controlled--is impaired.
Seligman's (1975) insight into the cognitive component of 
helplessness sheds additional light on the seemingly inexplicable 
behavior exhibited by the dogs who received inescapable shock in the 
training phase of Seligman and Maier's (1967) investigation. Recall that 
in the testing phase of that experiment, some of the dogs previously
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exposed to inescapable shock hurdled the shuttle-box barrier and 
successfully escaped the shock on several initial trials. Unlike the 
dogs in the escapable- and no-shock training conditions, however, the 
former did not continue to hurdle the barrier to escape the shock even 
though that response was effective in terminating the shock. For those 
dogs, the expectation of response-outcome noncontingency superseded the 
experience of shock offset upon hurdling the barrier and the contingency 
went unlearned. In reference to this observation, Seligman (1975, p,
51) noted that:
When [a dog who initially receives inescapable shock] goes to the 
shuttle box and jumps the barrier, in reality causing shock 
termination, the dog has trouble learning this. This is because .
. . he still expects that shock will be just as likely to go off if 
he fails to jump the barrier. Such a dog will revert to taking 
shock passively even after he makes one or two successful jumps.
In contrast, a naive dog has no interfering expectation that shock 
termination is independent of responding, so one jump over the 
barrier resulting in shock termination is sufficient for him to 
catch on.
Finally, Seligman (1975) conceived of learned helplessness as 
having an affective component. More specifically, he believed organisms 
experience a state of depression upon learning that important outcomes 
are uncontrollable. According to Seligman, the initial emotional 
response to an aversive event is fear. When confronted with such an 
event, organisms will attempt to exert control over the event in order 
to reduce the ensuing trauma. If the event can be brought under 
control, the fear response dissipates and is replaced by effective 
responding. If, on the other hand, the aversive event can not be 
brought under the organism's control, the initial fear reaction, because 
it is effortful and no longer useful, gives way to depression.
Although Seligman (1975) believed that uncontrollable trauma
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produced depression, he suggested that depressive reactions could also 
arise from uncontrollable events that were positive in valence.
Seligman based this speculation on his belief that positive affect does 
not emerge from reinforcement per se, but from effective responding or 
mastery over the environment. Thus, receiving "free" reinforcement was, 
according to Seligman, sufficient to engender depression. He states, 
for example:
I suggest that what produces self-esteem and a sense of competence, 
and protects against depression, is not only the absolute quality 
of experience, but the perception that one's own actions controlled 
the experience. To the degree that uncontrollable events occur, 
either traumatic or positive, depression will be predisposed and 
ego strength undermined. To the degree that controllable events 
occur, a sense of mastery and resistance to depression will result 
(P. 99).
This, then, is the model that Seligman (1975) developed to account 
for the behavior exhibited by organisms exposed to uncontrollable 
outcomes. Experience with response-noncontingent outcomes fosters an 
expectation of uncontrollability and the latter brings about deficits in 
motivation, contingency learning, and affect.
Although Seligman's (1975) formulation of learned helplessness was 
derived from experimental observations of nonhuman animals, researchers 
were quick to evaluate the theory's ability to predict human responses 
to uncontrollability. For example, Hiroto and Seligman (1975) exposed 
college students to aversive tones that were either controllable or 
uncontrollable, or to discrimination tasks that were either soluble or 
insoluble. Half of the subjects in each of these four training 
conditions were subsequently exposed to aversive tones that could be 
terminated (or avoided) by moving a manipulandum to the opposite side of 
a hand shuttle-box. The remaining subjects in each training condition
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were asked to solve (soluble) anagrams.
As would be predicted from learned helplessness theory, Hiroto and 
Seligman (1975) found that subjects who were initially exposed to 
uncontrollable outcomes performed worse on the test-phase tasks relative 
to subjects who initially received controllable outcomes. The former 
solved fewer anagrams and successfully escaped aversive tones on fewer 
trials than did their counterparts in the controllable training 
conditions. When they were successful in either solving test-phase 
anagrams or terminating the aversive tone, subjects in the two 
uncontrollable training conditions took longer to do so than did 
subjects in either controllable training condition. Furthermore, 
performance deficits were not affected by the degree of correspondence 
between training- and test-phase tasks. For example, subjects who were 
initially exposed to an insoluble discrimination task performed just as 
poorly on the noise-escape test task as they did on the anagram test 
task. This finding, as well as similar results observed among nonhuman 
animals (e.g., Altenor, Kay, & Richter, 1977; Braud, Wepman, & Russo, 
1969; Rosellini & Seligman, 1975), lends support to the suggestion that 
helplessness expectations generalize to, and produce deficits when 
dealing with a range of outcomes.
In an analogous investigation, Thornton and Jacobs (1971) first 
exposed college students to either escapable or inescapable electric 
shocks and then assessed shock-avoidance/escape responding. The 
students who first received inescapable shocks failed to either avoid or 
escape shock on more test trials than did their counterparts who 
initially experienced escapable shock. Indeed, a full 65% of the
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subjects in the former condition failed to make even one escape response 
across 10 test trials. Moreover, 60% of the subjects in the inescapable - 
shock condition spontaneously stated in post-experimental interviews 
that they did not attempt to avoid or escape shock on the test trials 
because they felt as if they had no control over the shocks and 
therefore expected responding to be futile.
Noting similarities in symptomatology, etiology, cure, and 
prevention, Seligman (1975) applied his learned helplessness model to 
human depression, suggesting that experimentally-induced helplessness is 
analogous to naturally occurring human depressions. With respect to 
symptoms, Seligman pointed out that both human depressives and organisms 
exposed to uncontrollability suffer motivational/motoric impairments. 
Like helpless organisms who remain passive and immobile instead of 
initiating responses that could effectively control important outcomes, 
depressives tend not to engage in even the most effortless activities 
and are much slower in the behaviors that they do perform.
Seligman additionally argued that depressives exhibit the same 
types of cognitive deficits that characterize helpless organisms. That 
is, depressives expect their behavior to be ineffective in altering 
important outcomes. Moreover, the results of an experiment conducted by 
Miller and Seligman (1973, cited in Seligman, 1975) suggest that these 
expectancies are resistant to change in the face of contrary evidence 
(i.e., experience with response-outcome contingency). Miller and 
Seligman examined changes in success expectancies among depressed and 
nondepressed subjects as they worked on tasks involving either skill- 
determined or chance-determined outcomes. When asked to estimate the
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likelihood of success on successive trials, expectancy changes as a 
function of previous task performance were larger among nondepressed 
subjects who worked on skill tasks than among nondepressed subjects who 
worked on tasks of chance. Specifically, nondepressives lowered their 
success expectancies more after experiencing failure on a skill task 
than after experiencing failure on a chance task. They likewise 
increased their success expectancies more after success on the skill 
task than after success on the chance task.
Among depressed subjects, however, previous performance had as 
little impact on success expectancies for the skill task as it did on 
success expectancies for the chance task. That is, depressed subjects 
in the skill-task condition were no more likely to alter their success 
expectancies in response to past successes and failures than were 
depressed subjects in the chance-task condition. Whereas nondepressives 
appropriately perceived the skill and chance components of the 
respective tasks, depressed subjects apparently perceived their 
performance on both types of tasks as chance-determined. In other 
words, depressives failed to see the relation between their behavior and 
their task performance when working on the skill task.
Interestingly, Miller and Seligman (1974, cited in Seligman, 1975) 
found that the pattern of expectancy changes exhibited by nondepressed 
subjects exposed to inescapable noise paralleled that exhibited by the 
untreated depressives described above. In contrast, nondepressives 
exposed to either escapable or no noise behaved like the untreated 
nondepressives described above. In discussing the implications of the 
latter findings, Seligman (1975, p. 87) suggested that "These results
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show experimentally that both depression as found in the real world and 
helplessness induced by uncontrollable events result in a negative 
cognitive set, the belief that success and failure are independent of 
one's efforts."
A subsequent investigation by Miller and Seligman (1975) 
demonstrated that laboratory-induced helplessness and naturally 
occurring depression converge not only with respect to cognitive 
deficits but also in regard to affective symptoms. In this study, 
depressed and nondepressed subjects were assigned to either an 
inescapable-noise, escapable-noise, or no-noise training condition. 
Subjects were then presented with a series of anagrams, all of which 
were scrambled according to the same pattern, and asked to solve each 
anagram within 100 seconds. Post-training performance on the anagrams 
task was indexed by average latency to solution, number of anagrams left 
unsolved after 100 seconds, number of trials required for learning the 
anagram pattern (with the latter defined as the point at which solutions 
are reached within 15 seconds), and number of anagrams successfully 
solved before learning the anagram pattern. Finally, Miller and 
Seligman assessed levels of pre- to post-training change in depressed 
mood among subjects in each training condition.
Consistent with previous demonstrations of the helplessness 
phenomena, Miller and Seligman (1975) found that nondepressed subjects 
who received inescapable-noise performed worse than nondepressed 
subjects in the escapable- and no-noise conditions on all performance 
measures. More importantly, however, Miller and Seligman demonstrated 
that untreated (i.e., no-noise control group) depressives also exhibited
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a greater degree of impairment on all performance measures than did 
nondepressed subjects in the escapable- and no-noise training 
conditions. Untreated depressives performed just as poorly on the 
anagrams task as did nondepressives pretreated with inescapable noise.
The effects of inescapable noise were not, however, limited to 
performance deficits on the anagrams task. Among initially nondepressed 
subjects, exposure to inescapable noise resulted in larger increases in 
post-training levels of depressed mood than did exposure to escapable or 
no noise. Although post-training anxiety and hostility levels also 
increased among nondepressives exposed to inescapable-noise, they did so 
to a lesser extent than depressed mood. Among initially depressed 
subjects, however, exposure to inescapable noise had no such effect on 
post-treatment changes in levels of depressed mood. Finally, subjects' 
self-reported depression levels were highly positively correlated with 
the degree of task impairment on the four performance measures (rs 
ranged from .69 to .86). Taken together, the results of Miller and 
Seligman's research program provide evidence of substantial overlap 
between naturally occurring depression and laboratory-based 
helplessness.
Guided by his laboratory observations, Seligman (1975) advanced a 
theory of human reactive depression in which experience with 
uncontrollability served a central etiological role. According to 
Seligman's learned helplessness model of depression, individuals become 
depressed when they learn that important outcomes, either positive or 
negative in valence, are noncontingently related to their actions. 
Seligman believed that such experience with response-outcome
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noncontingency gives rise to an expectation that future outcomes will 
also be uncontrollable. The syndrome of depression, he argued, is the 
result of this future uncontrollability expectation, and consists of the 
motivational, cognitive, and affective deficits characterizing the state 
of learned helplessness (see Figure 1). The motivational deficit 
manifests itself in human depression as psychomotor retardation as well 
as cognitive and social dullness; the cognitive deficit manifests itself 
as a "negative cognitive set," the depressive's belief that all actions 
are futile (e.g., "nothing I do matters"); and the affective deficit is 
expressed as sad or depressed mood.
Attributional Reformulation of Learned Helplessness Theory
Shortly after its development, researchers began to recognize that 
Seligman's (1975) theory of learned helplessness was unable to 
adequately account for the course and characteristics of helplessness 
deficits. Instances in which organisms failed to become helpless after 
exposure to uncontrollability were attributed post hoc to previous (but 
unknown) experiences with control that served to immunize those 
organisms from helplessness (Abramson et al., 1978; Seligman, 1975, 
1991). Furthermore, the original theory had difficulty explaining 
individual differences in the nature of helplessness deficits that did 
occur following experience with response-noncontingent outcomes.
To remedy these explanatory problems, an attributional 
reformulation of the learned helplessness model was proposed by Abramson 
et al. (1978). The reformulation allowed researchers to predict, a 
priori, 1.) under what conditions exposure to uncontrollable outcomes 
would give rise to an expectation of future outcome uncontrollability
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Figure 1. Learned Helplessness Model of Depression
(Adapted from Seligman. 1975^
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(and thus to learned helplessness deficits), 2.) whether the future 
uncontrollability expectancy would be relatively short-lived or 
relatively long-lasting, 3.) whether the future uncontrollability 
expectancy would remain specific to the outcome experienced as 
uncontrollable or generalize to a variety of other outcomes, and 4.) 
whether lowered self-esteem would accompany the other helplessness 
deficits. In addition, a revised theory of human depression, based on 
the attributional reformulation of learned helplessness theory, was 
advanced.
As in the original learned helplessness theory, Abramson et al. 
(1978) maintained that an expectation of future uncontrollability 
directly precipitates the motivational, cognitive, and affective 
helplessness deficits. In contrast to Seligman's (1975) suggestion, 
however, perceived response-outcome noncontingency was no longer 
regarded as a sufficient condition for the development of this future 
uncontrollability expectation. According to the reformulation, the 
perception of response-outcome noncontingency motivates an attributional 
search whereby individuals attempt to determine the cause of the 
uncontrollability. It is the causal attributions that individuals make 
for uncontrollable outcomes, not the outcomes themselves, that lead to 
the future uncontrollability expectation. Specifically, the 
reformulation suggested that individuals develop future 
uncontrollability expectations only when they attribute response- 
noncontingent outcomes to causes that are internal (something about 
themselves), stable (long-lasting), and global (affecting many other 
outcomes). When response-noncontingent outcomes are attributed to
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external (something about others or the environment), unstable (short­
lived) , and specific (affecting only a narrow range of outcomes) causes, 
expectations of future uncontrollability, and consequent learned 
helplessness deficits are not predicted to arise (see Figure 2).
The reformulated theory also suggested that the temporal and 
situational parameters of the future uncontrollability expectation, as 
well as the occurrence of self-esteem deficits, could be accounted for 
by the nature of the causal attributions made for uncontrollable 
outcomes.1 Abramson et al. (1978) hypothesized that three orthogonal 
dimensions of causal attributions--internal/ external, stable/unstable, 
and global/specific-- influence the future uncontrollability expectation 
and thus, the nature of helplessness deficits.
The internal-external dimension reflects the extent to which the 
causes of response-noncontingent outcomes are believed to reflect 
something about the self or something about the environment, 
respectively. Internal causes for failing an academic task despite 
studying might include low academic ability or poor study habits. 
External causes for the same outcome might include the difficulty of the 
task and poor academic instruction. According to Abramson et al.
(1978), attributing uncontrollable negative outcomes to internal causes 
results in a state of personal helplessness. Personally helpless 
individuals expect that they will be unable to control the future 
occurrence of negative events but believe that others possess the 
responses that can control those events. For example, a student who 
believes that her academic failure was caused by low ability might 
expect that she will be unable to attain future academic success but
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Figure 2. Reformulated Learned Helplessness Model of Depression
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-> Self esteem loss will accompany motivational, 
cognitive, and affective deficits
-> Chronicity of future uncontrollability
expectation and thus duration of depressive 
symptoms
-> Generality of future uncontrollability
expectation (i.e., range of outcomes over which a 
lack of control is expected) and thus pervasiveness 
of depressive symptoms
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that her fellow classmates will be able to do so.
Individuals who attribute noncontingency to external causes, on 
the other hand, are believed to experience a state of universal 
helplessness characterized by the expectation that neither they nor 
similar others are able to control the occurrence of future negative 
outcomes. A student who believes that her academic failure was caused 
by poor instruction might expect that both she and her fellow classmates 
will be unable to succeed on future academic tasks in the same class.
Given that the expectation of future uncontrollability is present 
among personally and universally helpless individuals, both are 
predicted to experience the motivational and cognitive deficits of 
learned helplessness. Because they believe that the causes of aversive 
uncontrollability reflect something about themselves, however, only 
personally helpless individuals should experience self-esteem loss in 
addition to the other deficits. According to the reformulation, then, 
both the personally helpless and universally helpless students mentioned 
above might stop trying to control future academic outcomes 
(motivational deficit) and erroneously perceive a lack of control over 
other academic outcomes (cognitive deficit). Only the personally 
helpless student, however, should experience lowered self-esteem in 
response to the noncontingent academic outcome.
The stable-unstable attributional dimension represents the extent 
to which causes are perceived, respectively, as enduring or transitory. 
Stable attributions for the uncontrollable academic outcome mentioned 
above might include low aptitude for that academic subject or chronic 
unfairness on the part of the instructor. Unstable attributions might
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include a temporary illness or an unusually heavy work load. According 
to the reformulation, the temporal persistence or chronicity of future 
uncontrollability expectations is dependent on the perceived stability 
of the causes attributed to uncontrollable negative outcomes.
Expectations of future noncontingency (and the resulting 
helplessness deficits) are believed to persist for an extended period of 
time when uncontrollable outcomes are attributed to stable causes, but 
to be short-lived when outcomes are attributed to unstable causes. When 
a student attributes an uncontrollable academic outcome to a stable 
cause such as low aptitude, it suggests that she will also be unable to 
control similar academic outcomes that occur well into the future. That 
student should thus remain helpless as long as she expects those 
outcomes to be uncontrollable. On the other hand, a student who 
attributes an uncontrollable academic outcome to an unstable cause 
should not expect that cause to render similar outcomes uncontrollable 
long into the future. The future uncontrollability expectation, and 
resulting helplessness deficits should thus dissipate quickly.
The third dimension of causal attributions discussed by Abramson 
et al. (1978) is the global-specific dimension. Global causes are those 
that affect a wide variety of outcomes whereas specific causes affect 
only a limited array of outcomes. Continuing with the example of 
academic failure, global causes might include low general intelligence 
or incompetent faculty at a particular institution. An inability to 
understand the particular academic task or the instructor's inability to 
explain the concepts relevant to that particular task reflect specific 
causes.
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According to the reformulated theory, the perceived globality of 
causes influences the generality of helplessness deficits or the range 
of outcomes over which an individual expects to lack future control. A 
student who attributes an uncontrollable negative outcome to a global 
cause might come to expect that the many outcomes affected by that cause 
will also be uncontrollable in the future. The helplessness deficits 
exhibited by that student should thus be highly generalized and manifest 
themselves in a wide variety of situations. For example, a global cause 
such as low general intelligence might be expected to adversely affect a 
variety of outcomes including one's performance in many different 
academic subjects or one's occupational success. A student who makes 
such an attribution after experiencing an uncontrollable academic 
failure might then become helpless in her other classes and/or give up 
the lofty career goals to which she once aspired.
Unlike global attributions, specific causes render only a limited 
array of outcomes uncontrollable. Being unable to understand a 
particular task or concept, for example, has little relevance to tasks 
requiring other skills. An individual who makes such an attribution 
might expect to lack control over only future tasks requiring the 
unattainable skill. That individual should not, however, expect other 
unrelated outcomes to also be uncontrollable.
The reformulation also made predictions about the severity of 
helplessness deficits and the extent of self-esteem loss among 
personally helpless individuals. Abramson et al. (1978) suggested that 
the motivational and cognitive deficits of helplessness increase in 
severity as the expectation of future uncontrollability increases in
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certainty. The severity of affective deficits and the intensity of 
self-esteem loss was hypothesized to be a function of both the certainty 
of the future uncontrollability expectation and the importance of the 
outcome over which a lack of control is expected. Individuals who are 
highly certain that an outcome will be uncontrollable should thus 
exhibit more extreme passivity and impairment in learning when outcomes 
truly are controllable. When that certainty concerns a highly important 
outcome (e.g., the ability to obtain a desired job), the Intensity of 
depressive affect and magnitude of self-esteem loss (if an internal 
causal attribution is made) should also increase.
To reiterate, the reformulated theory is an attributional model of 
learned helplessness that makes specific predictions about the 
occurrence and nature of helplessness deficits arising from perceived 
noncontingency. According to the reformulation, self-esteem loss 
accompanies helplessness deficits only among personally helpless 
individuals who attribute noncontingency to internal causes. The 
chronicity and generality of helplessness deficits are influenced, 
respectively, by the perceived stability and globality of the causes of 
noncontingent outcomes. Finally, the strength of the future 
uncontrollability expectation and the importance of the outcorae(s) 
expected to be uncontrollable influence the intensity of helplessness 
deficits.
The developers of the reformulated model also addressed the 
important question of when noncontingent outcomes are likely to be 
attributed to internal, stable, and/or global causes. They suggested 
that both "bottom-up" and "top-down" processes influence beliefs about
25
the causes of uncontrollable outcomes. With respect to the former, 
Abramson et al. (1978) followed the lead of other attribution theorists 
(e.g., Kelley, 1967) in noting that causal attributions for specific 
outcomes are often derived from situational information (e.g., the 
nature of the outcome, the contexts in which it occurs, whether others 
also experience it). For example, a student who continually fails exams 
that the majority of her classmates pass is likely to make an internal 
attribution for those failures. But Abramson et al. also speculated 
that causes might be attributed to outcomes in a "top-down" fashion.
That is, people's generalized styles of attributing causality to 
outcomes might shape their perceptions of the causes of specific 
outcomes. Abramson et al. further proposed that some people possess a 
"depressogenic attributional style," or a general tendency to attribute 
a wide variety of negative outcomes to internal, stable, and global 
causes. Individuals who possess this depressogenic attributional style 
are thought to be prone to helplessness deficits and depressive 
reactions when noncontingent negative outcomes occur.
Abramson et al. (1978) also revised Seligman's (1975) original 
helplessness model of human depression. According to the reformulated 
theory, "helplessness depression" is a subtype of depression comprised 
of motivational, cognitive, affective, and self-esteem deficits. In 
contrast to Seligman's (1975) proposal that each of these deficits 
follow directly from the expectation of future uncontrollability, 
Abramson et al. hypothesized that the affective deficits of depression 
arise only when the expectancy of future uncontrollability co-occurs 
with a negative outcome expectancy. That is, people experience sadness
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or depressed mood only when they anticipate either being unable to bring 
about highly desired outcomes or being unable to prevent the occurrence 
of highly undesired outcomes. Passivity and a negative cognitive set, 
however, arise when future outcomes of any valence are perceived as 
uncontrollable.
Abramson et al. (1978) also noted that the original helplessness 
model of depression could not explain the low self-esteem frequently 
observed among depressives, nor could it account for variability in the 
time course or generality of depressive symptoms. In line with their 
attributional reformulation of learned helplessness, Abramson et al. 
suggested self-derogation and low self-worth should be exhibited by 
depressives who attribute their helplessness to internal causes. 
Likewise, variability in the duration and generality of depressive 
symptoms was accounted for by individual differences in the perceived 
stability and globality of the causes of one's helplessness, 
respectively.
Abramson et al.'s (1978) reformulated model of helplessness 
depression thus restricted the affective component of human depression 
to expectations regarding the uncontrollable occurrence of negative 
outcomes (or nonoccurrence of positive outcomes), provided an account of 
the depressive's low self-esteem, and explained individual differences 
in the chronicity and generality of depressive symptomatology. Finally, 
it is important also to note that the reformulation regarded a 
negativistic attributional style as a vulnerability factor for 
depression. Abramson et al. suggested that people who generally 
attribute negative outcomes to internal, stable, and global causes
possess a "depressive personality," and are thus vulnerable to 
depressive reactions in response to uncontrollable stressors (see also 
Abramson et al., 1989; Metalsky et al., 1982).
Hopelessness Theory: A Revision and Extension of the Attributional 
Reformulation of Helplessness Depression
Since its appearance in the literature, the reformulated model of 
helplessness depression has been the subject of an extraordinary amount 
of research, not all of which has been supportive (for reviews see 
Brewin, 1985; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; Peterson, Villanova, & Raps, 1985; 
Robins, 1988; Sweeney, Anderson, & Bailey, 1986). In light of the 
accumulating evidence, and in response to various critiques of the 
reformulated model, Abramson et al. (1989) recently revised and extended 
their 1978 statement of the model. Abramson et al. refer to this 
revision as the hopelessness theory of depression. The fundamental 
postulate of hopelessness theory is that "hopelessness depression" 
represents a subtype of depression that is distinguished primarily by 
its etiology, but which is also unique in symptomatology, clinical 
course, and treatment/ prevention implications.
With respect to its etiology, Abramson et al. (1989) proposed that 
the formation of a hopelessness expectancy is the most proximal cause of 
the symptoms of hopelessness depression. The hopelessness expectancy is 
comprised of two necessary components; a negative outcome expectancy and 
a helplessness expectancy. The former refers to the belief that either 
highly undesired outcomes are likely to occur In the future or that 
highly desired outcomes are unlikely to occur. The latter reflects the 
belief that the occurrence of those outcomes can not be controlled. In
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essence, people feel hopeless when they expect their futures to be bleak 
and believe that there is nothing they can do to change that pessimistic 
forecast.
The formal theoretical status of the hopelessness expectancy is 
that of a necessary and sufficient proximal cause of hopelessness 
depression. It is a sufficient cause because, according to the model, 
the presence of a hopelessness expectancy guarantees the onset of 
depressive symptoms. A hopelessness expectancy is a necessary cause of 
hopelessness depression because it defines that subtype of depression.
Of course, Abramson et al. do not suggest that hopelessness is a 
necessary cause of all depressive disorders or symptoms. Finally, 
hopelessness is conceived as a proximal cause because its occurrence 
directly precedes the onset of depressive symptoms.
In addition to specifying hopelessness as the proximal cause of 
depressive symptoms, Abramson et al. (1989) outlined an etiological 
pathway by which hopelessness expectancies are believed to develop (see 
Figure 3). That causal pathway describes a series of sequentially 
occurring events, each of which contributes to, but is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for the formation of helplessness expectancies. The 
events along the proposed causal chain are therefore formally regarded 
as contributory causes of hopelessness depression.
The causal sequence leading up to the hopelessness expectancy is 
initiated by the perceived occurrence of one or more negative or 
stressful life events. As mentioned above, negative life events are 
contributory causes and are not by themselves sufficient for a 
hopelessness expectancy to occur. According to the hopelessness model,
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Figure 3. Causal chain Specified In the Hopelessness Model of Depression
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depressogenic inferences drawn from negative life events moderate the 
relation between those events and hopelessness. Whether the occurrence 
of a stressful event results in a hopelessness expectancy depends on the 
inferences an individual draws about: 1.) the cause of the event, 2.) 
the consequences resulting from the event, or 3.) the characteristics of 
the self given the event's occurrence. Note that in contrast to the 
reformulated model, the depressogenic inferences specified In 
hopelessness theory include, but are no longer limited to, causal 
attributions.
Although causal attributions are not accorded exclusive status, 
Abramson et al. (1989) do suggest that attributing negative events to 
stable and global causes can give rise to hopelessness expectancies. 
Hopelessness theory further speculates that stable and global 
attributions for negative events contribute to hopelessness expectancies 
only when those events are regarded as important. Finally, internal 
attributions for negative events play no role in the development of 
hopelessness expectancies according to the current model.
Abramson et al. (1989) suggest that regardless of how causality is 
attributed to negative events, people might also become hopeless if they 
expect those events to bring about a variety of undesired consequences. 
Thus an individual might believe that she performed poorly on an 
important job assignment because of inadequate preparation (an unstable 
and specific causal attribution), but still become hopeless if the poor 
performance is expected to undermine her ability to secure a desired 
promotion. In addition, hopelessness is thought to be more likely to 
occur when the expected negative consequences are regarded as highly
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important, unchangeable, and as affecting many aspects of one's life.
The final moderating variable included in the hopelessness model 
concerns the inferences an individual draws about herself upon 
experiencing a negative life event. Hopelessness is predicted to result 
when negative events adversely impact an individual's self-conception.
In other words, hopelessness arises when negative events are perceived 
as diagnostic of personal deficiencies such as being unworthy, 
unlovable, unintelligent, or incapable. As with inferred negative 
consequences, the development of hopelessness expectancies is believed 
to be more probable when the negative characteristics ascribed to the 
self are perceived as highly incapacitating (i.e., preventing one from 
attaining valued goals).
Although they are conceived as orthogonal causes, Abramson et al. 
(1989) acknowledge that it may be difficult to distinguish inferred 
negative self-characteristics from causal attributions. For example, 
the inference, "I failed the exam, therefore I must be unintelligent," 
includes the ascription of a negative trait to the self as well as an 
implicit internal attribution for the cause of the failure. Despite 
their cautionary comments, however, the difference between internal 
attributions (which currently have no causal role in the development of 
hopelessness) and inferred negative traits is unclear, and hopelessness 
theory currently offers no adequate resolution to this discrepancy.
The three classes of inferences discussed above are regarded as 
proximal contributory causes of hopelessness depression because their 
occurrence in the causal chain closely precedes the development of 
hopelessness expectancies (which then produce the symptoms of
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hopelessness depression). However, the causal pathway proposed by 
Abramson et al. (1989) also incorporates more remote (i.e., distal) 
causal factors that contribute indirectly to the formation of 
hopelessness expectancies. These distal contributory causes, which are 
referred to as "depressogenic cognitive styles," represent generalized 
thought patterns or styles of perceiving the environment that are 
believed to render individuals vulnerable to depressive symptomatology.
Abramson et al. (1989) suggested that individuals who chronically 
attribute negative events to stable and global causes, habitually 
anticipate negative consequences, or infer personal deficiencies when a 
variety of negative events occur, are at risk of becoming hopeless in 
the face of life stressors. Depressogenic cognitive styles are 
considered risk factors for hopelessness because the individuals who 
exhibit them are likely to make corresponding inferences when specific 
negative life events occur (i.e., attribute specific stressors to stable 
and global causes, expect negative consequences to result from those 
stressors, or infer derogatory characteristics about the self when those 
stressors occur).
Hypotheses regarding the relation between attributional style and 
depressive symptomatology are, of course, not new to hopelessness 
theory. Such a relation was initially suggested by the reformulators of 
helplessness theory (Abramson et al., 1978), elaborated in subsequent 
theoretical statements (e.g., Peterson & Seligman, 1984; Seligman, 
Abramson, Semmel, & von Baeyer, 1979), and empirically validated by 
helplessness researchers (for a review, see Sweeney et al., 1986). Like 
causal attributions for specific events, however, the role of
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attributional style in putting individuals at risk for depression is de- 
emphasized as other inferential styles are incorporated into the current 
model. In addition, hopelessness theory considers only the tendency to 
make stable and global attributions for negative events to be a risk 
factor for depressive symptoms. In contrast to previous statements, the 
tendency to attribute negative events to internal causes is no longer 
regarded as a risk factor.
The hopelessness model also differs from its theoretical 
predecessor in postulating a "specific vulnerability hypothesis" with 
regard to attributional style. The specific vulnerability hypothesis 
holds that depressogenic attributional styles are domain-specific and 
therefore increase the likelihood of depressive symptomatology only when 
vulnerable individuals encounter stressors in a corresponding domain. 
Specifically, Abramson et al. (1989) suggest that individuals habitually 
make stable and global attributions for either negative achievement 
outcomes or negative interpersonal outcomes. The former group should 
then be prone to depression when they encounter stressors in the 
achievement domain, but not when they experience stressful outcomes of 
an interpersonal or social nature. The converse is true of individuals 
whose depressogenic attributional style Is limited to interpersonal 
outcomes.
Abramson et al.'s (1989) notion of domain specific attributional 
styles is similar to Beck's (e.g., Beck, 1983) suggestions regarding 
sociotropic and autonomous personality styles. The former refers to 
tendencies toward socially dependency and is believed to render 
individuals vulnerable to depression when loss or disruption of social
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relationships is experienced. The latter is characterized by excessive 
achievement striving and independence needs. An autonomous personality 
style is believed to increase the likelihood of depressive reactions in 
the face of events that threaten one's goal attainment.
Relations between the aforementioned depressogenic cognitive 
styles and hopelessness expectancies are thought to be moderated by the 
occurrence of negative life events and the inferences drawn from those 
events. As such, hopelessness theory is regarded as a diathesis-stress 
model of depression. Depressogenic cognitive styles serve as "cognitive 
diatheses" that increase the likelihood of depression only in the 
presence of life stress. In the absence of negative life events (or in 
the presence of positive life events), individuals who exhibit the 
hypothesized inferential styles should be no more hopeless or depressed 
than individuals who do not exhibit those cognitive styles.
A note about the proposed symptoms and clinical course of 
hopelessness depression is also in order. The constellation of symptoms 
believed to characterize hopelessness depression includes the 
motivational and affective deficits originally discussed by Seligman 
(1975) and subsequently retained in the (1978) reformulation. According 
to the current statement, psychomotor decrements stem from the 
helplessness component of the hopelessness expectancy. Depressed or sad 
mood, on the other hand, stems from the negative outcome expectancies 
accompanying hopelessness. The cognitive deficit (i.e., negative 
cognitive set) discussed in the original and reformulated models is no 
longer included in the symptom constellation comprising hopelessness 
depression. According to Abramson et al. (1978), Its exclusion is based
on evidence suggesting that depressives do not erroneously underestimate 
the degree of control they have over outcomes. Rather, nondepressives 
appear to distort optimistically their degree of control, perceiving 
personal control over outcomes when none exists in reality (cf. Alloy & 
Abramson, 1979, 1988; Taylor & Brown, 1988).
Abramson et al. (1989) suggest that hopelessness depression might 
also be characterized by rumination and consequent disturbances in 
concentration and sleep. Furthermore, research by Beck (e.g., Beck, 
Kovacs, & Weismann, 1975) has shown that hopelessness expectancies are 
strong predictors of suicidal ideation and suicide attempts. As such, 
the latter are also considered likely concomitants of hopelessness 
depression.
Finally, Abramson et al. (1988) make predictions as to when self­
esteem loss will he present amid the other symptoms of hopelessness 
depression. In contrast to the reformulation which held that self­
esteem deficits stem exclusively from internal attributions, 
hopelessness theory predicts that internal attributions lead to self­
esteem loss only when they are combined with stable and global 
attributions. Self-esteem deficits are not expected to occur when 
negative outcomes (e.g., academic failure) are attributed to causes 
perceived as internal, unstable, and specific (e.g., lack of adequate 
preparation). An alternative route to self-esteem reduction suggested 
by hopelessness theory is the ascription of negative characteristics to 
the self in response to the occurrence of a negative life event (see 
above discussion of contributory causes of hopelessness).
Hopelessness depression is believed also to have a distinct
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clinical course. Briefly, Abramson et al. (1989) speculate that the 
continued presence of hopelessness expectancies predicts the duration 
(i.e., chronicity) of a given depressive episode. In turn, an 
individual's perceptions regarding the stability of event causes, 
inferred consequences, or inferred self-deficiencies 
might contribute to the maintenance of hopelessness expectancies.
Differences Between Hopelessness Theory and the Reformulated Model of
Helplessness Depression
Several differences between the hopelessness model and the 
reformulated model of helplessness depression were mentioned in the 
preceding discussion. Because of their importance to the present 
research, the differences between the two models are elaborated and more 
completely discussed below.
First, and perhaps most striking, Abramson et al. (1989) 
eliminated perceived uncontrollability from the etiological sequence 
leading to hopelessness depression. Hopelessness theory does not 
require negative events to be perceived as uncontrollable in order for 
hopelessness expectancies and depressive symptoms to emerge. As 
discussed above, a perceived lack of control over negative outcomes was 
central to both Seligman's (1975) original theory of learned 
helplessness and to the 1978 reformulated theory of helplessness. 
According to Seligman, exposure to uncontrollable outcomes directly 
precipitates helplessness expectancies. In the reformulation, exposure 
to uncontrollable negative outcomes brings about helplessness 
expectancies only when those outcomes are attributed to internal, 
stable, and global causes.
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According to hopelessness theory, perceiving negative events as 
uncontrollable is no longer a necessary prerequisite for the formation 
of hopelessness expectancies. Abramson et al. (1989) specifically 
assert that,
In contrast to the 1978 reformulation (but consistent with later 
statements such as those of Peterson & Seligman, 1984), we begin 
the etiological chain with the perceived occurrence of a negative 
life event, rather than an uncontrollable event, because the logic 
of the hopelessness theory requires only the occurrence of the 
former, rather than the latter, to initiate the series of causes 
hypothesized to culminate in hopelessness and, in turn, the 
symptoms of hopelessness depression ... (p. 360).
Other than the above statement, Abramson et al, (1989) offer no 
empirical or theoretical rationale for hopelessness theory's elimination 
of perceived uncontrollability (nor did Peterson and Seligman, 1984).
It appears to be based only on the assumption that stressful life 
events, combined with the hypothesized depressogenic inferences, are 
sufficient conditions for the development of hopelessness expectancies, 
regardless of the perceived controllability of those events.
Contrary to Abramson et al.'s (1989) recent assumptions, however, 
the results of recent investigations demonstrate the importance of 
perceived uncontrollability to the onset of depressive symptomatology. 
Several researchers (Benassi, Sweeney, & Asdigian, 1990; Brown & Siegel, 
1988; Pagel, Becker, & Coppel, 1985) have shown that individuals who 
attribute negative events to internal, stable and/or global causes 
exhibit elevated levels of depressive symptoms only when those events 
are perceived as relatively uncontrollable. Attributions for negative 
events perceived as controllable were not associated with elevated 
levels of depressive symptomatology. These results suggest that 
Abramson et al.'s removal of perceived uncontrollability from the
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hopelessness model is unwarranted. Instead, perceiving a lack of 
control over negative events might indeed be a necessary precursor of 
hopelessness expectancies, and thus to the symptoms associated with 
hopelessness depression.
Whereas perceived uncontrollability has been removed, other 
variables not previously included in the reformulation have been 
incorporated into the hopelessness model. Unlike the reformulation, the 
current model no longer regards causal attributions as the sole 
predictors of hopelessness expectancies, nor does it propose that 
attributional style is exclusive in rendering individuals vulnerable to 
depressive symptoms.
With respect to the former, the current statement suggests that 
expectations of negative consequences and inferred personal 
deficiencies, in addition to stable and global causal attributions for 
negative life events, might also lead to hopelessness expectancies. 
Numerous investigations have demonstrated a relation between depressive 
symptoms and stable and global causal attributions for negative events 
(e.g., Benassi et al., 1990; Brown & Siegel, 1988; Follete & Jacobson, 
1987; Metalsky et al., 1987, but see above for conditions under which 
this relation is not obtained). There is little evidence available, 
however, with which to evaluate the latter two predictions.
In support of the moderating effects of Inferred negative 
consequences, Abramson et al. (1989) cite several investigations 
conducted by Hammen and associates (i.e., Gong-Guy & Hammen, 1980,
Hammen & Cochran, 1981) which purport to demonstrate a relation between 
expectations of negative consequences and depressive symptomatology. A
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close examination of the measures used in those studies, however, 
suggests that inferred negative consequences might not have been 
adequately assessed. For example, Gong-Guy and Hammen (1980) and Hammen 
and Cochran (1981) found that, relative to nondepressives, depressed 
subjects perceived recent life stressors as causing a greater degree of 
uncertainty in their lives. Based only on subjects' responses to this 
measure, the authors suggested that cognitions about the consequences of 
stressful life events play a role in the onset of depressive symptoms.
This conclusion appears premature given that the single-item 
measure of life uncertainty used in each study might not adequately 
reflect expectations concerning the negative consequences of stressful 
life experiences. Moreover, the cross-sectional nature of these studies 
leaves open the possibility that perceived life uncertainty is a 
consequence rather than an antecedent of depressive symptomatology. 
Although suggestive, the findings obtained by Hammen and colleagues do 
not provide unequivocal support for the hypothesized effects of inferred 
negative consequences. A more definitive test of this component of 
hopelessness theory is thus required.
The model's predictions regarding the etiological role of inferred 
negative self-characteristics are likewise in need of evaluation. As 
the basis for these predictions, Abramson et al. (1989) cite clinical 
evidence that depressed patients engage in self-derogation and infer 
personal deficiencies when they experience negative events (e.g., 
inferring that one is worthless upon the termination of an important 
relationship, p. 361). From this evidence, of course, it is impossible 
to determine whether such inferences serve as causes or consequences of
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depressed affect. Abramson et al.'s notion of inferred negative self­
characteristics appears conceptually similar to the notion of self­
blame. Although self-blame is believed by some to be a symptom of 
depression (Beck, 1967), the precise role of self-blame in depression 
remains equivocal (cf. Shaver & Drown, 1986). The ability of inferred 
personal deficiencies to predict future depressive affect (or more 
specifically, the development of hopelessness expectancies) needs to be 
established in order for the model's predictions to be supported.
The diathesis-stress component of the hopelessness model has also 
been expanded to include cognitive styles other than the depressogenic 
attributional style as vulnerability factors for depression. The 
predictions that Abramson et al. (1989) do make about attributional 
style, however, are similar to those advanced by the reformulation 
(except for hopelessness theory's exclusion of the internality dimension 
as a risk factor). As discussed above, hopelessness theory predicts 
that stable and global attributions for specific negative events are 
more probable among individuals who are predisposed to attribute 
negative events to stable and global causes. As such, this subset of 
individuals is at greater risk of becoming hopeless and therefore 
depressed when specific negative events are encountered.
Abramson et al. (1989) additionally suggest that some individuals 
might habitually infer either negative consequences or personal 
deficiencies in response to a variety of negative events. According to 
hopelessness theory, these individuals are likely to make similar 
inferences in response to specific negative events and are therefore at 
risk of becoming hopeless. Abramson et al. liken these inferential
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styles to Beck's (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) notion of 
depressogenic assumptions and to Ellis' (1977) notion of irrational 
beliefs, both of which are described below.
According to Beck et al. (1979), depressogenic assumptions reflect 
deeply ingrained, maladaptive beliefs that predispose individuals to 
depression (p. 244). These beliefs primarily take the form of "personal 
contracts" or contingencies specifying the conditions required for 
happiness and perceived self-worth. Beck et al. (1979, p. 246) offered 
examples of the types of dysfunctional beliefs that foster depressive 
reactions, including the following: "In order to be happy, I have to be
successful in whatever I do"; "To be happy, I must be accepted by all 
people at all times"; and "If I make a mistake, it means that I am 
inept." Note that each of the above statements implies that one's value 
depends on prespecified external factors (e.g., being successful in 
one's endeavors, being regarded highly by others) (cf. Olinger, Kuiper,
& Shaw, 1987).
Beck argued that the above beliefs, and others like them, lay the 
groundwork for depressive affect because they require excessively 
demanding conditions that frequently can not be met. Furthermore, they 
are vaguely defined (e.g., "success") and therefore might never be fully 
satisfied. When those conditions are not met (e.g., when failure or 
rejection is encountered), the individual's sense of self-worth or 
personal security Is severely threatened and extreme reactions of 
depressed affect are likely to result.
Although not explicitly framed in terms of a diathesis-stress 
model, Beck's cognitive theory of depression clearly conforms to such a
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model (cf. Abramson et al., 1990). For example, Beck et al. (1979, p. 
270) suggest that dysfunctional beliefs by themselves do not lead to 
negative affect. Individuals who adopt such beliefs function quite well 
when they encounter acceptance, love, success, etc.; they are at risk 
for depression only when those factors are absent or are removed. 
Moreover, Beck et al. (1979, p. 16) do not regard life stressors by 
themselves to be sufficient for extreme depressive reactions. Such 
reactions are expected only among individuals who interpret life 
stressors through negativistic or depressogenic schemas. Thus, Beck's 
conception of depressogenic assumptions as vulnerability factors for 
depressive symptomatology provides a theoretical basis for including 
such beliefs among the other cognitive diatheses specified by 
hopelessness theory.
Beck et al. (1979) additionally suggested that depressogenic 
assumptions underlie various information processing errors that serve to 
distort the depressive's interpretations of her experiences. The errors 
outlined by Beck include such things as: 1.) drawing extreme conclusions 
based on limited information (i.e., overgeneralization), 2.) magnifying 
the significance of negative events while minimizing that of positive 
events, 3.) thinking in absolutist and dichotomous terms (e.g., people 
are either perfect or a failure), 4.) expecting severe consequences when 
bad things happen (i.e., catastrophizing), 5.) accepting excessive 
personal responsibility for negative events (i.e., personal causality), 
6.) inappropriately expecting the persistence of negative events (i.e., 
temporal causality), and 7.) making excessively punitive and moralistic 
judgments about the self. These illogical thought patterns are believed
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to follow from the inappropriate contingencies dictated by the 
depressive's maladaptive beliefs. For example, a person who believes 
that making mistakes renders one inept is likely to infer, upon making a 
mistake, that she is indeed inept or completely incapable, and therefore 
will never be able function competently at important tasks or achieve 
desired goals. These interpretive distortions contribute to the 
negative cognitive triad, which according to Beck, directly precipitates 
depressive symptomatology.
The cognitive errors that Beck ascribes to depressives appear 
similar to the negativistic inferences that contribute to hopelessness 
expectancies in Abramson et al.'s (1989) model. For example, 
"catastrophizing" is analogous to expecting negative consequences to 
result from specific negative events. Likewise, harsh moralistic and 
punitive self-judgments are analogous to inferring personal deficiencies 
from negative life events. Furthermore, Beck's conception of the 
relationship between depressogenic assumptions and cognitive errors is 
similar to (and provides theoretical support for) Abramson et al.'s 
suggestion that individuals who hold dysfunctional assumptions are 
likely to make the depressogenic inferences that contribute to 
hopelessness.
As with depressogenic assumptions, Abramson et al. (1989) suggest 
that irrational beliefs (Ellis, 1977) are similar to the dysfunctional 
inferential styles that serve as vulnerability factors in the 
hopelessness model. The notion of irrational beliefs is at the heart of 
Ellis' Rational-Emotive Therapy (R-ET) as well as the theory of 
psychopathology upon which R-ET is based. Ellis (1977) contends that
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illogical beliefs or thoughts about negative environmental events, and 
not the events themselves, are the primary causes of emotional 
disturbance (including, but not limited to, severe depressive affect).
Ellis (1977, p. 10) suggested that most irrational beliefs can be 
subsumed under the following categories 1.) unrealistic and absolutist 
demands regarding what the self, others, and world "should" and/or 
"must" be like; 2.) "awfulizing" beliefs regarding how terrible it is 
when people (including the self) or conditions deviate from what they 
should or must be like; 3.) beliefs regarding one's inability to 
tolerate conditions that deviate from what they should or must be like 
(i.e., "i-can't-stand-its"); and 4.) beliefs regarding how terrible 
people (including oneself) are when they fail to behave as they should 
or must behave. Ellis' (1977) conception of the nature and emotional 
consequences of irrational beliefs lends support to Abramson et al.'s 
(1989) contention that such beliefs predispose individuals to depressive 
affect. To a large extent, Ellis believes that irrational thinking 
reflects tendencies to overgeneralize from the data at hand and 
negatively distort objective realities. Accordingly, he suggests that 
many irrational thoughts involve, "unempirical or unrealistic 
statements," and "irrational or illogical conclusions from limited data" 
(p. 8). Irrational thinking might lead a person to conclude, for 
example, that because certain environmental conditions are currently 
undesirable, they will always be undesirable, or that because another 
person has behaved badly, s/he is a bad person. Irrational thinkers 
place overly stringent demands on themselves, others, and their 
environments. They overestimate or overgeneralize the "awfulness" of
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negative events as well as the "awfulness" of people (including 
themselves) who do not live up to their lofty standards. Individuals 
who advocate irrational beliefs should therefore be highly likely to 
expect negative consequences and/or infer personal deficiencies when 
they encounter life stressors, as is suggested by hopelessness theory.
An additional difference between the reformulation and 
hopelessness theory concerns the precursors of self-esteem deficits.
The reformulation suggested that the internal-external attributional 
dimension was uniquely and independently predictive of self-esteem 
deficits. Individuals who made internal attributions for negative 
outcomes were predicted to experience self-esteem loss, regardless of 
the stability or globality of those attributions. The hopelessness 
model, however, no longer regards internal attributions as sufficient 
for the appearance of self-esteem loss among depressives. Self-esteem 
deficits are now believed to result only when negative events are 
attributed to internal causes that are also perceived as stable and 
global. Hopelessness theory makes the following predictions regarding 
symptomatology associated with causal attributions: 1.) attributing 
negative life events to stable and global causes leads to the formation 
of a hopelessness expectancy, which in turn, leads to depressed affect, 
motoric lethargy, concentration difficulties, insomnia, etc, and 2.) 
attributing negative life events to internal. stable, and global causes 
predicts the occurrence of hopelessness expectancies, the symptom 
constellation described above, and self-esteem loss.
Abramson et al. (1989) instituted this revision in response to 
evidence indicating that internal attributions are sometimes associated
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with positive emotional and behavioral outcomes. Dweck (1975), for 
example, encouraged helplessness-prone children to attribute academic 
failures to low effort (an internal but unstable cause) . Children who 
received this attributional retraining after initial failure experiences 
perservered in the face of subsequent academic failure to a greater 
extent than did children who experienced initial task success. These 
results suggest that internal attributions might sometimes be associated 
with hopefulness rather than hopelessness, and thus lend support to the 
revised predictions presented by hopelessness theory.
The results of the few studies that have actually examined 
attributional precursors to self-esteem loss favor Abramson et al.'s 
(1989) current predictions over those made by the reformulated model.
For example, both Zautra, Guenther, and Chartier (1985) and Brewin and 
Furnham (1986) failed to observe a unique relation between internal 
attributions and self-esteem loss. Zautra et al. found that internal, 
stable, and global attributions for both hypothetical (i.e., ASQ) and 
real negative events were each significantly associated with self-esteem 
deficits. Subsequent analyses showed that internal attributions 
correlated significantly with self-esteem when those attributions were 
relatively stable but not when they were relatively unstable. Using a 
regression approach, Brewin and Furnham (1986) found that both internal 
and global attributions were uniquely related to low self-esteem.
Although the evidence presented above is consistent with Abramson 
et al.'s (1989) most recent predictions regarding self-esteem loss, a 
more direct evaluation of the competing predictions is necessary before 
the revision is ultimately verified. Abramson et al.'s (1989)
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additional speculation that self-esteem deficits stem from inferred 
personal deficiencies is also in need of assessment.
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I. METHODOLOGY
The present investigation was designed to test the etiological 
postulates of the hopelessness theory of depression (Abramson et al,, 
1989) and to evaluate the divergent predictions made by the hopelessness 
and reformulated learned helplessness models (Abramson et al., 1978) of 
depression. To achieve these research objectives, a two-wave 
longitudinal methodology was used in which subjects responded to 
measures of each construct in the two models over a three week period. 
During the first assessment session, subjects responded to measures of 
dysfunctional cognitive styles, self-esteem, hopelessness expectancies, 
and depressive symptomatology. Measures of life stress, event-based 
inferences and cognitions, self-esteem, hopelessness, and depressive 
symptoms were administered three weeks later when subjects returned for 
the follow-up assessment session.
Regression analyses were conducted to examine the degree to which 
higher levels of maladaptive cognitive styles and event-based cognitions 
were associated with T1 to T2 increases in depressive symptomatology 
among subjects who experienced highly stressful life events. Additional 
tests evaluated hypotheses concerning the mediational roles of event- 
cognitions and hopelessness expectancies as well as those regarding the 
cognitive precursors of self-esteem deficits. The role of perceived 
control in moderating the effects of life stress was assessed by 
performing the primary analyses separately for subjects who perceived
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their most upsetting stressors as relatively controllable and as 
relatively uncontrollable.
Research Participants 
Two hundred forty seven (94 male and 153 female) undergraduates 
enrolled in Introductory Psychology classes at the University of New 
Hampshire participated in exchange for course credit. The hopelessness 
model is appropriately tested using a sample of nondepressed college- 
student subjects (rather than clinically depressed patients) for several 
reasons. First, hopelessness theory addresses Itself to the etiology of 
depressive symptoms and can therefore be adequately assessed only by 
using a sample of initially nondepressed subjects. Second, as mentioned 
above, the hopelessness model is an etiological theory of moderate 
depressive reactions as well as depressive episodes of a more severe 
nature (cf. Metalsky et al., 1982). The depressive reactions that 
nonclinical student populations exhibit in response to life stressors 
are thus appropriately used in an evaluation of hopelessness theory (cf. 
Vredenburg, Flett, & Krames, 1993).
Materials
Dysfunctional Cognitive Styles
Attributional Stvle. Generalized tendencies to attribute negative 
achievement and interpersonal events to stable and global causes were 
assessed using Metalksy et al.'s (1987) Expanded Attributional Style 
Questionnaire (EASQ). In contrast to the original ASQ (Peterson et al, 
1982; Seligman et al., 1979) which includes six positive and six 
negative hypothetical events, the EASQ is comprised of 12 hypothetical 
negative events. Six of the EASQ events fall in the achievement domain
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(e.g., "You take an exam and receive a low grade on it") and the 
remaining six fall in the interpersonal domain (e.g., "Your relationship 
with your boyfriend/girlfriend ends even though you would like it to 
continue).
For each event on the EASQ, subjects wrote down the one major 
factor that would have caused it. They then rated each causal factor on 
seven-point bipolar externality-internality, instability-stability, and 
specificity-globality subscales. Responses to each subscale were summed 
across the six achievement events and across the six interpersonal 
events to yield total achievement-domain and interpersonal-domain EASQ 
scores on each attributional dimension. Total subscale scores can 
therefore range from six to 42, with higher scores reflecting stronger 
tendencies to attribute negative events to internal, stable, and global 
causes.
The EASQ was developed, in part, to bolster the low subscale 
reliabilities typically obtained using the original ASQ (cf., Peterson & 
Seligman, 1984). Metalsky et al. (1987) noted high internal consistency 
coefficients for composite stability and globality indexes in both the 
achievement (alpha — .77) and interpersonal (alpha — .79) domains. 
Metalsky et al. also demonstrated that scores on the EASQ are highly 
correlated with the attributions that college students make for specific 
negative events. They obtained a correlation of r - .60 between 
composite stability and globality scores in the achievement domain and 
scores on an analogous composite assessing causal attributions for 
failure on an important course exam. Consistent with the hopelessness 
model's specific vulnerability hypothesis (see above), attributions for
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exam failure were less strongly correlated (r - .30, £ > .10) with 
scores on the interpersonal-domain stability/ globality composite.
These data suggest that EASQ is both a reliable and valid measure of 
attributional styles in the achievement and interpersonal domains.
Dysfunctional Attitudes. Subjects also responded to Wiessman's 
(1979) Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS-Form A). The items on the DAS 
were derived from clinical reports of the thought content of depressed 
patients and include 40 statements such as: "I must be a useful, 
productive, creative person or life has no purpose," "A person should 
think less of himself if other people do not accept him," and "If I fail 
at my work, then I am a failure as a person." Subjects used seven-point 
(strongly disagree to strongly agree) Likert scales to indicate their 
level of agreement with each statement. Total scores can range from 40- 
280, with higher scores reflecting more dysfunctional attitudes.
Although Weissman (1979) demonstrated that the original 100-item 
DAS was multi-factorial, she reported alpha coefficients of .86 and .87 
for both 40-item versions of this measure. Dobson and Breiter (1983) 
obtained comparable reliability coefficients for males (alpha - .90) and 
for females (alpha - .88). In addition to being a reliable measure of 
depressogenic assumptions, the DAS has been shown to correlate in 
theoretically predicted ways with measures of depression-related 
cognitions and depressive symptomatology. Using a college-student 
sample, Weissman (1979) obtained a correlation of r - .52 between DAS 
scores and scores on Krantz and Hammen's (1976) Story Completion Test of 
cognitive distortion. Dobson and Breiter (1983) observed significant 
correlations (r - .43 for males; r - .36 for females) between DAS scores
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and scores on Hollon and Kendall's (1980) Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire. In addition, Weissman (1979) and Dobson and Breiter 
(1983) found DAS scores to correlate between .30 and .36 with scores on 
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & 
Erbaugh, 1961).
Irrational Beliefs. Kassinove, Crisci, and Tiegerman's (1977) 33- 
item Idea Inventory (Idl) was used to measure irrational beliefs falling 
in three of the four categories described by Ellis (1977): 1.) 
unrealistic demands (i.e., "shoulds" and "musts"); 2.) awfulizing 
statements, and 3.) blame and self-derogation. The Idl consists of 
Ellis' 11 original irrational beliefs and two additional statements 
corresponding to each of the original beliefs. Example statements on 
the Idl include: "People need the love or approval of almost everyone 
one they consider important" (one of Ellis' original irrational 
beliefs), "I feel inadequate and worthless when I fail at school or 
work," and "I cant help but feel depressed and rejected when others let 
me down." Responses to each item were recorded on Likert scales ranging 
from 1 (disagree) to 3 (agree). Total Idl scores can range from 33 to 
99, with higher scores reflecting stronger irrational ideation.
To assess the internal consistency of the Idl, Kassinove et al.
(1977) correlated each third of the total inventory with each of the 
other two-thirds and obtained reliability coefficients ranging from .84 
to .91. Vestre (1983) administered the Idl to a sample of college 
students on two occasions separated by a 4-week interval and obtained a 
test-retest reliability coefficient of .81. Also using a college- 
student sample, Kassinove et al. found that Idl scores (reverse coded in
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their study) correlated negatively with neuroticism (r - - .57) and 
adjustment (rs ranging from -.35 to -.58) scores. With respect to 
depressive symptomatology, Vestre and Budd (1980; cited in Vestre, 1983) 
obtained a significant correlation of -.40 between Idl and BDI scores. 
Finally, Vestre (1983) found that relative to low and moderate scorers, 
high Idl scorers exhibited the most Intense levels of negative affect 
across a 2-4 week time period.
Overgeneralization. The seven-item Overgeneralization subscale of 
Carver and Ganellen's (1983) Attitudes Toward Self Scale (ATS) was 
included as a measure of tendencies to generalize the implications of 
specific negative events to one's self worth. The Overgeneralization 
index was developed to assess one aspect of self-punitiveness that 
appears to overlap with the tendency, described to Abramson et al.
(1988), to perceive personal deficiencies in response to life stressors. 
Subscale items include statements such as "How I feel about myself 
overall is easily influenced by a single mistake," and "When even one 
thing goes wrong I begin to feel bad and wonder If I can do well at 
anything." Subjects used a five-point Likert scale to rate the extent 
of their agreement with each statement. Scores on this measure can 
range from 7-35 with higher scores reflect stronger overgeneralizing 
tendencies.
In Carver and Ganellen's (1983) factor analysis of the ATS (which 
also includes subscales assessing self-imposed high standards and self- 
criticism), all Overgeneralization items loaded onto a single factor -- 
with an alpha coefficient of .82. In addition, of the three ATS 
subscales, only Overgeneralization was significantly associated with
concurrently measured depressive symptomatology levels, accounting for 
23% of the variance in BDI scores among college undergraduates. Similar 
results using the ATS were obtained in a subsequent investigation 
conducted by Carver, La Voie, Kuhl, and Ganellen (1988). In addition, 
Ganellen (1988) reported that Overgeneralization was uniquely associated 
with depressive symptomatology--subscale scores continued to predict 
clinical ratings of depressive symptoms after controlling for levels of 
anxiety.
Locus of Control. Generalized control expectancies were assessed 
using the Powerful Others and Chance subscales of Levenson's (1981) 
multidimensional Locus of Control Scale. The eight-item Powerful Others 
scale measures the degree to which outcomes are believed to be 
controlled by people in positions of power (e.g., "Although I may have 
good ability, I will not be given leadership responsibility without 
appealing to those in positions of power"). The eight-item Chance scale 
measures the degree to which events are perceived to be random (e.g., 
Whether or not I get to be a leader depends on whether I'm lucky enough 
to be in the right place at the right time"). Subjects rated the extent 
of their agreement with each statement on six-point Likert scales such 
that higher scores reflected a more external control orientation. A 
composite locus of control measure, with a possible score range of 16 to 
96, was created by summing responses across all 16 items.2 
Stressful Achievement and Interpersonal Life Events
An Achievement Events Questionnaire (AEQ) and an Interpersonal 
Events Questionnaire (IEQ) were developed to assess the recent 
occurrence and perceived stressfulness of a variety of negative
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achievement and interpersonal events, respectively. Both questionnaires 
were adapted from several published life-stress measures, including 
Cochrane and Robertson's (1973) Life Events Inventory (LEI), Sarason, 
Johnson, and Siegel's (1978) Life Experiences Survey (LES), and 
Andersen's (1990) Life Events Questionnaire (LEQ). Numerous researchers 
have demonstrated that life-stress scores derived from the above 
inventories (by themselves and/or In combination with various measures 
of cognitive styles) successfully predict depressive symptomatology 
(e.g., Andersen, 1990; Hammen, Marks, Mayol, and de Mayo, 1985; Olinger 
et al., 1987; Robins & Block, 1988; Wise & Barnes, 1986). In developing 
the AEQ and the IEQ, only negative events relevant to the experiences of 
college students were selected from existing inventories. In addition, 
events were chosen such that they clearly fell into either achievement 
or interpersonal domains and did not overlap in content. Several 
events, not listed on any of the existing life stress measures, were 
also added. Finally, a scale on which subjects could rate the degree of 
stress associated with life events was adapted from Sarason et al.'s
(1978) LES.
The AEQ consists of 16 negative achievement events typically 
encountered by students in their first semester or year of college. 
Example events include: "I received a lower grade on an exam or paper 
than anticipated," "I am having trouble adjusting to the academic life 
at college (e.g., workload, time-management, effective study habits), "I 
chose a college major but now I realize that I do not like It," and "I 
am having difficulty balancing school responsibilities with my other 
commitments (e.g., job, sports, clubs, fraternity or sorority)." The
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IEQ lists 20 negative interpersonal events typical of the same 
population. Example events from the IEQ include: "I am having 
difficulty adjusting to the social life at college (e.g., difficulty 
making friends or "fitting in")," "I was rejected by someone I am 
attracted to," and "I had an argument/disagreement with a friend."
On each inventory, subjects placed a check next to each event they 
experienced in the three weeks since the first assessment session. 
Additional space was provided for subjects to write in up to five 
negative events that they experienced during the same time period but 
which were not listed on the inventory. Subjects were also asked to 
rate the degree of stress associated with each event that was either 
checked or written in. Stress ratings were made on seven-point Likert 
scales ranging from 1 (not at all stressful) to 7 (extremely stressful) 
(cf. Sarason et al., 1978). On both the AEQ and the IEQ, subjects were 
asked to select the one event that they experienced as most stressful 
and indicate (on two seven-point Likert scales) how important the event 
was to them.
Deoressogenic Inferences: Perceived Control. Expected Consequences. 
Personal Deficiencies. Self-Blame, and Causal Attributions
For their most upsetting achievement and interpersonal stressor, 
subjects completed four-Item measures of perceived control, expected 
negative consequences, perceived personal deficiencies, behavioral 
blame, and characterological blame. Subjects were also asked to 
identify the one major cause of their most stressful achievement and 
interpersonal event and to rate each cause on four-item scales assessing 
the attributional dimensions of internality-externality, stability-
instability, and globality-specificity. Ratings on each of these 
measures were made on seven-point Likert scales, anchored such that high 
scores reflect more depressogenic responses.
Hopelessness Expectancies
Generalized hopelessness expectancies were assessed with the Beck 
Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck et al,, 1974, Beck & Steer, 1988). The
BHS consists of 20 clinically-derived statements reflecting both
pessimistic and optimistic attitudes toward the future (e.g., "I might 
as well give up because there is nothing I can do about making things 
better for myself," "When I look ahead to the future, I expect that I 
will be happier than I am now"). Subjects provided true (coded as "1") 
or false (coded as "0") responses depending on whether each statement 
described their feelings or attitudes throughout the past week.
Responses to the positively keyed (optimistic) items were reverse scored
so that higher BHS scores (which can range from 0-20) reflected higher 
levels of hopelessness.
Beck and Steer (1988) reviewed the results of numerous studies 
that examined the psychometric properties of the BHS and reported 
internal consistency coefficients ranging from .82 to .93 as well as 
test-retest correlations of .69 (one week) and .66 (six weeks). They 
also found that BHS scores correlate significantly with clinical ratings 
of hopelessness (rs ranging from .62 to .74), severity of depressive 
symptomatology (rs ranging from .46 to .76), and scores on a BDI-item 
assessing pessimism toward the future (rs ranging from .42 to .74).
Beck et al. (1974) factor analyzed BHS data obtained in a sample 
of suicide attempters and observed three dimensions respectively
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reflecting feelings about the future, loss of motivation, and future 
expectations. These factors overlap sufficiently with the helplessness 
and negative outcome expectancy components of the proposed proximal 
cause of hopelessness depression.
Affect and Self-Esteem Measures
Depressive Symptomatology. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; 
Beck et al., 1979) was used to measure the symptomatology associated 
with hopelessness depression. The BDI is a widely used instrument that 
assesses the severity with which individuals experience a variety of 
somatic, motivational, emotional, and cognitive symptoms of depression. 
It consists of 21 sets of four statements that reflect increasingly 
severe levels of depressive symptoms (e.g., (a) "I do not feel sad," (b) 
"I feel sad," (c) "I am sad all the time and I can't snap out of it,"
(d) "I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it"). Subjects were 
asked to choose the one statement in each set that best represented how 
they felt during the previous week. Each response was coded on a 4- 
point scale ranging from 0 (least severe statement) to 3 (most severe 
statement). Total scores on the 21-item inventory can range from 0 to 
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Using meta-analytic techniques, Beck, Steer, and Garbin (1988) 
reviewed studies conducted over the past 25 years that evaluated the 
psychometric properties of the BDI. The results of their review 
revealed that the BDI provides a reliable and valid indicator of 
depressive symptoms in both psychiatric and nonpsychiatric populations. 
Among the latter, the mean alpha coefficient associated with the BDI was 
.81. Beck et al. (1988) reported stability coefficients for the BDI
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ranging from .60 to .90 in nonpsychiatric samples. In addition, Oliver 
and Burkham (1979) reported a test-retest reliability coefficient of .78 
for BDI scores assessed across a three-week interval in a college - 
student sample.
Beck et al.'s (1988) analysis also showed that BDI scores obtained 
by nonpsychiatric respondents are highly correlated with clinical 
ratings of depression (rs range from .60 to .80) and scores on other 
self-report depression inventories (rs range from .60 to .86). Looking 
specifically at college students, Bumberry, Oliver, and McClure (1978) 
reported that BDI scores correlated .77 with symptom ratings obtained 
concurrently from psychiatric interviews. Using a similar procedure, 
Hammen (1980) obtained a correlation of .80. These data indicate that 
the BDI provides a valid assessment of the severity of depressive 
symptoms experienced by subjects sampled from college-student 
populations.
Self-Esteem Deficits. Rosenberg's (1965) Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) 
was used to measure levels of self-esteem. The RSES is a brief (10 
items) but widely used inventory that primarily assesses a self- 
acceptance component of self-esteem. Using a five-point Likert scale, 
subjects indicated the extent of their agreement with statements such 
as, "I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with 
others," and "All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am failure."
Scale values ranged from 1 (extremely true) to 5 (extremely untrue), 
yielding a possible score distribution of 10-50. Higher scores reflect 
higher self-esteem.
Robinson and Shaver (1973) reported that the RSES is both reliable
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over time (.85) and internally consistent (.92). Zautra et al. (1985) 
administered the RSES to college students on two occasions separated by 
a two-week interval and reported a test-retest reliability coefficient 
of r - .81. With respect to concurrent validity, RSES scores have been 
shown to correlate between .27 and .83 with other self-report measures 
of self-esteem and with clinical ratings of self-esteem (Robinson & 
Shaver, 1973). Zautra et al. (1985) obtained correlations of ,45 and 
.58 between the RSES and two depression inventories (one of which was 
the BDI). Zautra et al. also demonstrated that the two depression 
measures used in their research correlated significantly more highly 
with one another than they did with the RSES. The latter suggests that 
scores on the RSES reflect more than depressed or negative affect.
Procedure
Subjects participated in two assessment sessions in mixed sex 
groups of approximately 15. The initial two-hour sessions were 
conducted during October and November of 1991. Follow-up sessions, 
requiring only one-hour of time, were held three weeks later. The 
nature and participation requirements of the study were described to 
subjects at the outset of the initial session. Subjects were asked to 
sign informed consent forms as an indication of their willingness to 
participate in this research. Subjects then received folders containing 
all of the measures to be completed during the session as well as answer 
sheets for their responses.
During the first assessment session, subjects completed measures 
in the following order: EASQ, BDI, DAS, Idl, BHS, RSES, ATS-OVERGEN, and 
LOC. At the follow-up session, the measures were ordered in the
61
following way: BHS, RSES, BDI, AEQ, and IEQ. Written instructions were 
available for each measure and additional oral instructions were 
provided for several of the measures (EASQ, AEQ, and IEQ). Subjects 
responded to each measure at their own pace and were allowed to take 
rest breaks as needed.
After completing their participation in both assessment sessions, 
subjects received a written debriefing statement describing the purpose 
of this research as well as the nature of the materials they completed. 
The debriefing statement included my name and phone number and subjects 
were encouraged to contact me if they wanted to discuss the nature or 
results of this research in the future.
62
II. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive and Reliability Data 
Means, medians, standard deviations, and coefficient alpha 
reliabilities for the Time 1 (Tl) measures of dysfunctional cognitive 
style, the Time 2 (T2) event stress and event cognition measures, and 
the Tl and T2 hopelessness, mood, and self-esteem scales for subjects 
who completed both sessions are presented in Tables 1 through 4, 
respectively. Scores on the stability and globality subscales of the 
Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire (EASQ; Metalsky et al., 1987) 
were summed to form "attributional generality" scales in the achievement 
and interpersonal domains (see Table 1). Similar composites were 
created from the scales assessing stability and globality attributions 
for subjects' most stressful achievement and interpersonal events (see 
Table 3). The use of these composite attributional scales is consistent 
with hopelessness model's contention that only the stability and 
globality dimensions of causal attributions play a role in the 
development of hopelessness depression (Abramson et al., 1989; Metalsky 
et al., 1982, 1987).
An achievement stress variable was created by multiplying 
subjects' ratings of the stressfulness of their most upsetting 
achievement event by their ratings of the importance of that event. The 
interpersonal stress variable likewise represents the multiplicative 
product of subjects' stressfulness and importance ratings for their most 
upsetting interpersonal event. Methodological as well as theoretical
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Cognitive Stvle Measures
Measure M Mdn SD Alpha N
EASQ-ACGEN 42,40 43.0 10.80 .79 247
EASQ-ACINT 30.20 30.0 4.84 .48 247
EASQ-IPGEN 45.22 45.0 10.03 .72 247
EASQ-IPINT 26.54 26.0 5.08 .41 247
DYSATT 130.39 129.0 20.61 .79 246
IRRIDEAS 65.14 65.0 10.14 .82 243
OVERGEN 19.09 19.0 6.36 .87 244
LOCUS 45.43 46.0 10.91 .82 228
Note. EASO -ACGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire: Achievement 
Events Generality Composite; EASQ-ACINT-Extended Attributional Style 
Questionnaire: Achievement Events Intemality Subscale; EASO- 
IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire: Interpersonal Events 
Generality Composite; EASO-IPINT-Extended Attributional Style 
Questionnaire: Interpersonal Events Internality Subscale;
DYSATT-Dvsfunctional Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS-Irrational Ideas 
Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward 
Self Scale; LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance Locus of Control Composite.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Event Stress Measures
Measure M Mdn SD Alpha N
ACSTRESS 31.09 33.0 12.43 NA 230
IPSTRESS 28.16 27.5 13.35 NA 225




Descriptive Statistics for Achievement- and Interpersonal-Event
Cognition Measures
Measure M Mdn SD Alpha N
AEQ-GEN 6.81 7.0 2.36 .76 231
AEQ-INT A.23 4.5 1.91 .93 231
AEQ-CNS 3.45 3.3 1.58 .87 230
AEQ-DEF 2.64 2.3 1.47 .88 230
AEQ-CNT 3.67 3.8 1.53 .79 230
AEQ-BBL 3.98 4.0 1.88 .86 230
AEQ-CBL 3.17 3.0 1.80 .84 230
IEQ-GEN 7.45 7.3 2.33 .80 221
IEQ-INT 3.39 3.5 1.93 .92 223
IEQ-CNS 3.34 3.5 1.67 .93 225
IEQ-DEF 2.73 2.3 1.68 .91 225
IEQ-CNT 4.78 4.8 1.42 .75 225
IEQ-BBL 3.28 3.0 1.84 .88 225
IEQ-CBL 2.96 2.5 1.82 .88 225
Note. AEQ-Achievement Events Questionnaire; IEO-Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire; GEN—Attributional Generality Subscale; INT— Internality
Subscale; CNS-Expected Consequences Subscale; DEF- Personal Deficiencies




Descriptive Statistics for Time 1 (Til and Time 2 (T21) 
Hopelessness. Depressive Symptom, and Self-Esteem Measures
Measure M Mdn SD Alpha N
Tl BHS 4.24 3.0 3.74 .84 247
T2 BHS 3.88 3.0 3.56 .83 234
Tl BDI 9.57 8.0 6.36 .82 247
T2 BDI 7.88 6.0 6.87 .88 226
Tl RSES 38.65 39.0 7.31 .88 244
T2 RSES 39.97 42.0 7.32 .90 234




considerations guided the construction of the event stress variables in 
this way. With respect to the former, recall that subjects provided 
stress ratings for the one achievement and interpersonal event that they 
experienced as most stressful. Given these instructions, it was not 
surprising to find that the distributions of stress ratings for both 
achievement and interpersonal events were highly negatively skewed 
(skewness - -.824 and -1.04, respectively). Combining stress and 
importance ratings produced event upsettingness variables that were more 
normally distributed. On a theoretical level, the stress measure used 
here is consistent with the claim that the etiological pathway leading 
to hopelessness depression is triggered by the occurrence of a negative 
life event and the perception of that event as important (Abramson et 
al., 1988). Moreover, hopelessness theorists themselves have used a 
similarly constructed stress variable in previous tests of the model 
(Metalsky et al., 1987).3 Inspection of the alpha coefficients in 
Tables 1-4 reveals that all but several of the measures possessed 
adequate levels of internal consistency. The low reliability obtained 
for the internality subscale of the EASQ (see Table 1) proved to be the 
exception to this pattern (see Cutrona, Russell, & Jones, 1984; Peterson 
& Seligman, 1984; Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, & 
Seligman, 1982; Peterson et al., 1985 for similar findings regarding the 
internality dimension of attributional style).
Sub ■} ect-Attrition 
Differences between the 12 subjects who failed to return to the 
follow-up session (noncompleters) and the 235 subjects who participated 
in both sessions (completers) were assessed through a series of
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multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) and correlational analyses 
on the Tl cognitive style, hopelessness, depressive symptom, and self 
esteem measures (cf. Metalsky & Joiner, 1992).4 Noncompleters did not 
differ from completers on any of the Tl measures (all j>s > .33),5 nor 
was completion status significantly correlated with scores on any of the 
Tl measures (rs range from -.05 to .07, ns). These data provide no 
evidence that subject attrition biased the results of this investigation 
in any way.
Test-Retest Reliabilities and Mean Differences Between Scores on the Tl
and T2 Measures
Scores on the hopelessness, depressive symptom, and self esteem 
measures were highly stable across assessment sessions (test-retest 
reliability coefficients - ,64, .63, and .76 respectively). A series of 
repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs), with time of 
administration serving as the within-subjects factor, was conducted to 
examine mean differences in scores on the Tl and T2 measures. Based on a 
Bonferroni correction for the number of tests performed (Kirk, 1984), 
interpretation was restricted to differences that were significant at or 
beyond the p = .017 level.
Using this criterion, T2 BDI scores were significantly lower than 
Tl BDI scores (F [1, 225] - 21.76, g < .001) and T2 RSES scores were 
reliably higher than Tl RSES scores (F [1, 230] - 18.76, £ < .001). The 
reduction in BHS scores from Tl to T2 did not meet the adjusted alpha 
criterion, F (1, 233) - 4.00, £ < .05. The Tl to T2 decreases in 
distress levels that were observed in this study are similar to those 
found by other researchers using student samples (e.g., Barnett &
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Gotlib, 1988) and may reflect, in part, measurement reactivity (cf. 
Zimmerman, 1986).
Gender Differences 
Gender differences on the Tl and T2 measures were evaluated in 
several steps. A one-way between-subjects MANOVA was first performed on 
Tl RSES, BDI, and BHS scores. A significant multivariate effect of 
subject gender emerged in that analysis, F (3, 240) - 2.68, £ < .05).
Due to the magnitude of the intercorrelations among these measures (rs 
range from .54 to .60, all £S < .01), stepdown analysis was used to 
assess the significance of the individual measures.6 Higher priorities 
were given to measures assessing more stable aspects of functioning, 
resulting in the following ordering of measures: RSES, BHS, and BDI. A 
five percent familywise error rate was maintained by setting the alpha 
level for each test to £ — .017.
In accord with the stepdown procedure, gender differences on the 
Tl RSES measure were assessed In a univariate ANOVA. Scores on all 
other measures were examined in separate univariate analyses of 
covariance (ANCOVAs) in which subject gender served as the between- 
groups factor and higher-priority measures were used as covariates. As 
shown in Table 5, the only effect to emerge was a marginally significant 
gender difference in Tl RSES scores. Female subjects reported lower 
levels of self-esteem (M - 37.86) than male subjects (M - 39.94) did. 
Note that after controlling for this difference in self-esteem, males 
and females did not significantly differ in levels of depressive 
symptomatology (adjusted BDI Ms - 9.05 and 9.94, respectively).
Gender differences on the remaining Tl measures were evaluated
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Table 5
Results of Univariate and Stepdown Analyses Assessing Gender







RSES 4.70 1,242 .03 4.70 1,242 .03 .02
BHS 0.50 1,242 .48 0.46 1,241 .50 .002
BDI 4.92 1,242 .03 2.84 1,240 .09 .02
Note. RSES-Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale: BHS-Beck Hopelessness Scale: 
BDI-Beck Depression Inventory.
a Significance levels can not be properly evaluated because tests are 
not independent. The significance levels presented here are those that 
would have been obtained in a univariate context.
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controlling for pre-existing differences in self-esteem. In the first 
analysis, scores on the cognitive style measures were subjected to a 
one-way multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA). Subject gender 
was the between-groups factor and Tl RSES served as a covariate.7 This 
analysis yielded a highly significant gender effect, F (8, 211) - 3.42, 
£ — .001. Due to the moderate to large correlations among most scales 
within this set (see Table 7 below), stepdown analysis was used to 
evaluate the significance of the individual cognitive style measures.
Tl RSES was used as a covariate in all stepdown tests and the cognitive 
style scales were prioritized in the order in which they are listed in 
Table 6. A five percent family-wise error rate was maintained by 
restricting interpretation to differences that were significant at or 
beyond the p - .006 level.
None of the tests met or surpassed this criterion, although a 
number of marginal effects were observed (see Table 6). Relative to 
males, females exhibited a stronger tendency to attribute negative 
achievement outcomes to internal causes (adjusted Ms - 30.64 and 29.29, 
respectively). Conversely, males were more likely than females to make 
stable and global causal attributions for negative achievement outcomes 
(adjusted Ms - 47.56 and 43.75) and for negative interpersonal outcomes 
(adjusted Ms - 47.56 and 43.75). Consistent with observations made in 
other investigations (e.g., Barnett & Gotlib, 1988), females (adjusted M 
- 127.75) scored somewhat lower than males (adjusted M - 133.60) on the 
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale. Finally, Overgeneralization scores were 
slightly higher among females (adjusted M - 19.06) than among males 
(adjusted M - 18.76).
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Table 6
Results of Univariate and Stepdown Analyses Assessing Gender 






EASQ-ACINT 4.19 1,218 .04 4.19 1,218 .04 .02
EASQ-ACGEN 5.00 1,218 .03 4.67 1,217 .03 .02
EASQ-IPINT 3.55 1,218 .06 2.71 1,216 .10 .02
EASQ-IPGEN 8.07 1,218 .01 4.36 1,215 .04 .04
DYSATT 5.39 1,218 .02 3.43 1,214 .07 .02
IRRIDEAS 0.004 1,218 .95 1.83 1,213 .18 .000
OVERGEN 0.25 1,218 .62 3.38 1,212 .07 .001
LOCUS 3.38 1,218 .07 1.88 1,211 .17 .02
Note. EASQ-ACINT-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire: Achievement 
Events Internality Subscale; EASO-ACGEN-Extended Attributional Style 
Questionnaire: Achievement Events Generality Composite; EASO- 
IPINT-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire: Interpersonal Events 
Internality Subscale; EAS0-1PGEN-Extended Attributional Style 
Questionnaire: Interpersonal Events Generality Composite;
DYSATT—Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS—Irrational Ideas 
Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneral1zation Subscale of the Attitudes Toward 
Self Scale; LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance Locus of Control Composite.
a Significance levels can not be properly evaluated because tests are 
not independent. The significance levels presented here are those that 
would have been obtained in a univariate context.
73
Gender differences on the T2 measures of self-esteem, 
hopelessness, and depressive symptomatology were examined in a one-way 
MANCOVA with Tl self-esteem scores used as covariates.® Stepdown 
analysis (measures ordered: 1.) RSES, 2.) BHS, 3.) BDI) revealed that 
the multivariate gender effect found across this set of measures (F [3, 
218] - 3.12, p - .03) was specific to T2 BHS scores. After controlling 
for Tl and T2 levels of self-esteem, males (adjusted BHS M - 4.45) 
exhibited higher levels of hopelessness at T2 than females did (adjusted 
BHS M - 3.45), F (1, 219) - 8.31, p < .01. Gender differences were not 
obtained for either T2 RSES scores (F [1, 220] - 0.47, p - .49) or T2
BDI scores (F [1, 218] - 0.59, p - .44).
Multivariate analysis of the T2 achievement and interpersonal 
event stress measures (controlling for Tl RSES scores) also yielded a 
significant gender difference (F [2, 214] - 3.29, p < .05). Given the 
modest correlation (r - .29) between achievement and interpersonal 
stress, as well as the difficulty of appropriately prioritizing these 
measures, the results of the univariate rather than stepdown tests were 
interpreted. The negative achievement events reported by females were 
rated as more stressful (adjusted M - 32.78) than those reported by 
males (adjusted M - 28.99), F (1, 215) - 4.92, p < .03. A similar, but 
nonsignificant effect emerged in the analysis of interpersonal- event 
stress (adjusted Ms - 29.39 and 26.12 for females and males, 
respectively), F (1, 215) - 3.24, p - .07. Despite these differences in
the perceived stressfulness of life events, scores on the event
cognition measures in the achievement (F [7, 218] - 1.70, p - .11) and 
interpersonal (F [7, 211] - 1.81, p - .09] domains did not reliably
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differ as a function of gender.
Considering the number of measures used in this investigation, 
relatively few gender differences were observed. The differences that 
did emerge generally reflected higher levels of emotional distress among 
women and higher levels of dysfunctional cognition among men. For 
example, females reported lower levels of self-esteem at Tl and higher 
levels of stress associated with the recent occurrence of negative 
achievement and interpersonal events. Males did, however, report higher 
levels of hopelessness at T2 relative to females.
With respect to the cognition measures, males endorsed more 
dysfunctional attitudes than females did and were more likely to 
attribute negative achievement and interpersonal outcomes to stable and 
global causes. Overgeneralization and internalization tendencies, on 
the other hand, were slightly stronger among females. Notwithstanding 
these differences, the results of the gender analyses provided little 
indication that it was necessary to perform the primary analyses 
separately for male and female subjects.
Dysfunctional Cognitive Styles 
Diathesis-Stress Predictions of Hopelessness Theory
A primary tenet of the hopelessness model is that individuals who 
possess certain dysfunctional cognitive styles are at increased risk of 
becoming hopelessness and thus developing the symptoms of hopelessness 
depression when they experience stressful events. These cognitive 
diatheses, which are formally referred to in the hopelessness model as 
"distal contributory causes" of hopelessness depression, include 
tendencies to attribute the causes of negative events to stable and
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global factors, expect negative events to result in an array of adverse 
consequences, and view the self as personally flawed or deficient when 
negative events occur. The hopelessness model hypothesizes that 
individuals who possess these dysfunctional cognitive styles will be 
more likely than their counterparts to exhibit elevated levels of 
depressive symptomatology under conditions of high stress. In the 
absence of stress (or in the presence of positive life events), little 
or no difference is expected in the degree of depressive symptomatology 
manifested by individuals who do and do not possess the hypothesized 
cognitive diatheses.
The diathesis-stress predictions advanced by hopelessness theory 
were evaluated in the present investigation by examining the degree to 
which levels of dysfunctional cognitive style interact with the severity 
of a recent life stressor to predict Tl to T2 increases in depressive 
symptomatology.9 Specifically, Analysis of Partial Variance (APV; Cohen 
& Cohen, 1983) was used to examine whether residual changes in BDI 
scores from Tl to T2 (I.e., change in BDI scores from Tl to T2, adjusted 
for Tl BDI score) could be predicted from interactions of subjects' 
ratings of the stressfulness of a recent negative life event and their 
scores on several different measures of dysfunctional cognitive style 
(cf. Metalsky et al., 1987). An extension of Analysis of Covariance 
(ANCOVA), APV assesses relations between a covariate-adjusted change 
score and one or more quantitative (rather than group membership) 
research factors, which are also adjusted for the covariate, and is more 
appropriate than the simple pre-test/post-test change score method for 
predicting change over time (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).
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In each analysis conducted here, residualized change scores were 
created by partialling out the variance in T2 BDI scores that was 
predictable from Tl BDI scores. Residualized BDI change scores were 
then regressed on the main effects of event stressfulness and 
dysfunctional cognitive style. The interaction of event stressfulness 
and dysfunctional cognitive style was always evaluated on the third and 
final step, after the variance due to Tl BDI scores and the two main 
effects had been removed from both T2 BDI scores and the interaction 
terra. The squared partial correlation (pr2) represents the portion of 
variance in residualized BDI change scores uniquely accounted for by 
each predictor variable, whereas the R2 increment on each step 
represents the total variance in T2 BDI scores explained by the set of 
variables entered on that step (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Support for the 
diathesis-stress predictions of the hopelessness model would be obtained 
if the partial correlations corresponding to the cognitive style X 
stress interaction terms are significantly greater than zero.
Each cognitive style variable and its interaction with achievement 
and interpersonal stress was tested in a separate analysis. Following 
the recommendations of Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan (1990), as well as 
those of Cohen and Cohen (1983), all stress and cognitive style 
variables were "centered" prior to their entry in the regression models. 
Centering is accomplished by subtracting the mean from scores on 
relevant variables. Its use serves to reduce multicollinearity problems 
(i.e., unstable regression coefficients) that result when interaction 
terms are created from scores on main effect variables. Multiplicative 
composites representing interactions of dysfunctional cognitive styles
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and either achievement or interpersonal stress were formed from centered 
scores.
Zero-order correlations among the variables used in the 
diathesis-stress regression models are presented in Table 7. In 
general, associations among the cognitive style, event-stress, and 
depressive symptomatology measures were moderate to strong in magnitude. 
The one exception to this pattern occurred for the achievement stress 
variable, which was relatively weakly correlated with measures of 
dysfunctional cognitive style and depressive symptomatology. The 
analyses appearing in Table 8 test hypotheses regarding the interactive 
effects of cognitive style and achievement stress on depressive 
symptomatology. As can be seen, a large portion of the variance in T2 
BDI scores (40%) was predictable from Tl BDI scores. Such a finding is 
understandable In light of the fact that the first and second assessment 
sessions were separated by only three weeks. A similar result was 
obtained in Metalsky and Joiner's (1992) investigation which used a five 
week interval between assessment sessions.
The main effect of achievement-event stress was a significant 
predictor of residualized BDI change scores, uniquely accounting for an 
additional two to three percent of the residualized variance across 
analyses. Significant although weak positive relations were also 
obtained between residualized BDI change scores and scores on the 
Overgeneralization and Irrational Ideas main effect variables. Except 
for a marginally significant Locus of Control X Achievement Stress 
effect, none of the cognitive style X achievement stress interactions 
contributed to the prediction of change in BDI scores from Tl to T2.
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Table 7
Intercorrelations Among Cognitive Style. Stress, and Depressive 
Symptomatology Measures
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Tl BDI -
2. T2 BDI .63 -
3. ACSTRESS .29 .31 -
4. IPSTRESS .35 .40 .29 -
5. EASQ-ACGEN .31 .23 .16a .12b -
6. EASQ-IPGEN .39 .39 .23 .27 .69 -
7. DYSATT .45 .34 .10° .25 .23 .40 -
8. IRRIDEAS .45 .43 .26 .23 .22 .32 .53 -
9. OVERGEN .60 .47 .26 .32 .32 .45 .48 .46 -
10. LOCUS .43 .35 .14° .24 .19 .31 .50 .48 .49
Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at or 
beyond the £ < .01 level. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESS- 
Achievement Event Stress; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress; EASO- 
AGGEN°-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire; Achievement Events 
Generality Composite; EASO-IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style 
Questionnaire: Interpersonal Events Generality Composite;
DYSATT—Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS—Irrational Ideas 
Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward 
Self Scale; LQCUS-Powerful Others and Chance Locus of Control Composite.
a £ < .05. b ns.
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Table 8
Regression Models Predicting Ttme 1 fTl1) to Time 2 (T2) Change in 
Residualized BDI Scores from Achievement Stress. Dysfunctional 
Cognitive Style, and Achievement Stress X Dysfunctional Cognitive 
Style Interactions (N — 226^
Step Predictors in Set R*tnc Ffoc df pr t
1 T1 BDI .40 146.39a 1,224 .63 12.10s
2 EASQ-ACGEN .03 0.50
ACSTRESS .02 3.47c 3,222 .17 2.54b
3 EASQ-ACGEN X ACSTRESS .00 0.03 4,221 .01 0.19
1 T1 BDI .40 146.39s 1,224 .63 12.10s
2 DYSATT .07 1.09
ACSTRESS .02 3.95c 3,222 .17 2.63b
3 DYSATT X ACSTRESS .002 0.71 4,221 .06 0.84
1 T1 BDI .40 146.39s 1,224 .63 12.10s
2 IRRIDEAS .18 2.77b
ACSTRESS .04 7.29b 3,222 .15 2.19c
3 IRRIDEAS X ACSTRESS .005 1.81 4,221 .09 1.35
1 Tl BDI .40 146.39s 1,224 .63 12.10s
2 OVERGEN .13 1.88d
ACSTRESS .03 5.16b 3,222 .16 2.39c
3 OVERGEN X ACSTRESS .00 0.0003 4,221 .001 0.02
1 Tl BDI .40 146.39s 1,224 .63 12.10s
2 LOCUS .09 1.39
ACSTRESS .02 4.34b 3,222 .17 2.58b
3 LOCUS X ACSTRESS .01 3.42e 4,221 .12 1.85e
Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress;
EASQ-ACGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire-Achievement Events
Generality Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale;
IRRIDEAS-Irrational Ideas Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale
of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale; LOCUS—Powerful Others and Chance
Locus of Control Composite.
a £ < .0001. b £ < .01. C £ < .05. d £ - .06. e £ - .07.
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A similar pattern of results emerged when cognitive style scores, 
interpersonal stress levels, and their corresponding interaction terms 
were used to predict residual changes in T2 BDI scores (see Table 9).
The significant main effect of Interpersonal stress was twice as strong 
as that of achievement stress, explaining between four and five percent 
of the variance in residualized BDI scores. Scores on the Attributional 
Style (Interpersonal Domain) and Irrational Ideas measures were also 
significant predictors. As in the previous set of analyses, none of the 
cognitive style X interpersonal stress Interaction terms were reliably 
different from zero.
Competing Predictions Derived From the Reformulated Theory of Learned 
Helplessness
One of the primary differences between the 1989 hopelessness model 
and the 1978 reformulation of learned helplessness theory pertains to 
the role of perceived control In the development of depressive 
symptomatology. Whereas the reformulation began the causal chain 
leading to learned helplessness depression with the perception of 
negative events as uncontrollable, the 1989 statement eliminated 
perceived uncontrollability as a factor in the development of 
hopelessness depression. Unlike the hopelessness model, the 
reformulated theory of learned helplessness would predict that 
dysfunctional cognitive styles are associated with increases in 
depressive symptomatology only among individuals who experience highly 
stressful life events that are also perceived as uncontrollable.
This prediction was evaluated in a series of regression analyses 
similar to those described above. This time, however, the analyses were
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Table 9
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl*) to Time 2 (T2) Change In 
Residualized BDI Scores from Interpersonal Stress. Dysfunctional 
Cognitive Style, and Interpersonal Stress X Dysfunctional 
Cognitive Style Interactions fN - 226>
Step Predictors in Set R2|nc F-inc df pr t
1 Tl BDI .40 146.39° 1,224 .63 12.10a
2 EASQ-IPGEN .15 2.20c
IPSTRESS .04 8.69b 3,222 .21 3.17b
3 EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS .002 0.80 4,221 .06 0.90
1 Tl BDI .40 146.39° 1,224 .63 12.10a
2 DYSATT .04 0.62
IPSTRESS .03 6.34b 3,222 .22 3.42b
3 DYSATT X IPSTRESS .001 0.52 4,221 .05 0.72
1 Tl BDI .40 146.39° 1,224 .63 12.10°
2 IRRIDEAS .19 2.89b
IPSTRESS .05 10.55° 3,222 .22 3.32b
3 IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS .01 2.38 4,221 .10 1.54
1 Tl BDI .40 146.39° 1,224 .63 12.10°
2 OVERGEN .11 1.72d
IPSTRESS .04 7.69b 3,222 .21 3.27b
3 OVERGEN X IPSTRESS .0002 0.07 4,221 .02 0.26
1 Tl BDI .40 146.39° 1,224 .63 12.10°
2 LOCUS .08 1.12
IPSTRESS .03 6.80b 3,222 .22 3.39b
3 LOCUS X IPSTRESS .0003 0.13 4,221 -.02 -0.35
Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress; EASQ-IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style Ouestionnaire-
Interpersonal Events Generality Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional
Attitudes Scale: IRRIDEAS-Irrational Ideas Inventory;
OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale;
LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance Locus of Control Composite.
a E < .0001. b £ < .01. c £ < .05. d £ - .09.
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performed separately for subjects who perceived their most stressful 
achievement event as either relatively controllable (N - 126) or 
relatively uncontrollable (N - 100) and for subjects who perceived their 
most stressful interpersonal event as either relatively controllable (N 
- Ill) or relatively uncontrollable (N - 107). Low and high perceived 
control groups were formed through median splits on the measures 
assessing perceived control over negative achievement (Mdn — 3.8) and 
interpersonal (Mdn - 4.8) events. As before, the cognitive style X 
stress interaction terms were formed from centered scores on the 
cognitive style and either achievement or interpersonal stress 
variables. Diathesis-stress predictions derived from the reformulated 
theory of learned helplessness would receive support if cognitive style 
scores interacted with event stressfulness to predict Tl to T2 increases 
in BDI scores among subjects who perceived negative achievement or 
interpersonal events as relatively uncontrollable but not among subjects 
who perceived those events as relatively controllable.
Achievement Stress. Tables 10 and 11 present zero-order 
correlations among the cognitive style, achievement stress, and 
depressive symptom measures separately for subjects who perceived their 
most stressful achievement event as relatively controllable and 
uncontrollable, respectively. Regression results are presented first 
for subjects who perceived negative achievement events as controllable 
(see Table 12). Higher levels of achievement stress as well as higher 
scores on measures of Irrational Ideas, Overgeneralization, and Locus of 
Control Orientation (indicating greater externality), were significantly 
associated with residual increases in BDI scores from Tl to T2. None of
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Table 10
Intercorrelations Among Cognitive Stvle. Achievement Stress, and
Depressive Symptomatology Among Subjects Who Perceived Events as
Controllable (N — 126)
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Tl BDI
2. T2 BDI .65 -
3. ACSTRESS .33 .35 -
4. EASQ-ACGEN .29 . 18a .24 -
5. DYSATT .45 .37 . 09b . 22a -
6. IRRIDEAS .45 .44 .26 .31 .51 -
7. OVERGEN .51 .48 .30 .43 .44 .46 -
8. LOCUS .37 .38 .09b .09b .50 .50 .47 -
Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at or 
beyond the £ < .01 level. BDI-Beck Depression
Inventory; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress; EASO-ACGEN-Extended 
Attributional Style Questionnaire: Achievement Events Generality 
Composite; DYSATT-Dvsfunctional Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS- Irrational 
Ideas Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralizatlon Subscale of the Attitudes 
Toward Self Scale; LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance Locus of Control 
Composite.
8 £ < .05. D ns.
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Table 11
Intercorrelations Among Cognitive Style. Achievement Stress, and
Depressive Symptomatology Among Subjects Who Perceived Events as
Uncontrollable (N - 100)
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Tl BDI
2. T2 BDI .62 -
3. ACSTRESS .23° .25® -
4. EASQ-ACGEN .33 .29 .06b -
5. DYSATT .46 .32 .10b .23® -
6. IRRIDEAS .45 .43 .24® .10b .55 -
7. OVERGEN .70 .48 .21® .21® .53 .46 -
8. LOCUS .54 .36 .22® .31 .51 .47 1
Hin
Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at or 
beyond the £ < .01 level. BDI-Beck Depression
Inventory; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress; EASO-ACGEN-Extended 
Attributional Style Questionnaire: Achievement Events Generality 
Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS- Irrational 
Ideas Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes 





Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl) to Time 2 (T2> Change in 
Residualized BDI Scores from Achievement Stress. Dysfunctional 
Cognitive Stvle. and Achievement Stress X Dysfunctional Cognitive 
Style Interactions Among Subjects Who Perceived Events as 
Controllable (N - 1261
Step Predictors in Set p2inc F-inc df pr t
1 Tl BDI
1—1 87.61° 1,124 .64 9.36a
2 EASQ-ACGEN -.05 -0.58
ACSTRESS .02 2 , 45c 3,122 .20 2.20e
3 EASQ-ACGEN X ACSTRESS .005 1.14 4,122 -.10 -1.07
1 Tl BDI .41 87.61° 1,124 .64 9.36a
2 DYSATT .13 1.44
ACSTRESS .03 3.35c 3,122 .20 2.24c
3 DYSATT X ACSTRESS .00 0.00 4,121 -.001 -0.01
1 Tl BDI .41 87.610 1,124 .64 9.36a
2 IRRIDEAS .20 2.22c
ACSTRESS .04 4.83b 3,122 .17 1.85d
3 IRRIDEAS X ACSTRESS .0004 0.09 4,121 .03 0.30
1 Tl BDI .41 87.61° 1,124 .64 9.36a
2 OVERGEN .19 2.16c
ACSTRESS .04 4.68b 3,122 .16 1.81d
3 OVERGEN X ACSTRESS .0002 0.05 4,121 .02 0.23
1 Tl BDI .41 87.61° 1,124 .64 9.36a
2 LOCUS .20 2.31c
ACSTRESS .04 5.05b 3,122 .20 2.28c
3 LOCUS X ACSTRESS .01 1.65 4,121 .12 1.29
Note., BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress;
EASQ-ACGEN-Extended Attrlbutional Style Questionnaire-Achievement Events
Generality Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale
IRRIDEAS-Irrational Ideas Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale
of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale; LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance
Locus of Control Composite.
a E < .0001. b 2 <  .01. c 2 < .05. d £ - .07.
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the cognitive style X achievement stress interaction terms approached 
significance, however. The results of analogous tests for subjects who 
perceived a lack of control over negative achievement events appear in 
Table 13. No significant main effects or interactions involving the 
achievement stress and cognitive style variables were obtained. Thus, 
for negative achievement events, no evidence was obtained to support the 
etiological status accorded to perceptions of uncontrollability in the 
reformulated learned helplessness theory.
Interpersonal Stress. Tables 14 and 15 present zero-order 
correlations among the cognitive style, interpersonal stress, and 
depressive symptom measures separately for subjects who perceived their 
most stressful interpersonal event as relatively controllable and 
uncontrollable, respectively. A very different pattern of findings 
emerged when the regression analyses were repeated for interpersonal 
stress. Among subjects who perceived negative interpersonal events as 
relatively controllable, only the stress, Irrational Ideas, and Locus of 
Control main effect variables predicted temporal increases in BDI scores 
(see Table 16). Among subjects who perceived a lack of control over 
negative interpersonal events, event stress as well as Attributional 
Style (Interpersonal Domain) were significant main effect predictors of 
Tl to T2 increases in BDI scores (see Table 17). More important, 
however, all but one of the cognitive style X interpersonal stress 
interaction terras accounted for a significant portion of the variance 
(ranging from three to eight percent) in residualized BDI scores. 
Although small in magnitude, the size of these Interaction effects is 
comparable to that reported in similar investigations (e.g., Alloy &
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Table 13
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl) to Time 2 (T21 Change in
Residualized BDI Scores from Achievement Stress. Dysfunctional 
Cognitive Style, and Achievement Stress X Dysfunctional Cognitive 
Style Interactions Among Subjects Who Perceived Events as 
Uncontrollable (N — 1001
Step Predictors in Set r2inc F-inc df pr t
1 Tl BDI .38 60.89a 1,98 .62 7.80B
2 EASQ-ACGEN .12 1.16
ACSTRESS .02 1.56 3,96 .14 1.35
3 EASQ-ACGEN X ACSTRESS .01 1.59 4,95 .13 1.26
1 Tl BDI .38 60.89a 1,98 .62 7.80a
2 DYSATT .03 0.33
ACSTRESS .01 0.92 3,96 .13 1.32
3 DYSATT X ACSTRESS .01 1.53 4,95 .13 1.24
1 Tl BDI .38 60.89a 1,98 .62 7.80a
2 IRRIDEAS .18 1.81d
ACSTRESS .03 2.54e 3,96 .11 1.06
3 IRRIDEAS X ACSTRESS .02 3.04e 4,95 .18 1.74e
1 Tl BDI .38 60.89® 1,98 .62 7.80a
2 OVERGEN .08 0.81
ACSTRESS .02 1.20 3,96 .13 1.26
3 OVERGEN X ACSTRESS .00001 0.001 4,95 -.003 -0.03
1 Tl BDI .38 60.89s 1,98 .62 7.80s
2 LOCUS .02 0.21
ACSTRESS .01 0.89 3,96 .13 1.28
3 LOCUS X ACSTRESS .01 1.49 4,95 .12 1.22
Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress;
EASQ-ACGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire-Achievement Events
Generality Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale ;
IRRIDEAS-Irrational Ideas Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale
of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale; LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance
Locus of Control Composite .
a 2 < .0001. d £ - .07. e E - .08.
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Table 14
Intercorrelatlons Among Cognitive SCvle. Interpersonal Stress,
and Depressive Symptomatology Among Subjects Who Perceived Events
as Controllable (N - 111^
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Tl BDI
2. T2 BDI .61 -
3. IPSTRESS .35 .34 -
4. EASQ-IPGEN .44 .36 .27 -
5. DYSATT .50 .37 ,24® .49
6. IRRIDEAS .44 .44 .25 .38 .55 -
7. OVERGEN . 66 .47 .36 .38 .51 .36 -
8. LOCUS .53 .46 .28 .44 .54 .42 .62
Note. Unless otherwise indicated. ,all correlations are significant at or
beyond the < .01 level. BDI1-Beck Depression
Inventory; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress; EASQ-IPGEN- Extended 
Attributional Style Questionnaire: Interpersonal Events Generality 
Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS- Irrational 
Ideas Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes 
Toward Self Scale; LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance Locus of Control 
Composite.
0 E < . 05. b ns,
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Table 15
Intercorrelations Among Cognitive Style. Interpersonal Stress,
and Depressive Symptomatology Amonfl Subjects Who Perceived Events
as Uncontrollable (N - lOO1)
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Tl BDI
2. T2 BDI .68 -
3. IPSTRESS .35 .49 -
4, EASQ-IPGEN .36 .41 .28 -
5. DYSATT .38 .32 .26 .34 -
6. IRRIDEAS .45 .42 .21® .27 .54 -
7. OVERGEN .52 .49 .28 .54 .48 .55 -
8. LOCUS .32 . 23B .20“ .17b .46 .57 .33
Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at or 
beyond the £ < .01 level. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IPSTRESS- 
Interpersonal Event Stress; EASQ-IPGEN- Extended Attributional Style 
Questionnaire: Interpersonal Events Generality Composite; DYSATT- 
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS- Irrational Ideas Inventory; 
OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale; 
LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance Locus of Control Composite.
a n ^ nq &£ < .05. D ns,
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Table 16
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 fTl^  to Time 2 IT21 Change in 
Residualized BDI Scores from Interpersonal Stress. Dysfunctional 
Cognitive Style, and Interpersonal Stress X Dysfunctional 
Cognitive Style Interactions Among Subjects Who Perceived Events 
as Controllable fN - 1111
Step Predictors in Set p2K inc F.inc df pr t
1 Tl BDI .37 64.65® 1,109 .61 8.04°
2 EASQ-IPGEN .09 0.93
IPSTRESS .02 1.77 3,107 .14 1.50
3 EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS .002 0.36 4,106 -.06 -0.60
1 Tl BDI .37 64.65® 1,109 .61 8.04°
2 DYSATT .07 0.68
IPSTRESS .02 1.57 3,107 .15 1.58
3 DYSATT X IPSTRESS .005 0.08 4.106 -.03 -0.29
1 Tl BDI .37 64.65® 1,109 .61 8.04°
2 IRRIDEAS .22 2.37c
IPSTRESS .05 4.20c 3,107 .13 1.40
3 IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS .001 0.16 4,106 .04 0.41
1 Tl BDI .37 64.65° 1,109 .61 8.04°
2 OVERGEN .08 0.86
IPSTRESS .02 1.71 3,107 .14 1.47
3 OVERGEN X IPSTRESS .02 2.69 4,106 -.16 -1.64
1 Tl BDI .37 64.65° 1,109 .61 8.04°
2 LOCUS .18 1.92d
IPSTRESS .04 3.22c 3,107 .14 1.45
3 LOCUS X IPSTRESS .001 0.19 4,106 -.04 -0.43
Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IPSTRESS—Interpersonal Event
Stress; EASQ-IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire-
Interpersonal Events Generality Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional
Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS-Irrational Ideas Inventory; OVERGEN-
Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale;
LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance Locus of Control Composite •
a £ < .0001. b E < .01. c £ < .05. d E - *06.
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Table 17
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 to Time 2 CT2') Change In
Residualized BDI Scores from Interpersonal Stress. Dysfunctional 
Cognitive Stvle. and Interpersonal Stress X Dysfunctional 
Cognitive Stvle Interactions Among Subjects Who Perceived Events 
as Uncontrollable (N - 107>
Step Predictors in Set ro s
1
F.inc df pr t
1 Tl BDI .44 83.63a 1,105 .67 9.15a
2 EASQ-IPGEN .19 1.98c
IPSTRESS .09 9.32b 3,103 .32 3.44b
3 EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS .04 8.46b 4,102 .28 2.91b
1 Tl BDI .44 83.63® 1,105 .67 9.15a
2 DYSATT .02 0.25
IPSTRESS .07 7.13b 3,103 .34 3.69b
3 DYSATT X IPSTRESS .02 3.60d 4,102 .18 1.90d
1 Tl BDI .44 83.63® 1,105 .67 9.15®
2 IRRIDEAS .16 1.61
IPSTRESS .08 8.57b 3,103 .34 3.72b
3 IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS .02 4.13c 4,102 .20 2.03c
1 Tl BDI .44 83.63® 1,105 ,67 9.15®
2 OVERGEN ,17 1.76e
IPSTRESS .08 8.84b 3,103 .33 3.60b
3 0VERGEN X IPSTRESS .03 7.56b 4,102 .26 2.75b
1 Tl BDI .44 83.63® 1,105 67 9.15®
2 LOCUS 02 -0.23
IPSTRESS .07 7.12b 3,103 35 3.77b
3 LOCUS X IPSTRESS .0002 0.04 4,102 02 0.21
Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress; EASQ-IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire-
Interpersonal Events Generality Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional
Attitudes Scale: IRRIDEAS-•Irrational Ideas Inventory;
OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale:
LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance Locus of Control Composite.
0 e < .0001. D £ < .01. c e < .05. a E - .06. e £ - .08.
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Clements, 1992; Metalsky et al., 1987; Metalsky & Joiner, 1992).
The unstandardized regression coefficients obtained for the four 
significant interaction terms in Table 17 were compared in series of t- 
tests with the unstandardized regression coefficients obtained for the 
corresponding interaction terms in Table 16. The purpose of these 
comparisons was to determine whether the cognitive style X stress 
interactions were reliably larger among subjects who perceived negative 
interpersonal events as uncontrollable than among subjects who perceived 
negative interpersonal events as controllable (cf. Williams, 1985). The 
results are presented in Table 18. Significant differences were 
obtained for the interactions involving Attributional Style 
(Interpersonal Domain) and Overgeneralization. Although both were in 
the predicted direction, the Interpersonal Stress X Dysfunctional 
Attitudes interaction was only marginally higher in the low control 
group and the Interpersonal Stress X Irrational Ideas interaction did 
not reliably differ in low and high in perceived control groups.
Despite the somewhat inconsistent results of these comparisons, an 
effort was made to clarify the nature of the four cognitive style X 
interpersonal stress interactions. Toward this end, the relationship 
between each of the cognitive style variables and residual Tl to T2 
changes in BDI scores was evaluated at low, average, and high values of 
uncontrollable interpersonal stress. Using the procedures outlined by 
Cohen and Cohen (1983) and Jaccard et al. (1990), the slope of 
residualized BDI change scores on each cognitive style measure was 
calculated at one standard deviation below the mean, at the mean, and 
one standard deviation above the mean on the interpersonal stress
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Table 18
Comparisons of Cognitive Stvle X Interpersonal Stress Regression 
Coefficients Obtained Among Subjects Who Perceived Events as 
Uncontrollable and Subjects Who Perceived Events as Controllable
Interaction Term b1 S.E.t b2 S.E.Z t Pa
EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS .013 .005 -.002 .004 2.34 <.025
DYSATT X IPSTRESS .003 .001 -.0006 .002 1.61 <.06
IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS .006 .003 .002 .004 0.92 <.25
OVERGEN X IPSTRESS .01 .005 -.01 .007 2.33 <.025
Note, bj-Unstandardized regression coefficient obtained among subjects 
who perceived interpersonal events as uncontrollable (JI - 107).
S.E.^Standard error of regression coefficient obtained among subjects 
who perceived interpersonal events as uncontrollable. b2-Unstandardized 
regression coefficient obtained among subjects who perceived 
interpersonal events as controllable (N - 111). S.E.2-Standard error of 
regression coefficient obtained among subjects who perceived 
interpersonal events as controllable, t - [ (b1 - b2)/((S.E.1)2 + 
(S.E.Z)2) ]1/2. df - + Nz - 4. IPSTRESS" Interpersonal Event Stress;
EASO-IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire-Interpersonal 
Events Generality Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; 
IRRIDEAS- Irrational Ideas Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization 
Subscale of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale.
0 One-tailed.
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measure among subjects low in perceived control. The results of these 
calculations appear in Table 19.
The form of the interaction was the same in each case. At low 
values of interpersonal stress, there was no relation between levels of 
dysfunctional cognition and residual changes in BDI scores (i.e., the 
regression coefficient did not differ from zero). At medium values of 
stress, significant positive relations emerged between residualized BDI 
change scores and scores on the Overgeneralization and Attributional 
Style (Interpersonal Domain) measures. At high values of stress, 
significant positive relations were obtained for all four measures of 
dysfunctional cognitive style. Among subjects who felt unable to 
control the occurrence of highly stressful interpersonal events, higher 
levels of dysfunctional cognition were associated with larger increases 
in levels of depressive symptomatology.
The present results provide evidence that dysfunctional cognitive 
styles render Individuals vulnerable to depressive symptomatology, and 
support the general diathesis-stress framework that was made explicit in 
hopelessness theory. They do not, however, support the removal of 
perceived uncontrollability from the etiological model specified by 
hopelessness theorists. Increases in depressive symptomatology among 
individuals who possessed dysfunctional cognitive styles were observed 
only when highly stressful uncontrollable Interpersonal events occurred. 
Analogous relations were not observed among subjects who experienced 
highly stressful but controllable interpersonal events.10 This pattern 
of results Is exactly what would be predicted by Abramson et al.'s 
(1978) reformulation of learned helplessness theory.
Table 19
SloDes of Residual BDI Scores on Cognitive Stvle Variables at
Low. Medium, and High Levels of Uncontrollable Interpersonal
Stress
Measure bLow l^ow ^med *"med h^igh h^igh
EASQ-IPGEN -.01 -0.13 .10 2. 32c .21 3.50a
DYSATT -.04 -0.001 .001 0.96 .05 1.61d
IRRIDEAS .00 0.0003 .08 1.68 .16 2.42b
OVERGEN .06 0.66 .19 2.38c .33 2.87b
Note. EASO-IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire - 
Interpersonal Events Generality Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional 
Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS-lrrational Ideas Inventory;
OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale. 
a E < -001. 0 £ < -01. c £ “ *02. 0 £ < -05-
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Hopelessness Theory's Specific Vulnerability Hypothesis
The specific vulnerability hypothesis put forth by hopelessness 
theory predicts that individuals who possess a depressogenic 
attributional style in a particular domain (e.g., the interpersonal 
domain) are at risk for developing depressive symptomatology only when 
they encounter stressors in the same domain (e.g., social stressors).
The fact that, in the present investigation, subjects who tended to make 
stable and global attributions for negative interpersonal outcomes 
increased in levels of depressive symptomatology when they also 
experienced high levels of interpersonal stress is consistent with this 
hypothesis, but does not by itself provide unequivocal support for it.
In order to demonstrate the specificity of the interactive 
relation between attributional style and stress, it must be shown that 
1.) individuals who possess a depressogenic attributional style for 
negative interpersonal outcomes do not exhibit increases in depressive 
symptomatology under conditions of elevated achievement stress, and 2.) 
individuals who possess a depressogenic attributional style for negative 
achievement outcomes do not exhibit increases in depressive 
symptomatology under conditions of elevated interpersonal stress.
The specific-vulnerability hypothesis was tested in two additional 
regression analyses that evaluated the predictive utility of 
"incongruent" attributional style X stress interactions among subjects 
who perceived negative life events as uncontrollable. As shown in the 
upper panel of Table 20, the interaction of Achievement Stress and 
Attributional Style (Interpersonal Domain) was not significant. 
Consistent with the specific vulnerability hypothesis, the tendency to
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Table 20
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl~) to Time 2 (T2) Change in 
Residualized BDI Scores from Domain-Inconeruent Attributional 
Stvle X Stress Interactions Amonp Subjects Who Perceived Events 
as Uncontrollable (N — 107
Step Predictors in Set R2inc F.nc df pr t
1 Tl BDI .38 60.89° 1,98 .62 7.80a
2 EASQ-IPGEN .17 1.72
ACSTRESS .03 2.37 3,96 .12 1.21
3 EASQ-IPGEN X ACSTRESS .02 2.94 4,95 .17 1.72
1 Tl BDI .44 83.63a 1,105 .67 9.15s
2 EASQ-ACGEN .10 0.98
IPSTRESS .07 7.64b 3,103 .35 3.80b
3 EASQ-ACGEN X IPSTRESS .03 5.91c 4,102 .23 2.43c
Note. BDI—Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESS—Achievement Event Stress;
IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress: EASO-IPGEN-Extended Attributional
Style Questionnaire-Interpersonal Events Generality Composite; EASO-
ACGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire- Achievement Events
Generality Composite.
a E. < .0001. b e  < .01. c £ < .05.
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make stable and global attributions for negative interpersonal outcomes 
did not confer a risk for depressive symptomatology at high levels of 
achievement stress.
The results presented in the lower panel of Table 20, however, 
suggest a very different conclusion about the validity of the specific 
vulnerability hypothesis. Significant effects were found for both 
Interpersonal Stress and the interaction of Interpersonal Stress and 
Attributional style (Achievement Domain). The results of a slope 
analysis performed on that interaction revealed that, as the 
stressfulness of negative interpersonal events increased, the tendency 
to make stable and global attributions for negative achievement events 
became more strongly associated with increases in depressive symptoms.
This finding is of special interest in light of the fact that 
scores on all other cognitive style measures used in this research, with 
the exception of Locus of Control, also predicted increases in 
depressive symptoms at high levels of (uncontrollable) interpersonal 
stress. Stress stemming from the occurrence of negative achievement 
events did not moderate either the nature or the strength of any 
cognitive style-depression relation. Although each cognitive style 
measure was developed to assess a unique type of dysfunctional 
cognition, the diathesis-stress results reported thus far suggest some 
commonality that underlies these constructs and leaves individuals 
particularly susceptible to depressive symptoms in the face of 
interpersonal difficulties. The analyses described in the following 
section were conducted to more specifically address this suggestion.
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Assessing the Unique Effects of the Diathesis-Stress Interactions
Although hopelessness theorists described various dysfunctional 
cognitive styles that might serve as vulnerability factors for 
depressive symptomatology, they left open the question of whether these 
cognitive diatheses were orthogonal. For example, when discussing 
tendencies to anticipate negative consequences and attribute personal 
deficiencies to the self when stressors occur, Abramson et al. (1989, p. 
362) remarked that "We do not know whether such cognitive styles are 
independent of the hypothesized depressogenic attributional style."
In addition to the results reported above, the recent findings of 
Metalsky and Joiner (1992) suggest that the cognitive diatheses 
specified in the hopelessness model are not independent but reflect a 
higher-order vulnerability factor. When assessed in separate analyses, 
Metalsky and Joiner found that tendencies to make stable and global 
attributions for negative outcomes, expect adverse consequences to 
result from negative events, and attribute negative characteristics to 
the self when negative events occur each interacted with scores on a 
measure of life stress (the number of stressors recently experienced) to 
predict temporal increases in depressive symptomatology. When tested in 
the same analysis, none of the interaction terms attained significance, 
leading Metalsky and Joiner (p. 673) to speculate that "it was the 
variance shared by the three vulnerability factors that conferred a risk 
for depressive reactions. Thus, the variance shared by the three 
vulnerability factors may constitute a common 'core' liability."
In the same vein, the diathesis-stress interaction terms that 
reliably predicted changes in depressive symptoms in the present
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research were assessed simultaneously to determine if they exert unique 
effects. The Tl BDI covariate was entered on the first step of this 
regression analysis, followed by the eptry of five main effect terms on 
the second step: ratings of interpersonal stress and scores on the 
Overgeneralization, Attributional Style (Interpersonal Domain), 
Irrational Ideas, and Dysfunctional Attitude measures, All four 
cognitive style X interpersonal stress interaction terms entered the 
equation on the third step. Unique predictive utility would be 
attributed to each interaction term that continued to be significantly 
related to residualized BDI change scores after all other Interaction 
terms were statistically controlled.
Table 21 shows a pattern of results similar to that reported by 
Metalsky and Joiner (1992) . Of the main effects evaluated on the second 
step of the analysis, only interpersonal stress accounted for a 
significant portion (11%) of the variance in BDI change scores. None of 
the cognitive style main effect or Interaction variables contributed 
unique variance to the prediction of BDI change scores. These results 
strengthen speculations that a higher-order cognitive vulnerability 
factor, which is tapped by a number of existing measures, contributes to 
the onset of depressive symptomatology under conditions of high 
(uncontrollable) Interpersonal stress.
Hopelessness as a Mediator of the Relation Between Dysfunctional 
Cognitive Stvle and Depressive Symptomatology
As the proximal sufficient cause of depression in Abramson et 
al.'s (1989) revised model, hopelessness is believed to mediate the 
effects of all cognitive style and stress variables on depressive
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Table 21
Regression Models Assessing the Unique Contribution of Each 
Significant Cognitive Stvle X Interpersonal Stress Interaction 
Among Subjects Who Perceived Events as Uncontrollable (N — 107')
Step Predictors in Set R2inc Finc df pr t
1 Tl BDI .44 83.63° 1,105 .67 9.15°




IPSTRESS .10 4.33b 6,100 .33 3.45b
3 EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS .16 1.59
DYSATT X IPSTRESS -.07 0.71
IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS .06 0.60
OVERGEN X IPSTRESS .05 2.94c 10,96 .10 1.02
Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress; EASO-IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire- 
Interpersonal Events Generality Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional 
Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS-Irrational Ideas Inventory; OVERGEN- 
Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale.
a E < .0001. b £ < .01. c E < .05.
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symptomatology. According to the model, individuals who possess 
dysfunctional cognitive styles become hopeless (i.e., come to believe 
that negative outcomes are likely to occur in the future and that 
nothing can be done to prevent their occurrence) under conditions of 
high stress and therefore exhibit elevated levels of depressive 
symptomatology. Thus the relation between dysfunctional cognitive style 
and depression hypothesized by Abramson et al. (1989), and demonstrated 
in the present investigation among subjects who perceived interpersonal 
stressors as uncontrollable, is thought to be an indirect one, mediated 
by the formation of hopelessness expectancies.
Support for this mediational hypothesis is very limited. 
Ironically, although future outcome and control expectancies have always 
played a key role in learned helplessness theorizing, empirical tests of 
these models (e.g., Cutrona, 1983; Follette & Jacobson, 1987; Metalsky 
et al. , 1982; Metalsky et al., 1987; O'Hara, Rehm, & Campbell, 1982; 
Rothwell & Williams, 1983) frequently fail to include measures of 
hopelessness (but see Alloy & Clements, 1992; Andersen, 1990; Metalsky 
et al., 1993; Metalsky & Joiner, 1992; Riskind, Rholes, Brannon,
Burdick, 1987 for exceptions). When future expectancies have been 
measured so that the mediational hypotheses of the hopelessness model 
could be evaluated, the results have not always been in line with 
predictions. Metalsky arid Joiner (1992), for example, found that 
interactions of dysfunctional cognitive style and life stress continued 
to predict increases in depressive symptomatology after controlling for 
concurrent increases in hopelessness expectancies (see Alloy & Clements, 
1992 for similar results). Metalsky et al. (1993), however, did find
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that hopelessness accounted for the relation between negativlstic 
attributional styles and depressive reactions among students who 
received failing grades on a midterm exam.
The regression analyses described below were conducted in an 
effort to determine whether hopelessness expectancies (as assessed by 
the BHS) mediate the interactive effects of dysfunctional cognitive 
style and stress that were observed in the present research. For each 
significant cognitive style X stress interaction effect, two regression 
equations were estimated to determine whether the conditions required 
for hopelessness mediation were satisfied (cf. Baron & Kenny, 1986; 
Metalsky & Joiner, 1992). The first analysis in each set tested whether 
the interaction of cognitive style and stress predicts T2 BHS scores 
after controlling for Tl BHS scores and the cognitive style and stress 
main effects (Condition 1). The second analysis in each set tested 
whether T2 BHS scores predict residualized increases in T2 BDI scores 
(Condition 2), and whether the cognitive style X stress interaction 
continues to predict BDI change scores after T2 BHS scores are 
controlled (Condition 3).
The mediating role of hopelessness expectancies predicted by 
Abramson et al. (1989) would be demonstrated if high levels of 
dysfunctional cognitive style in combination with high levels of 
uncontrollable Interpersonal stress predicted increases in hopelessness, 
if increases in hopelessness were significantly associated with 
increases in depressive symptomatology, and if the cognitive style X 
stress interactions that previously predicted changes in depressive 
symptoms were no longer significant when hopelessness was included in
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the model. Partial mediation would be demonstrated if Conditions 1 and 
2 were satisfied and the interactive effects of cognitive style and 
stress on depressive symptoms were significantly reduced in strength (as 
opposed to being eliminated in the case of complete mediation) after 
controlling for hopelessness.
Tables 22 through 25 present the results of the mediational 
analyses. None of the cognitive style X stress interaction effects were 
mediated by hopelessness. Interactions involving Interpersonal Stress 
and Dysfunctional Attitudes, Irrational Ideas, and Overgeneralization 
failed to predict changes In BHS scores (Condition 1) and, although 
increases in hopelessness were reliably associated with increases in 
depressive symptomatology (Condition 2), those interaction terms 
continued to be significant predictors of BDI change scores after 
controlling for hopelessness (Condition 3). This pattern of findings 
suggests a direct relation between dysfunctional cognitive styles and 
depressive symptomatology under conditions of elevated Interpersonal 
stress.
BHS change scores were predicted by the interaction of 
Interpersonal Stress and Attributional Style (Interpersonal Domain) (see 
Table 25). Removing the variance associated with hopelessness, however, 
had only a trivial effect on the strength of the relation between BDI 
change scores and the Interpersonal Stress X Attributional Style 
interaction. Table 26 shows that the regression coefficients 
corresponding to each interaction term did not significantly decrease in 
magnitude after T2 BHS scores were controlled. The development of 
hopelessness expectancies was not, therefore, responsible for the
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Table 22
Regression Model Testing the Role of Hopelessness as a Mediator 
of the Relation Between Dysfunctional Attitudes and Depressive 
Symptomatology Amonp Subjects Who Perceived Negative 
Interpersonal Events as Uncontrollable fN - 107)
Step Criterion Predictors in Set Rz-inc Finc df pr t
1 T2BHS T1BHS .29 43.44® 1,105 .54 6.59a
2 DYSATT -.05 -0.55
IPSTRESS .04 3.35c 3,103 .25 2.59b
3 DYSATT X IPSTRESS .001 0.13 4,102 .04 0.36
1 T2BDI T1BDI .61 7.81®
T1BHS .44 41.54® 2,104 .04 0.37
2 DYSATT .02 0.25
IPSTRESS .07 7.02b 4,102 .34 3.66b
3 T2BHS .12 32.36® 5,101 .49 5.69®
4 DYSATT X IPSTRESS .01 3.71d 6,100 .19 1.93d
Note. BHS-Beck Hopelessness Scale: BDI-Beck Depression Inventory;
DYSATT-Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale: IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress.
a £ < .0001. b E <  -01. C E <  .05. d £ -.06.
106
Table 23
Regression Model Testing the Role of Hopelessness as a Mediator 
of the Relation Between Irrational Ideas and Depressive 
Symptomatology Among Subjects Who Perceived Negative 
Interpersonal Events as Uncontrollable (N - 107)
Step Criterion Predictors in Set RZi „inc F-inc df pr t
1 T2BHS T1BHS .29 43.44° 1,105 .54 6.59°
2 IRRIDEAS -.05-■0.56
IPSTRESS .04 3.36c 3,103 .25 2.59b
3 DYSATT X IPSTRESS .01 0.73 4,102 .08 0.86
1 T2BDI T1BDI .61 7.81°
T1BHS .44 41.54° 2,104 .04 0.37
2 IRRIDEAS .16 1.60
IPSTRESS .08 8.44b 4,102 .34 3.69b
3 T2BHS . 12 34.07° 5,101 .50 5.84°
4 IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS .01 3.41e 6,100 .18 1.85°
Note. BHS-Beck Hopelessness Scale; BDI-Beck Depression Inventory;
IRRIDEAS—Irrational Ideas Inventory; IPSTRESS—Interpersonal Event
Stress.
a £ < .0001. b E < .01, c 2 < -05. d E -.06. e E - .07.
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Table 24
Regression Model Testing the Role of Hopelessness as a Mediator
of the Relation Between Overgeneralizatlon and Depressive 
Symptomatology Among Subjects Who Perceived Negative 
Interpersonal Events as Uncontrollable (N — 107)
Step Criterion Predictors in Set tnc F.inc df pr t
1 T2BHS T1BHS .29 43.44s 1,105 .54 6.59a
2 OVERGEN .02 0.25
IPSTRESS .04 3.23c 3,103 .23 2.42c
3 OVERGEN X IPSTRESS .01 2.31 4,102 .15 1.52
1 T2BDI T1BDI .61 7.81B
T1BHS .44 41.54a 2,104 .04 0.37
2 OVERGEN .17 1.75c
IPSTRESS .08 8.72b 4,102 .33 3.58b
3 T2BHS .11 31.908 5,101 .49 5.65s
4 OVERGEN X IPSTRESS .02 4.71c 6,100 .21 2.17c
Note. BHS-Beck Hopelessness Scale; BDI--Beck Depression Inventory;
OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward Self Scales;
IPSTRESS-Interoersonal Event Stress.
8 e < .0001. b E <  .01. C E <  .05. d j) -.06. e 2 - .07.
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Table 25
Repression Model Testing the Role of Hopelessness as a Mediator 
of the Relation Between Dysfunctional Attributional Stvle 
(Interpersonal Domain^ and Depressive Symptomatology Among 
Subjects Who Perceived Negative Interpersonal Events as 
Uncontrollable (N — 107)
Step Criterion Predictors in Set ®-2fnc i^nc df pr t
1 T2BHS TlBHS .29 43.44a 1,105 .54 6.59a
2 EASQ-IPGEN 18 1,89d
IPSTRESS .06 5.08b 3,103 .20 2.08e
3 EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS.02 3.85c 4,102 .19 1.96c
1 T2BDI TlBDI 61 7.81a
TlBHS .44 41.54a 2,104 .04 0.37
2 EASQ-IPGEN 19 1.96c
IPSTRESS .08 9.16b 4,102 .32 3.43b
3 T2BHS . 10 28.82a 5,101 .47 5.37a
4 EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS.02 5.38d 6,100 .23 2.32c
Note. BHS-Beck Hopelessness Scale; BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; EASO-
IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire-Interpersonal Events
Generalitv Composite: IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress.
a E < .0001. D E < .01. c £ < .05. a 2 -.06. e £ - .08.
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Table 26
Comparisons of Cognitive Stvle X Interpersonal Stress Regression 
Coefficients With those Obtained in Hopelessness Mediational 
Analysis (N — 107^
Interaction Term b1 s .e m b2 S.E.Z t PB
DYSATT X IPSTRESS .003 .001 .002 .001 0.71 >.05
IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS .006 .003 .005 .003 0.24 >.05
OVERGEN X IPSTRESS .01 .005 .009 .004 0.15 >.05
EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS .013 .005 .006 .003 1.21 >.05
Note. b2-Unstandardized regression coefficient obtained in hopelessness 
mediational analysis. S.E.2-Standard error of regression coefficient 
obtained in hopelessness mediational analysis, t - [ (b1 - b2)/((S.E..j)2 + 
(S.E.2)2)]1/2. df - Nj + N2 - 4. IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress; 
DYSATT-Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS-Irrational Ideas 
Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward 
Self Scale; EASO-IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire- 
Interpersonal Events Generality Composite.
a One-tailed.
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increases in depressive symptomatology observed among subjects who 
possessed higher levels of dysfunctional cognitive style and experienced 
high levels of uncontrollable interpersonal stress.
Summary of Dysfunctional Cognitive Stvle Findings
Taken together, the results reported in this section provide 
little support for Abramson et al.'s (1989) predictions regarding the 
etiological role of dysfunctional cognitive styles in hopelessness 
depression. Scores on measures of Locus of Control, Overgeneralization, 
Attributional Style, Irrational Ideas, and Dysfunctional Attitudes 
failed to predict T1 to T2 increases in depressive symptomatology at 
high levels of either achievement or interpersonal stress. The 
reformulation's (Abramson et al., 1978) competing prediction that 
dysfunctional cognitive styles would be positively associated with 
depressive symptoms when negative outcomes were perceived as 
uncontrollable fared much better.
Among subjects who perceived a lack of control over negative 
interpersonal events, those with higher scores on measures of 
Overgeneralization, Attributional Style (Interpersonal Domain), 
Irrational Ideas, and Dysfunctional Attitudes exhibited larger increases 
in depressive symptomatology as the stressfulness of those events 
increased. Similar relations among dysfunctional cognitive styles, 
interpersonal stress, and depressive symptomatology were not observed 
for subjects who perceived negative events as controllable. These 
findings suggest that highly stressful experiences were not sufficient 
by themselves to trigger increases in depressive symptomatology among 
cognitively vulnerable individuals. Rather, dysfunctional cognition was
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associated with temporal increases in depressive symptoms only when 
(interpersonal) stressors were perceived as uncontrollable.
Tests of the hopelessness model's supplemental diathesis-stress 
predictions likewise yielded little support. Consistent with the 
specific vulnerability hypothesis, the tendency to make stable and 
global attributions for negative interpersonal outcomes predicted 
increases in depression at high levels of (uncontrollable) interpersonal 
stress but not at high levels of (uncontrollable) achievement stress.
The converse was not true, however, of attributional style in the 
achievement domain. Tendencies to make stable and global attributions 
for negative achievement events predicted increases in depression at 
high levels of (uncontrollable) interoersonal stress but not at high 
levels of (uncontrollable) achievement stress.
In addition, no justification was found for conceptualizing the 
three dysfunctional cognitive styles discussed by hopelessness theorists 
as independent vulnerability factors. When evaluated simultaneously, 
none of the previously significant cognitive style X interpersonal 
stress interaction terms contributed unique variance to the prediction 
of T1 to T2 change in depressive symptomatology levels. Assuming the 
adequate measurement of these constructs, tendencies to attribute 
negative outcomes to stable and global causes, expect adverse 
consequences to result from life stressors, and draw derogatory 
inferences about the self when negative events occur appear to be unique 
manifestations of a more global vulnerability factor rather than 
Independent risk factors.
Finally, hopelessness expectancies did not mediate any of the
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interactive effects of dysfunctional cognitive style and stress on 
depressive symptoms. All but one of the cognitive style X interpersonal 
stress interaction terms failed to predict changes In hopelessness 
expectancies. Although the Attributional Style (Interpersonal Domain) X 
Interpersonal Stress interaction was significantly related to 
hopelessness, it continued to be reliably associated with changes in 
levels of depressive symptomatology after controlling for hopelessness. 
In contrast to the expectations of hopelessness theorists, relations 
between dysfunctional cognitive styles and depression were direct rather 
than mediated.
Relations Between Dysfunctional Cognition and Event Inferences: 
Mediational Predictions of Hopelessness Theory 
Hopelessness theory addresses itself to the question of why 
certain dysfunctional cognitive styles put individuals at risk for 
depression when negative life events occur. According to the theory, 
relations between maladaptive cognitive styles and depressive 
symptomatology are mediated by the inferences that cognitively 
vulnerable individuals make about the stressors they experience.
Abramson et al. (1989) hypothesized that attributing specific negative 
events to stable and global causes, expecting those events to bring 
about undesired consequences, and inferring personal deficiencies when 
those events occur, each increase the likelihood of hopelessness and, in 
turn, hopelessness depression. Although they acknowledge that events 
themselves provide the "raw data" for the types of Inferences that are 
made, Abramson et al. made the reasonable prediction that individuals 
who habitually make stable and global attributions, anticipate adverse
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consequences, or view themselves as personally flawed when negative 
events occur, will be more likely than their counterparts to make 
corresponding inferences when particular stressful events occur. Thus, 
it is the propensity of cognitively vulnerable individuals to make 
hopelessness-inducing inferences about stressful life events that is 
believed to increase their risk of depressive symptomatology when such 
events occur.
The analyses described below evaluate mediational predictions 
concerning associations between dysfunctional cognitive styles and 
inferences made in response to the occurrence of uncontrollable 
interpersonal stressors. A series of hierarchical regression analyses 
were performed to assess the extent to which interactions of 
dysfunctional cognitive style and interpersonal stress predicted scores 
on event-based measures of attributional generality (i.e., the stable 
and global attributional composite), expected negative consequences, and 
inferred personal deficiencies among subjects low in perceived control. 
Because they have been implicated as etiological factors for depression 
(e.g., Janoff-Bulman, 1979), scores on measures of behavioral and 
characterological blame for uncontrollable interpersonal stressors also 
served as criterion variables in these analyses.
Separate regression equations were estimated to assess the 
predictive utility of interactions involving Interpersonal Stress and 
Attributional Style (Interpersonal Domain), Dysfunctional Attitudes, 
Irrational Ideas, and Overgeneralization. Event inference scores were 
regressed on the (centered) cognitive style and interpersonal stress 
main effect variables on the first step of each analysis. Cognitive
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style X interpersonal stress interaction terms, formed from centered 
scores on their respective main effect variables, were always assessed 
on the second step of the analysis. Zero-order correlations among the 
cognitive style, interpersonal stress, and inference measures are 
presented in Table 27. In addition to being moderately correlated among 
themselves, scores on most event-inference measures were significantly 
positively associated with scores on each cognitive style measure expect 
the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale and Irrational Ideas Inventory.
Hierarchical regression results for the Attributional Style 
(Interpersonal Domain) measure appear in Table 28. The main effects of 
both attributional style and interpersonal stress significantly 
predicted * :ores on each event-inference measure. Tendencies to make 
stable and global attributions for negative interpersonal outcomes were 
associated with higher scores on scales assessing stable and global 
event attributions, negative consequence expectancies, perceived 
deficiencies, and behavioral as well as characterological blame for 
uncontrollable interpersonal stressors. Between four and 10% percent of 
the variance in scores on these measures was predictable from the 
Attributional Style main effect variable. In addition, the more 
stressful subjects' uncontrollable interpersonal events were, the higher 
their scores were on each inference measure. Stress ratings were most 
strongly related to expectations about the negative consequences of 
uncontrollable interpersonal experiences, accounting for 22% of the 
variance in scores on that measure. Stress was only weakly related to 
behavioral blame, accounting for a marginally significant three percent 
of the variance In scores on that measure. The Attributional Style
Table 27
Intercorrelations Among Cognitive Stvle. Interpersonal Stress and
Event-Cognition Measures Among Subjects Low In Perceived Control
fN - 107)
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. EASQ-IPGEN-
2. DYSATT .34 -
3. IRRIDEAS .27 .54 -
4. OVERGEN .54 .48 .55 -
5. IPSTRESS .28 .26 .21° .28 -
6. IEQ-GEN .37 .16b , 15b ,29 .38 -
7. IEQ-CNS .35 .10b . 21a .31 .52 .48 -
8. IEQ-DEF .37 . 15b . 14b .32 .34 .26 .42 -
9. IEQ-BBL .35 .10b ,05b .32 .26 .23° .28 .80
10. IEQ-CBL .26 . 08b . 08b .27 .26 . 18b . 18b .78 .89
Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at or 
beyond the £ < ,01 level. EASO-IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style 
Questionnaire-Interpersonal Events Generality Composite; 
DYSATT-Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; IRRIDEAS-Irrational Ideas 
Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward 
Self Scale; IPSTRESS- Interpersonal Event Stress; IEO-GEN-Interpersonal 
Events Questionnaire-Attributional Generality Subscale; IEO-CNS- 
Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Expected Consequences Subscale; IEO- 
DEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale;
IEO-BBL-Internersonal Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; 
IEO-CBl^Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Characterological Blame 
Subscale.
a £ < .05. b ns.
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Table 28
Regression Models Predicting Inferences About Uncontrollable 
Negative Interpersonal Events from Interpersonal Stress. 
Attributional Stvle (Interpersonal Domain^. and Interpersonal 
Stress X Attributional Style Interactions
Step Criterion Predictors in Set R2fnc Ffnc df pr t
1 IEQ-GEN EASQ-IPGEN .30 3.17b
IPSTRESS .22 14.53s 2,104 .31 3. 32b
2 EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS.002 0.20 3,103 .04 0.45
1 IEQ-CNS EASQ-IPGEN .26 2.72b
IPSTRESS .32 24.29® 2,104 .47 5.42®
2 EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS.001 0.17 3,103 .04 0.41
1 IEQ-DEF EASQ-IPGEN .31 3.31b
IPSTRESS .20 12.95® 2,104 .27 2.80b
2 EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS.0003 0.03 3,103 -.02 ■-0.18
1 IEQ-BBL EASQ-IPGEN .30 3.19b
IPSTRESS .15 9.17® 2,104 .18 1.87d
2 EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS.002 0.22 3,103 -.05 •■0.47
1 IEQ-CBL EASQ-IPGEN .21 2.15c
IPSTRESS .11 6.13® 2,104 .20 2.07c
2 EASQ-IPGEN X IPSTRESS .00 0.00 3,103 .001 0.01
Note. EASQ-IPGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire- 
Interpersonal Events Generality Composite; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event 
Stress; IEO-GEN-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Attributional 
Generality Subscale; IEO-CNS-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Expected 
Consequences Subscale; IEO-DEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire- 
Personal Deficiencies Subscale; IEO - BBL-Intemersonal Events 
Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEO-CBL-Interpersonal Events 
Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
® E < .0001. b e  < .01. c E < .05. d £ -.06.
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(Interpersonal Domain) X Interpersonal Stress interaction was unrelated 
to scores on all of the Inference measures examined. The hopelessness 
model's mediational hypothesis regarding the attributional diathesis was 
not supported. Tendencies to make stable and global attributions for 
negative interpersonal outcomes were associated with negativistic 
inferences for uncontrollable interpersonal events at all levels of 
stress.
Table 29 presents regression results for the Dysfunctional 
Attitudes Scale. Moderate to strong positive associations were once 
again observed between stress ratings and scores on all Inference 
measures. However, neither the main effect of Dysfunctional Attitudes 
nor the Dysfunctional Attitudes X Interpersonal Stress interaction 
effect accounted for a significant portion of the variance in scores on 
any event inference measure. An identical pattern of results was 
obtained in the analyses involving scores on the Irrational Ideas 
Inventory (see Table 30).
As shown in Table 31, scores on the Overgeneralization main effect 
variable were, along with stress ratings, significant predictors of the 
inferences subjects made about uncontrollable negative interpersonal 
events. Stronger tendencies to magnify the implications of negative 
events were associated with higher scores on all measures of 
depressogenic inferences across all levels of stress. Like the 
attributional diathesis, the positive relation between 
Overgeneralization and inferences did not vary as a function of the 
stressfulness of negative uncontrollable interpersonal events.
Hypothesized relations between dysfunctional cognitive styles and
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Table 29
Regression Models Predicting Inferences About Uncontrollable 
Negative Interpersonal Events from Interpersonal Stress. 
Dysfunctional Attitudes, and Interpersonal Stress X Dysfunctional 
Attitudes Interactions
Step Criterion Predictors in Set R^ -inc Finc df pr t
1 IEQ-GEN DYSATT .07 0.68
IPSTRESS .15 8.92b 2,104 .35 3.85b
2 DYSATT X IPSTRESS .01 0.91 3,103 .09 0.95
1 IEQ-CNS DYSATT -.05 -0.49
IPSTRESS .27 19,40a 2,104 .51 6.12s
2 DYSATT X IPSTRESS .01 0.97 3,103 .10 0.98
1 IEQ-DEF DYSATT .07 0.72
IPSTRESS .12 7.04b 2,104 .31 3.37b
2 DYSATT X IPSTRESS .0001 0.01 3,103 .01 0.10
1 IEQ-BBL DYSATT .03 0.31
IPSTRESS .07 3.77c 2,104 .24 2.55b
2 DYSATT X IPSTRESS .001 0.08 3,103 .03 0.28
1 IEQ-CBL DYSATT .02 0.17
IPSTRESS .07 3.68c 2,104 .24 2.57b
2 DYSATT X IPSTRESS .0002 0.02 3,103 .01 0.14
Note. DYSATT-Dvsfunctional Attitudes Scale; IPSTRESS- Interpersonal 
Event Stress; IEO-GEN-Intemersonal Events Questionnaire-Attributional 
Generality Subscale; IEO-CNS-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Expected 
Consequences Subscale; IEO-DEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire- 
Personal Deficiencies Subscale; IEO-BBI^Interpersonal Events 
Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEO-CBL^Interpersonal Events 
Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
a E < .0001. b E < .01. c B < -05-
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Table 30
Regression Models Predicting Inferences About Uncontrollable 
Negative Interpersonal Events from Interpersonal Stress. 
Irrational Ideas, and Interpersonal Stress X Irrational Ideas 
Interactions
Step Criterion Predictors in Set R!|nc Finc df P* t
1 IEQ-GEN IRRIDEAS .08 0.83
IPSTRESS .15 9.05b 2,104 .36 3.92b
2 IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS .00 0.002 3,103 .004 0.04
1 IEQ-CNS IRRIDEAS .12 1.26
IPSTRESS .28 20.32B 2,104 .50 5.87s
2 IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS .01 1.59 3,103 .12 1.26
1 IEQ-DEF IRRIDEAS .08 0.78
IPSTRESS .12 7.09b 2,104 .32 3.45b
2 IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS .002 0.21 3,103 .05 0.46
1 IEQ-BBL IRRIDEAS _,002-0.02
IPSTRESS .07 3.72° 2,104 ,25 2.68b
2 IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS .00 0.001 3,103 .,004 0.04
1 IEQ-CBL IRRIDEAS .03 0.26
IPSTRESS .07 3.70c 2,104 .25 2.60b
2 IRRIDEAS X IPSTRESS .0005 0.05 3,103 .02 0.23
Note. IRRIDEAS-:Irrational Ideas Inventory; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress: IEO-GEN--Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Attributional
Generality Subscale; IEQ-CNS-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Expected
Consequences Subscale; IEQ-DEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-
Personal Deficiencies Subscale; IEQ-BBI^Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale: IEQ-CBI^*Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
0 E < .0001. 15 e  < .01. c E < .05.
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Table 31
Regression Models Predicting Inferences About Uncontrollable 
Negative Interpersonal Events from Interpersonal Stress. 
Overgeneralization, and Interpersonal Stress X Overgeneralization 
Interactions





































































Note. OVERGEN-Overeeneralization Subscale of the Attitudes Toward Self 
Scale; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress; IEQ-GEN- Interpersonal 
Events Questionnaire-Attributional Generality Subscale; IEQ- 
GNS-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Expected Consequences Subscale; 
IEO-DEF-Interoersonal Events Ouestionnaire-Personal Deficiencies 
Subscale: IEO-BBl>Interoersonal Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame 
Subscale: IEO-CBL-Interoersonal Events Ouestionnaire-Characteroloeical 
Blame Subscale.
a E < .0001. D e < .01. c E < -05.
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inferences about uncontrollable interpersonal stressors failed to 
receive support in all tests of the hopelessness model's mediational 
component. Although higher attributional style and overgeneralization 
scores were associated with increases in depressive symptomatology among 
subjects who experienced highly upsetting uncontrollable interpersonal 
stressors, the inferences made about those events were not predictable 
by any of the cognitive style X stress interactions. Dysfunctional 
cognitive style was either unrelated to interpersonal event inferences 
or positively related to inferences across all levels of interpersonal 
stress. In no case were maladaptive cognitions associated with negative 
inferences for only the most stressful of subjects' uncontrollable 
interpersonal experiences.
Relations Between Event Inferences and Depressive Symptomatology 
Proximal Contributory Cause Predictions of Hopelessness Theory
The results described above suggest that maladaptive inferences 
did not mediate the dysfunctional cognition-depressive symptom relations 
observed among subjects who experienced high levels of uncontrollable 
interpersonal stress. The hopelessness model's proposed causal chain 
linking dysfunctional cognition to maladaptive inferences about negative 
life events, and maladaptive inferences to depressive symptoms (via 
hopelessness expectancies) was not, therefore, empirically confirmed.
The failure to provide support for this etiological process does not, of 
course, nullify or in any way diminish the importance of the direct 
effects that dysfunctional cognitive styles had on increases in 
depressive symptomatology. Likewise, a lack of support for the 
mediational component does not preclude the possibility that maladaptive
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inferences about: highly upsetting events will affect levels of 
depressive symptoms independently of dysfunctional cognitive styles.
An additional set of analyses was therefore performed to evaluate 
the proximal contributory cause component of the hopelessness model.
The APV procedure described previously was used to test the hypothesis 
that attributing highly upsetting life events to stable and global 
causes, expecting an array of negative consequences to result from those 
events, and/or making derogatory character inferences would be 
associated with increases in depressive symptomatology. Relations 
between depressive symptom levels and behavioral as well as 
characterological blame for life stressors were also explored. The 
etiological role of maladaptive inferences postulated by hopelessness 
theorists would be demonstrated if event-inference X stress interaction 
terms accounted for a significant portion of the variance in 
residualized BDI change scores. Such findings would indicate that 
higher scores on the inference measures were associated with increases 
in residual BDI change scores among subjects who experienced highly 
stressful negative life events.
Tables 32 and 33 present zero-order correlations among the 
depressive symptom, event-inference, and stress measures used in the 
analyses involving negative achievement and negative interpersonal 
events, respectively. Results of the achievement- and interpersonal- 
event regressions appear in Tables 34 and 35. Both achievement stress 
and interpersonal stress were positively related to residualized BDI 
change scores. In addition, significant main effects were obtained for 
achievement and interpersonal event attributional generality, negative
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Table 32
Intercorrelations Among Achievement Stress. Achievement Event 
Inferences, and Depressive Symptomatology fN — 2261
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. T1 BDI
2. T2 BDI .63 -
3. ACSTRESS .29 .31 -
4. AEQ-GEN .22 .34 .35 -
5. AEQ-CNS .28 .44 .49 .58 -
6. AEQ-DEF .35 .45 .30 .42 .51 -
7. AEQ-BBL ,08b .14° ,13b .12b .24 .50 -
8. AEQ-CBL .17° .21 . 08b .20 .23 .64 .76 -
Note. Unless otherwise indicated, correlations are significant at the £ 
< .01 level. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event 
Stress; AEO-GEN-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Attributional 
Generality Subscale; AEO-CNS- Achievement Events Questionnaire-Expected 
Consequences Subscale; AEO-DEF-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Personal 
Deficiencies Subscale; AEO-BBL-Achievement Events Questionnaire- 
Behavioral Blame Subscale; AEO-CBL-Achievement Events Questionnaire- 
Characterological Blame Subscale.
a £ < .05. b ns.
Table 33
Intercorrelations Among Interpersonal Event Inferences.
Interpersonal Stress, and Depressive Symptomatology (N — 226*)
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Tl BDI .
2. T2 BDI .63 -
3. IPSTRESS .35 .40 -
4. IEQ-GEN .24 .38 .40 -
5. IEQ-CNS .33 .50 .50 .48 -
6. IEQ-DEF .25 .45 .36 .30 .45 -
7. IEQ-BBL . 07a .22 .28 .19 .23 .72 -
8. IEQ-CBL .12a .28 .26 .20 .22 .77 .85
Note. Unless otherwise indicated, correlations are significant at the j> 
< .01 level. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IPSTRESS-Internersonal Event 
Stress; I EO - GEN-Interaersonal Events Questionnaire-Attributional 
Generality Subscale; IEO-CNS- Interpersonal Events Questionnaire- 
Expected Consequences Subscale; IEO-DEF-Intemersonal Events 
Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale; IEO-BBIflnternersonal 
Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEO-CBI^Interpersonal 
Events Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
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Table 34
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl^ to Time 2 (T2> Change in 
Residualized BDI Scores from Achievement Stress. Achievement 
Event Inferences, and Achievement Stress X Event Inference 
Interactions (N — 226^
Step Predictors in Set FInc df pr t
1 T1 BDI .40 146.39° 1,224 .63 12.10°
2 AEQ-GEN .22 3.30b
ACSTRESS .05 8.96b 3,222 .10 1.50
3 AEQ-GEN X ACSTRESS .003 1.14 4,221 .07 1.07
1 T1 BDI .40 146.39° 1,224 .63 12.10°
2 AEQ-CNS .30 4.76°
ACSTRESS .07 15.01° 3,222 .02 0.34
3 AEQ-CNS X ACSTRESS .001 0.37 4,221 -.04 -0.61
1 T1 BDI .40 146.39° 1,224 .63 12.10°
2 AEQ-DEF .28 4.36°
ACSTRESS .06 13.13° 3,222 .11 1.65
3 AEQ-DEF X ACSTRESS .002 0.80 4,221 -.06 -0.89
1 T1 BDI .40 146.39° 1,224 .63 12.10°
2 AEQ-BBL .09 1.33
ACSTRESS .02 4.25c 3,222 .16 2.43c
3 AEQ-BBL X ACSTRESS .01 2.14 4,221 .10 1.46
1 T1 BDI .40 146.39° 1,224 .63 12.10°
2 AEQ-CBL .12 1.85d
ACSTRESS .03 5.10b 3,222 .17 2.55b
3 AEQ-CBL X ACSTRESS .01 3.22d 4,221 .12 1.80d
Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress; 
AEO-GEN-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Attributional Generality 
Subscale; AEO-CNS-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Expected Consequences 
Subscale; AEO-DEF-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies 
Subscale; AEO-BBL-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame 
Subscale; AEO-CBI^-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Characterological 
Blame Subscale.
a E < .0001. b £ <  .01. c p <  .05. d £ - .07.
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Table 35
Repression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl) to Time 2 (T2) Change In 
Residualized BDI Scores from Interpersonal Stress. Interpersonal 
Event Inferences, and Interpersonal Stress X Event Inference 
Interactions (N — 226)
Step Predictors in Set R2K inc F.inc df Pr t
1 T1 BDI .40 146.39a 1,224 .63 12.10®
2 IEQ-GEN .23 3.57b
IPSTRESS .06 12.84® 3,222 .14 2. llc
3 IEQ-GEN X IPSTRESS .002 0.75 4,221 -.06 -0.87
1 T1 BDI .40 146.39® 1,224 .63 12.10®
2 IEQ-CNS .32 5.03®
IPSTRESS .09 19.50® 3,222 .08 1.14
3 IEQ-CNS X IPSTRESS .02 9.76b 4,221 .21 3.12b
1 T1 BDI .40 146.39® 1,224 .63 12.10®
2 IEQ-DEF .33 5.21®
IPSTRESS .09 20.45® 3,222 .13 1. 97c
3 IEQ-DEF X IPSTRESS .00 0.00 4,221 .001 -0.02
1 Tl BDI .40 146.39® 1,224 .63 12.10®
2 IEQ-BBL .17 2.50b
IPSTRESS .05 9.43b 3,222 .18 2.74b
3 IEQ-BBL X IPSTRESS .00 0.00 4,221 -.002 -0.04
1 Tl BDI .40 146.39® 1,224 .63 12.10®
2 IEQ-CBL .21 3.22b
IPSTRESS .06 11.59® 3,222 .18 2.74b
3 IEQ-CBL X IPSTRESS .001 0.20 4,221 .03 0.45
Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress; IEQ-GEN-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Attributional
Generality Subscale; lEQ-CNS-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Expected
Consequences Subscale; IEQ-DEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-
Personal Deficiencies Subscale; IEQ-BBL- Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEQ-CBL^Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
® E < -0001. b e < -01. c E < .05.
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consequences, and personal deficiencies, as well as behavioral and 
characterological blame for negative interpersonal events. However, 
with only one exception, neither set of analyses yielded any significant 
inference X stress interaction effects. Given the paucity of support 
for the hopelessness model's predictions, the significant stress and 
inference main effects that emerged from these analyses will not be 
further detailed nor will the single significant interaction be 
described.
Competing Predictions Derived From the Reformulated Theory of Learned 
Helplessness
The regression analyses described in the preceding paragraphs were 
repeated to evaluate predictions derived from the 1978 reformulation of 
learned helplessness theory about the etiological role of maladaptive 
inferences in the onset of depressive symptomatology. The reformulation 
postulated that expectations of future uncontrollability arise when 
individuals make internal, stable, and global attributions about the 
causes of uncontrollable negative outcomes. Although the reformulation 
limited itself to a discussion of the attributional precursors of 
helplessness depression, it would not be inconsistent with the logic of 
the 1978 model to predict that negative consequence expectancies, 
inferred personal deficiencies, and/or self-blame associated with 
uncontrollable negative events would also be predictive of increases in 
depressive symptomatology. After all, it is reasonable to expect that 
inferences of these nature, like internal, stable, and global causal 
attributions, would be associated with expectations that one will be 
unable to prevent the occurrence of highly undesired outcomes in the
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future or unable to bring about the occurrence of highly desired 
outcomes.
Tests of these hypotheses were performed by examining the 
predictive utility of inference X stress interactions separately for 
subjects who perceived their most negative achievement event as 
relatively controllable (N - 126) or relatively uncontrollable (N - 100) 
and for subjects who perceived their most negative interpersonal event 
as either relatively controllable (N - 111) or relatively uncontrollable 
(N - 107). Median splits on the achievement and interpersonal control 
measures were again used to classify subjects into low and high 
perceived control groups. All other aspects of the analyses were the 
same as those previously described.
Achievement Stress. Zero-order correlations among the depressive 
symptom, inference, and stress variables appear in Table 36 for subjects 
who perceived achievement stressors as controllable and in Table 37 for 
subjects who perceived a lack of control over achievement stressors. An 
examination of the correlations in Tables 36 and 37 shows that relations 
among depressive symptoms, achievement stress, and event inferences were 
comparable in magnitude among subjects who perceived high and low levels 
of control over negative achievement events. Behavioral and 
characterological blame for uncontrollable achievement stressors were, 
however, more highly positively correlated with depressive symptoms and 
scores on most inference measures than were behavioral and 
characterological blame for controllable achievement stressors.
As shown in Tables 38 and 39, respectively, scores on the event 
inference measures did not interact with levels of achievement stress to
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Table 36
Intercorrelations Amonp Achievement Event Inferences. Achievement
Stress, and Depressive Symptomatology Among Subjects High in
Perceived Control fN " 126>
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. T1 BDI
2. T2 BDI .65 -
3. ACSTRESS .33 .35 -
4. AEQ-GEN . 19a .25 .30 -
5. AEQ-CNS .24 .25 .40 .47 -
6. AEQ-DEF .39 .44 .38 .44 .54 -
7. AEQ-BBL - .01b .10b .24 ,09b .31 .40 -
8. AEQ-CBL . 09b . 15b .12b . 19a .24 .56 .67 -
Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at or 
beyond the £ < .01 level. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESS- 
Achievement Event Stress; AEO-GEN-Achievement Events Questionnaire- 
Attributional Generality Subscale; AEQ-CNS- Achievement Events 
Questionnaire-Expected Consequences Subscale; AEO-DEF—Achievement Events 
Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale; AEO-BBL-Achievement Events 
Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; AEQ-CBL-Achievement Events 
Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
8 p < .05, b ns.
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Table 37
Intercorrelations Among Achievement Event Inferences. Achievement
Stress, and Depressive Symptomatology Among Subjects Low in
Perceived Control (N — 100>
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. T1 BDI
2. T2 BDI .62 -
3. ACSTRESS . 23a .25° -
4. AEQ-GEN .23° .38 .39 -
5. AEQ-CNS .31 .57 .56 .66 -
6. AEQ-DEF .33 .55 .23 .45 .53 -
7. AEQ-BBL .29 .43 .17b .37 .46 .70 -
8. AEQ-CBL .37 .49 .15b .40 .45 .81 .80 -
■ -- ■
Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at or 
beyond the jj < .01 level. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESS- 
Achievement Event Stress; AEO-GEN-Achievement Events Questionnaire- 
Attributional Generality Subscale; AEO-CNS-Achievement Events 
Questionnaire-Expected Consequences Subscale; AEO-DEF-Achievement Events 
Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale; AEO-BBL^Achievement Events 
Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; AEO-CBL-Achievement Events 
Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
a p < .05. b ns.
Table 38
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl> to Time 2 (T2) Change in 
Resldualized BDI Scores from Achievement Stress. Achievement 
Event Inferences, and Achievement Stress X Event Inference 
Interactions Among Subjects High in Perceived Control (N - 126~)
Step Predictors in Set inc Finc df pr t
1 T1 BDI .41 87.61® 1,124 .64 9,36a
2 AEQ-GEN .12 1.36
ACSTRESS .03 3.23c 3,122 .16 1.74d
3 AEQ-GEN X ACSTRESS .005 1.12 4,121 .10 1.06




ACSTRESS .02 3,122 .15 1.71d
3 AEQ-CNS X ACSTRESS .0002 0.05 4,121 .02 0.21
1 Tl BDI .41 87.61° 1,124 .64 9.36°
2 AEQ-DEF .21 2,41c
ACSTRESS .05 5.29b 3,122 .13 1.39
3 AEQ-DEF X ACSTRESS .0002 0.04 4,121 - .02 -0.19
1 Tl BDI .41 87.61° 1,124 .64 9.36°
2 AEQ-BBL .08 0.93
ACSTRESS .03 2.73d 3,122 .16 1.83d
3 AEQ-BBL X ACSTRESS .005 1.01 4,121 .09 1.01
1 Tl BDI .41 87.61° 1,124 .64 9.36°
2 AEQ-CBL .09 1.05
ACSTRESS .03 2.85d 3,122 .18 2.04c
3 AEQ-CBL X ACSTRESS .01 2.45 4,121 .14 1.57
Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress;
AEQ-GEN-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Attributional Generality
Subscale; AEQ-CNS-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Expected Consequences
Subscale; AEQ-DEF-Achlevement Events Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies
Subscale; AEQ-BBL-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame
Subscale; AEQ-CBI^-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Characterological
Blame Subscale.
a £ < .0001. b £ < .01. c e < -05. d e  < .09.
132
Table 39
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Til to Time 2 (T2> Change In 
Resldualized BDI Scores from Achievement Stress. Achievement 
Event Inferences. and Achievement Stress X Event Inference 
Interactions Among Subjects Low In Perceived Control (N - 100^
Step Predictors in Set R2loc Ffnc df pr t
1 Tl BDI .38 60.89° 1,98 .62 7.80°
2 AEQ-GEN .28 2.89b
ACSTRESS .06 5.12b 3,96 .03 0.26
3 AEQ-GEN X ACSTRESS .0001 0.01 4,95 .01 0.12
1 Tl BDI .38 60.89° 1,98 .62 7.80°
2 AEQ-CNS .50 5.63°
ACSTRESS .16 17.02° 3,96 -.17 -1.69
3 AEQ-CNS X ACSTRESS .004 0.87 4,95 -.10 -0.93
1 Tl BDI .38 60.89° 1,98 .62 7.80°
2 AEQ-DEF .43 4.64°
ACSTRESS .12 11.80° 3,96 .07 0.67
3 AEQ-DEF X ACSTRESS .004 0.80 4,95 -.09 -0.89
1 Tl BDI .38 60.89° 1,98 .62 7.80°
2 AEQ-BBL .30 3.12b
ACSTRESS .07 5.81b 3,96 .10 1.01
3 AEQ-BBL X ACSTRESS .007 1.22 4,95 .11 1.10
1 Tl BDI .38 60.89° 1,98 .62 7.80°
2 AEQ-CBL .33 3.47b
ACSTRESS .08 7.00b 3,96 .12 1.15
3 AEQ-CBL X ACSTRESS .006 1.13 4,95 .11 1.06
Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress;
AEQ-GEN-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Attributional Generality
Subscale; AEQ-CNS-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Expected Consequences
Subscale; AEQjDEF-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies
Subscale: AEQ-BBL-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame
Subscale; AEQ-CBL-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Characterological
Blame Subscale.
a £ < .0001. b e < .01.
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predict Increases in depressive symptomatology among subjects who 
perceived negative achievement events as relatively controllable or as 
relatively uncontrollable. It is interesting to note, however, that a 
different pattern of results obtained in the two sets of analyses.
Higher scores on measures of attributional generality, expected negative 
consequences, behavioral blame, and characterological blame for 
uncontrollable achievement stressors, but not for controllable 
achievement stressors, were associated with increases in residualized 
BDI scores.
Interpersonal Stress. Tables 40 and 41 present zero-order 
correlations among the depressive symptom, Inference, and stress 
variables for subjects who perceived negative interpersonal stressors as 
controllable and uncontrollable, respectively. The strength of 
interrelations among these measures was similar in both groups although 
depressive symptoms at Tl tended to be more highly correlated with the 
inferences subjects made about controllable rather than uncontrollable 
interpersonal stressors.
As can be seen in Table 42, scores on the attributional 
generality, negative consequence, personal deficiency, and 
characterological blame main effect variables were positively associated 
with residual Tl to T2 increases in depressive symptoms among subjects 
who experienced controllable interpersonal stressors. The main effect 
of interpersonal stress was nonsignificant, however, as were four of the 
five inference X interpersonal stress interaction effects tested. The 
only interaction effect to reliably predict residualized changes in BDI 
scores (accounting for 6% of the variance) was that between
Table 40
Intercorrelations Among Interpersonal Event Inferences.
Interpersonal Stress, and Depressive Symptomatology Among
Subjects High in Perceived Control (N — 111>
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Tl BDI .
2. T2 BDI .61 -
3. IPSTRESS .35 .34 -
4. IEQ-GEN .30 .39 .43 -
5. IEQ-CNS .43 .53 .48 .49 -
6. IEQ-DEF .34 .49 .41 .36 .49 -
7. IEQ-BBL .09b . 18b .37 . 18b .19® .60
8. IEQ-CBL . 16b .29 .30 .24® .25 .71 .78
Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at 
the £ < .01 level. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal 
Event Stress; IEO-GEN-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Attributional 
Generality Subscale; IEO-CNS- Interpersonal Events Questionnaire- 
Expected Consequences Subscale; IEO-DEF-Interpersonal Events 
Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale; IEO-BBL- Interpersonal 
Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEO-CBl>Interpersonal 
Events Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
£ < .05 . b ns.
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Table 41
Intercorrelations Among Interpersonal Event Inferences.
Interpersonal Stress, and Depressive Symptomatology Among
Subjects Low In Perceived Control (N — 107)
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Tl BDI
2. T2 BDI .68 -
3. IPSTRESS .35 .49 -
4. IEQ-GEN .17b .38 .38 -
5. IEQ-CNS . 21a .47 .52 .48 -
6. IEQ-DEF . 14b .38 .34 .26 .42 -
7. IEQ-BBL . 07b .22a .26 . 23a .28 .80 -
8. IEQ-CBL . 08b .23a .26 . 18b . 18b .78 .89
Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at 
the £ < .01 level. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal 
Event Stress; IEO-GEN-Interpersonal Events Questlonnalre-Attributional 
Generality Subscale; IEO-CNS- Interpersonal Events Questionnaire- 
Expected Consequences Subscale; IEO-DEF-Interpersonal Events 
Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale; IEO-BBlf Interpersonal 
Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEO-CBl^Interpersonal 
Events Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
a £ < .05. b ns.
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Table 42
Repression Models Predicting Time 1 fTl^  to Time 2 CT2^  Change in 
Residualized BDI Scores from Interpersonal Stress. Interpersonal 
Event: Inferences, and Interpersonal Stress X Event Inference 
Interactions Among Subjects Hlgb In Perceived Control (N — llll
Step Predictors in Set *2|nc Finc df pr t
1 Tl BDI .37 64.65° 1,109 .61 8.04°
2 IEQ-GEN .22 2.36c
IPSTRESS .05 4.19c 3,107 .07 0.70
3 IEQ-GEN X IPSTRESS .01 1.51 4,106 -.12 -1.23
1 Tl BDI .37 64.65° 1,109 .61 8.04°
2 IEQ-CNS .33 3.68b
IPSTRESS .08 8.25b 3,107 .02 0.17
3 IEQ-CNS X IPSTRESS .03 6.38b 4,106 .24 2.53b
1 Tl BDI .37 64.65° 1,109 .61 8.04°
2 IEQ-DEF .34 3.70b
IPSTRESS .08 8.36b 3,107 .04 0.41
3 IEQ-DEF X IPSTRESS .004 0.82 4,106 -.09 -0.91
1 Tl BDI .37 64.65° 1,109 .61 8.04°
2 IEQ-BBL .10 1.08
IPSTRESS .02 1.93 3,107 .11 1.13
3 IEQ-BBL X IPSTRESS .001 0.12 4,106 -.03 -0.35
1 Tl BDI .37 64.65° 1,109 .61 8.04°
2 IEQ-CBL .20 2.09c
IPSTRESS .04 3.56c 3,107 .10 1.06
3 IEQ-CBL X IPSTRESS .0003 0.06 4,106 .02 0,24
Note., BDI-Beck Depression Inventory: IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress; IEQ-GEN-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Attributional
Generality Subscale; IEQ-CNS-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Expected
Consequences Subscale; IEQ-DEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-
Personal Deficiencies Subscale; IEQ-BBL- Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEQ-CBL-Interpersonal Events
Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
a £ < .0001. D £ < .01. c E < .05.
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interpersonal stress and expected negative consequences.
A markedly different pattern of results emerged for subjects who 
perceived a lack of control over negative interpersonal events (see 
Table 43). Significant main effects were obtained for interpersonal 
stress as well as for attributional generality, negative consequences, 
and inferred personal deficiencies. Weaker and only marginally 
significant effects were obtained for scores on the behavioral and 
characterological blame main effect variables. In addition, scores on 
measures of expected negative consequences, inferred personal 
deficiencies, behavioral blame, and characterological blame interacted 
with levels of interpersonal stress to predict residual Tl to T2 
increases in BDI scores (although Interactions involving the latter two 
measures were only marginally significant).
Table 44 shows the results of comparisons between the 
interpersonal stress X event Inference interactions obtained among 
subjects low and high in perceived control over negative interpersonal 
events. Only the interaction of interpersonal stress and perceived 
personal deficiencies was reliably larger among low control subjects. 
Results pertaining to the interactions of stress with behavioral and 
characterological blame were in the predicted direction but 
nonsignificant. Contrary to expectations, the unstandardized regression 
coefficient for the interpersonal stress X negative consequences 
interaction was nonsignificantly larger in the high control group than 
in the low control group.
Slope analyses (Cohen & Cohen, 1983; Jaccard et al., 1990) were 
performed to illustrate the relation between event inferences and
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Table 43
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl^  to Time 2 fT2) Change In 
Residualized BDI Scores from Interpersonal Stress. Interpersonal 
Event Inferences. and Interpersonal Stress X Event Inference 
Interactions Among Subjects Low in Perceived Control fN - 107)

























1 Tl BDI .44 83.63° 1,105 .67 9.15°
2 IEQ-CNS .33 3.54b
IPSTRESS .12 14.23° 3,103 .17 1.76d
3 IEQ-CNS X IPSTRESS .02 5.28c 4,102 .22 2.30c
1 Tl BDI .44 83.63° 1,105 .67 9.15°
2 IEQ-DEF .31 3.27b
IPSTRESS .11 13.17° 3,103 .26 2.74b
3 IEQ-DEF X IPSTRESS .03 6.68b 4,102 .25 2.59b
1 Tl BDI .44 83.63° 1,105 .67 9.15°
2 IEQ-BBL .16 1.63
IPSTRESS .08 8.60b 3,103 .31 3.29b
3 IEQ-BBL X IPSTRESS .01 3.16e 4,102 .17 1.78d
1 Tl BDI .44 83.63° 1,105 .67 9.15°
2 IEQ-CBL .17 1.70
IPSTRESS .08 8.74b 3,103 .31 3.28b
3 IEQ-CBL X IPSTRESS .01 3.05d 4,102 .17 1.75d
Note. BDI-Beck Degression Inventory: IPSTRESS-Interoersonal Event 
Stress: IEO-GEN-Intemersonal Events Questionnaire-Attributional 
Generality Subscale: IEO-CNS-Interoersonal Events Ouestionnaire-ExDected 
Conseauences Subscale: IEO-DEF-Interoersonal Events Ouestionnaire- 
Personal Deficiencies Subscale: IEO-BBL^Interpersonal Events 
Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale: lEO-CBL-Interoersonal Events 
Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
° E < .0001. D £ < .01. c £ < .05. d E - .08.
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Table 44
Comparisons of Inference X Interpersonal Stress Repression
Coefficients Obtained Among Subjects Who Perceived Events as
Uncontrollable and Subjects Who Perceived Events as Controllable
Interaction Term S.E.., b2 S. E.j t Pa
IEQ-CNS X IPSTRESS .039 .017 .063 .025 -0.80 <.25
IEQ-DEF X IPSTRESS .050 .019 .022 .024 2.40 <.01
IEQ-BBL X IPSTRESS .036 .020 .008 .023 1.47 <.08
IEQ-CBL X IPSTRESS .035 .020 .006 .024 0.97 <.25
Note, b.|—Unstandardized regression coefficient obtained among subjects 
who perceived interpersonal stressors as uncontrollable (N - 107).
S. E. .j-Standard error of regression coefficient obtained among subjects 
who perceived interpersonal stressors as uncontrollable. 
b2=Unstandardized regression coefficient obtained among subjects who 
perceived interpersonal stressors as controllable (N - 111). 
S.E.2-Standard error of regression coefficient obtained among subjects 
who perceived interpersonal stressors as controllable, t - [(b1 - 
b2)/((S.E.2)2 + (S.E.2)2)]1/2. df - N, + N2 - 4. BDI-Beck Depression 
Inventory; IPSTRESS- Interpersonal Event Stress; IEO-CNS-Interpersonal 
Events Questionnaire-Expected Consequences Subscale; IEO-DEF- 
Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale; IEO- 
BBl-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEO- 
CBL-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale
6 One-tailed.
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residual Tl to T2 changes in BDI scores at low, average, and high values 
of uncontrollable interpersonal stress. The results of these analyses 
for the negative consequence, personal deficiency, behavioral blame, and 
characterological blame measures appear in Table 45, The form of the 
interaction was consistent across the four event inference measures.
The inferences that subjects made about relatively unstressful 
interpersonal events (i.e., stress rating of one standard deviation 
below the mean) were unrelated to residualized BDI change scores (i.e., 
the slope of T2 BDI scores on each inference variable was not 
significantly different from zero, all ps > .10). Only the negative 
consequence and personal deficiency inferences that subjects made about 
interpersonal events that were average in stressfulness were positively 
related to residual Tl to T2 change scores (ps - .002 and ,03, 
respectively). Among subjects who experienced highly upsetting 
uncontrollable interpersonal stressors (stress rating of one standard 
deviation above the mean), however, higher scores on measures of 
expected negative consequences, personal deficiencies, behavioral blame, 
and characterological blame were each reliably associated with increases 
in residualized BDI scores. Thus, as the stressfulness of 
uncontrollable negative interpersonal events increased, higher scores on 
measures of maladaptive event inferences became more strongly associated 
with residual Tl to T2 increases in depressive symptomatology.
Assessing the Unique Effects of the Inference X Stress Interactions
Given the moderate to strong intercorrelations that were observed 
among negative consequence expectancies, Inferred personal deficiencies, 
behavioral blame, and characterological blame for uncontrollable
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Table A 5
Slopes of Residual BDI Scores on Event Inference Variables at 
Low. Medium, and High Levels of Uncontrollable Interpersonal 
Stress
Measure blow blow bmed m^ed b high bhigh
IEQ-CNS .29 0.91 .82 3.12a 1.38 3.66s
IEQ-DEF -.08 -0.26 .59 2.15b 1.29 2.95s
IEQ-BBL -.18 -0.51 .35 1.30 .91 2.22b
IEQ-CBL -.19 -0.60 .28 1.07 .77 1.79c
Note. lEO-CNS-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Expected Consequences 
Subscale; IEQ-DEF—Interpersonal Events Questionnaire -Personal 
Deficiencies Subscale; IEO-BBL^Interpersonal Events Questionnaire - 
Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEO-CBL-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire- 
Characterological Blame Subscale.
8 £ < .01. b p. < . 05. c p > .05 < .10.
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interpersonal stressors (see Table 41), it is important to determine 
whether the stress X event inference interactions described above remain 
significant when assessed simultaneously. The independent effects of 
the interactions were therefore assessed by entering stress ratings 
along with scores on each inference measure on the second step of a 
hierarchical regression analysis, after the variance explainable by Tl 
BDI scores was removed on the first step. The four stress X event 
inference interactions were entered as a set on the third step of the 
analysis. Results are presented in Table 46.
As a set, the main effect variables accounted for 15% of the 
variance in residualized BDI change scores. Only negative consequence 
expectancies and inferred personal deficiencies were individually 
predictive, however, respectively explaining six and four percent of 
residual BDI score variance. The set of stress X event inference 
interaction terms did not contribute to the prediction of T2 BDI scores 
after Tl BDI scores, stress ratings, and the four event inference main 
effects were statistically controlled. These findings provide no 
evidence upon which to posit distinct roles of negative consequence 
expectancies, personal deficiency inferences, and self-blame in the 
etiology of depressive symptomatology.
Hopelessness as a Mediator of the Relation Between Event Inferences and 
Depressive Symptomatology
The final series of regression analyses to be reported in this 
section evaluated predictions about the role of hopelessness as a 
mediator of relations between depressive symptomatology and inferences 
about highly upsetting uncontrollable interpersonal stressors. Only
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Table 46
Regression Model Assessing the Unique Contribution of Each 
Significant Event Inference X Interpersonal Stress Interaction 
Among Subjects Who Perceived Events as Uncontrollable CN — 107)
S tepPredictors in Set dZK fnc i^nc df Pr t
















3 IEQ-CNS X IPSTRESS 
IEQ-DEF X IPSTRESS 
IEQ-BBL X IPSTRESS 









Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event 
Stress; IEO-GEN-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Attributional 
Generality Subscale; IE0-CNS-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Expected 
Consequences Subscale; IEO-DEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire- 
Personal Deficiencies Subscale; IEO-BBl>Internersonal Events 
Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEQ-CBL-Interaersonal Events 
Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
a E < .0001. b £ < .01. ' E < .05.
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indirect associations between negativistic event inferences and 
depressive symptoms are predicted by hopelessness theorists. Such 
inferences are believed to be related to depression only insofar as they 
contribute to the development of hopelessness expectancies. In the 
context of the present research, support for this mediational hypothesis 
would be obtained by demonstrating that 1.) the interpersonal stress X 
event inference Interactions that predicted Tl to T2 increases in 
depressive symptoms also predict Tl to T2 increases in hopelessness 
expectancies, 2.) T2 hopelessness expectancies are positively related to 
the severity of depressive symptoms exhibited at T2, and 3.) the 
interactive effects of interpersonal stress and event inferences on T2 
depressive symptoms are eliminated (or diminished, in the case of 
partial mediation) when levels of T2 hopelessness are statistically 
controlled.
The results of regression analyses designed to evaluate these 
predictions appear in Tables 47 through 50. The analyses involving 
negative consequence expectancies and inferred personal deficiencies 
revealed no evidence of hopelessness mediation. As can be seen in Table 
47, the residualized BHS change scores obtained by subjects who 
perceived a lack of control over negative interpersonal events were not 
predictable from the interaction of stress ratings and scores on the 
measure of negative consequence expectancies. Moreover, the 
Interpersonal Stress X Negative Consequence interaction continued to 
predict residualized BDI change scores with no significant reduction in 
magnitude (see Table 51) after hopelessness expectancies at T2 were 
controlled. Table 48 shows a similar pattern of results for the
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Table 47
Regression Model Testing the Role of Hopelessness as a Mediator 
of the Relation Between Negative Consequence Expectancies and 
Depressive Symptomatology Amonp Subjects Who Perceived Negative 
Interpersonal Events as Uncontrollable (N - 107)
Step Criterion Predictors in Set RZi i nc Finc df pr t
1 T2BHS T1BHS .29 43.44° 1,105 .54 6.59a
2 IEQ-CNS .15 1.52
IPSTRESS .06 4.43b 3,103 .14 1.42
3 IEQ-CNS X IPSTRESS .00 0.00 4,102 .00 0.01
1 T2BDI T1BDI .61 7.81°
T1BHS .44 41.54° 2,104 .04 0.37
2 IEQ-CNS .33 3.53b
IPSTRESS .12 14.07° 4,102 .17 1.74
3 T2BHS .10 29.09° 5,101 .47 5.39°
4 IEQ-CNS X IPSTRESS .02 6.57b 6,100 .25 2.56b
Note. BHS—Beck Hopelessness Scale; BDI—Beck Depression Inventory; IEO-
CNS-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire: Expected Consequences Subscale;
IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress.
° E < .0001. a E < .01.
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Table 48
Regression Model Testing the Role of Hopelessness as a Mediator 
of the Relation Between Personal Deficiency Inferences and 
Depressive Symptomatology Among Subjects Who Perceived Negative 
Interpersonal Events as Uncontrollable (N - 107>
Step Criterion Predictors in Set R2,winc Ffnc df pr t
1 T2BHS TlBHS .29 43.44a 1,105 .54 6.59°
2 IEQ-DEF





3 IEQ-DEF X IPSTRESS .01 1.38 4,102 .12 1.77
1 T2BDI T1BDI











3 T2BHS . 10 28.83° 5,101 .47 5.37°
4 IEQ-DEF X IPSTRESS .02 5.32c 6,100 .22 2.31c
Note. BHS-Beck Hopelessness Scale; BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; IEQ- 
DEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire: Personal Deficiencies Subscale; 
IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress.
a E < . 0001. b E < • 01. c £ < . 05.
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Table 49
Regression Model Testing the Role of Hopelessness as a Mediator
of the Relation Between Behavioral Blame and Depressive 
Symptomatology Among Subjects Who Perceived Negative 
Interpersonal Events as Uncontrollable (N - 107)
Step Criterion Predictors in Set p2inc FirK df pr t
1 T2BHS TlBHS .29 43.44° 1,105 .54 6.59a
2 IEQ-BBL





3 IEQ-BBL X IPSTRESS .03 5.44c 4,102 .22 2. 33c
1 T2BDI T1BDI











3 T2BHS .11 29.36® 5,101 .47 5.42®
4 IEQ-BBL X IPSTRESS .002 0.65 6,100 .08 0.81
Note. BHS-Beck Hopelessness Scale: BDI-Beck Depression Inventory: 
BBI^Interpersonal Events Questionnaire: Behavioral Blame Subscale; 
IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress.
IEQ-
0 E < .0001. d e < .01. c £ <  .05. d £ - .06.
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Table 50
Regression Model Testing the Role of Hopelessness as a Mediator 
of the Relation Between Characterological Blame and Depressive 
Symptomatology Among Subjects Who Perceived Negative 
Interpersonal Events as Uncontrollable IN - 107)
Step Criterion Predictors in Set pZK inc i^nc df pr t
1 T2BHS TlBHS .29 43.44° 1,105 .54 6.59a
2 IEQ-CBL





3 IEQ-CBL X IPSTRESS .03 5.45c 4,102 .23 2.34c
1 T2BDI T1BDI











3 T2BHS .11 30.15s 5,101 .48 5.49s
4 IEQ-CBL X IPSTRESS .002 0.56 6,100 .07 0.75
Note. BHS-Beck Hopelessness Scale: BDI-Beck Depression Inventory: 
CBL-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire: Characterological Blame 
Subscale: IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress.
IEQ-
a e < .0001. b e < -01. c E < .05.
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Table 51
Comparisons of Regression Coefficients for Event-Inference X 
Interpersonal Stress With Those Obtained In Hopelessness 
Mediational Analyses
Interaction Term b1 S .E. 1 b2 S . E .2 t P
IEQ-CNS X IPSTRESS .039 .017 .038 .015 0.43 >.25
IEQ-DEF X IPSTRESS .050 .019 .040 .017 0.40 >.25
IEQ-BBL X IPSTRESS .036 .020 .015 .019 0.71 <.25
IEQ-CBL X IPSTRESS .035 .020 .014 .019 0.75 <.25
Note. b2-Unstandardized regression coefficient obtained in hopelessness 
mediational analysis. S.E.2-Standard error of regression coefficient 
obtained in hopelessness mediational analysis, t — [(b^  - b2)/((S • E.,,)2 + 
(S.E.2)2)]1/2, df - Nj + N2 - 4. IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress. 
IEQ-CNS-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Expected Consequences 
Subscale; IEQ-DEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Personal 
Deficiencies Subscale; IEO-BBI^»Interpersonal Events Questionnaire- 
Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEO-CBL-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire- 
Characterological Blame Subscale.
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personal deficiency inference measure (see also Table 51).
Somewhat stronger support for hopelessness theory's mediational 
predictions was obtained when behavioral and characterological blame 
were assessed. With respect to the former, the Interpersonal Stress X 
Behavioral Blame interaction term accounted for a significant 5% of the 
variance in residualized BHS change scores (see Table 49). Higher 
levels of behavioral blame were associated with Tl to T2 increases in 
hopelessness among subjects who experienced very stressful 
uncontrollable negative interpersonal events. Increases In hopelessness 
were significantly associated with corresponding increases in depressive 
symptom severity-- Tl to T2 changes in BHS scores predicted a full 22% 
of the variance in BDI change scores. Finally, the Interpersonal Stress 
X Behavioral Blame interaction term that previously predicted BDI scores 
(albeit marginally, see Table 43) was no longer significant after T2 BHS 
scores were controlled. As shown in Table 50, an identical pattern of 
results emerged for characterological blame.
The three conditions required to establish hopelessness mediation 
(cf. Baron & Kenny, 1986) were therefore satisfied in the analyses 
involving behavioral and characterological blame. Subjects who 
perceived a lack of control over highly stressful interpersonal events 
but blamed either their actions or their characters for the occurrence 
of those events exhibited increases in hopelessness expectancies from Tl 
to T2. Those expectations about the future occurrence of uncontrollable 
negative outcomes served to increase the severity of depressive 
symptomatology experienced by those subjects. It is important to note, 
though, that the regression coefficients obtained for the behavioral and
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characterological blame interaction terms in the mediational analyses on 
T2 BOX scores were not significantly different than those obtained in 
the analyses that did not control for T2 BHS scores (see Table 51). 
Summary of Event Inference Findings
Once again, little support for predictions derived from 
hopelessness theory was found in the present data. Hypothesized 
relations between dysfunctional cognitive styles and inferences about 
negative life events, as well as those between event inferences and 
depressive symptomatology, were not empirically demonstrated. Although 
higher scores on measures of Attributional Style (Interpersonal Domain) 
and Overgeneralization were reliably associated with more depressogenic 
inferences for uncontrollable interpersonal stressors, none of the 
cognitive style variables specifically predicted inferences about the 
most upsetting uncontrollable interpersonal stressors.
Hopelessness theory's predictions regarding relations between 
event inferences and depressive symptomatology fared no better. Despite 
several significant stress and event-inference main effects, changes in 
depressive symptomatology were not reliably predicted by any event- 
inference X achievement or interpersonal stress interaction. When data 
from subjects high and low in perceived control were analyzed 
separately, somewhat stronger support was obtained for an alternative 
set of predictions derived from the learned helplessness reformulation. 
Levels of stress did not interact with inferences made about 
controllable or uncontrollable negative achievement events to predict 
depressive symptoms. In addition, all but one of the stress X 
interpersonal event inference interactions were unrelated to BDI scores
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among subjects who perceived interpersonal stressors as controllable.
The exception to this pattern occurred for negative consequence 
expectancies, which predicted increases in depressive symptoms among 
subjects who experienced highly stressful but controllable interpersonal 
events.
Among subjects low in control, however, interpersonal stress 
interacted with negative consequence expectancies, perceived personal 
deficiencies, behavioral blame, and characterological blame to predict 
depressive symptomatology. Inspection of the interactions revealed that 
the magnitude of positive associations between negativistic inferences 
and Tl to T2 changes in BDI scores increased as the stressfulness of 
subjects' uncontrollable interpersonal events also increased. However, 
the strength of the interactions involving behavioral and 
characterological blame was not significantly different in the high and 
low control groups and the interpersonal stress X negative consequences 
interaction was nonsignificantly larger in the high control group. It 
therefore seems appropriate to conclude that the interpersonal stress X 
negative consequences interaction predicted depressive symptoms among 
all subjects and only the interaction of interpersonal stress X personal 
deficiencies predicted depressive symptoms exclusively among subjects 
low in perceived control. The former favors the hopelessness model, and 
the latter, the reformulated model of learned helplessness.
Finally, analyses assessing the degree to which hopelessness 
expectancies mediated the observed relations between event inferences 
and depressive symptoms yielded few conclusive findings. Hopelessness 
expectancies were not predicted by interactions of uncontrollable
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interpersonal stress and either negative consequence expectancies or 
perceived personal deficiencies. Moreover, when the analyses on 
residualized BDI change scores were repeated using T2 BHS scores as 
controls, the predictive utility of these two interaction effects did 
not diminish in magnitude.
Results of the mediational analyses using behavioral and 
characterological blame as predictors were more ambiguous.
Interpersonal stress interacted with scores on both measures to predict 
residual increases in hopelessness among subjects low in control and the 
two marginally significant stress X blame interaction effects on BDI 
change scores dropped out when hopelessness expectancies were 
statistically controlled. However, additional analyses revealed no 
difference in the strength of the behavioral and characterological blame 
interaction effects with and without the hopelessness covariate. Rather 
than applying a mediational interpretation to these findings, it may be 
more appropriate to conclude that behavioral and characterological blame 
are more highly related to hopelessness than to depressive symptoms 
among subjects who experienced highly upsetting uncontrollable 
interpersonal stressors.
Self-Esteem Deficits
A final set of analyses was conducted to evaluate hopelessness 
theory's revision of the predictions that the 1978 reformulation made 
about the cognitive precursors of self-esteem loss. The reformulated 
model postulated an exclusive association between self-esteem deficits 
and the internality-extemality dimension of causal attributions. 
Attributing uncontrollable negative outcomes to Internal causes
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(regardless of the stability or globality of those causes) was linked to 
a state of personal helplessness characterized by the belief that 
others, but not the self, could control the occurrence of important 
future outcomes. Only individuals who felt personally helpless were 
believed to suffer self-esteem loss in addition to the other symptoms of 
helplessness depression.
A growing body of evidence indicating that internal attributions
are sometimes associated with positive behavioral outcomes led to a
restatement of these predictions in the hopelessness model. Self-esteem
loss is now believed to occur among individuals who either attribute
negative outcomes to internal, stable and global causes or ascribe
derogatory characteristics to themselves when stressful life events
occur. Abramson et al. (1988, p. 363) explicitly state that
If people make internal, stable, global attributions, then they 
expect that others could attain the outcomes about which they feel 
hopeless and therefore would feel inadequate compared with others. 
In addition, lowered self-esteem should occur in cases of 
hopelessness depression when people have inferred negative 
characteristics about themselves that they view as important to 
their general self-concept and not remediable or likely to change.
The APV procedure described throughout this paper was employed 
again to test the alternative predictions that the hopelessness and 
reformulated learned helplessness models make about the cognitive 
precursors of self-esteem deficits. In each regression model estimated, 
event-inference and stress main effect variables, as well as inference X 
stress interaction terms, served as predictors of residualized changes 
in RSES scores from Tl to T2. The first set of regression equations 
tested interactions between achievement stress and composite internal, 
stable, and global attributions for an achievement stressor, internal
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attributions alone, perceived personal deficiencies, behavioral blame, 
and characterological blame. These analyses were then performed 
separately for subjects who perceived high and low levels of control 
over their most upsetting achievement stressor. Parallel tests were 
conducted using the attributional and cognition measures corresponding 
to stressful interpersonal events.
The purpose of the analyses reported in this section was not to 
predict changes in self-esteem that occur independently of changes in 
depressive symptoms. The predictions made in both the reformulated 
theory of learned helplessness and the hopelessness model pertain to the 
conditions under which self-esteem deficits will accompany depressive 
symptoms rather than the conditions that give rise exclusively to self­
esteem loss. The above quote from Abramson et al. (1988) illustrates 
this point from the perspective of hopelessness theory. Thus, although 
the overlap between depressive symptoms and self-esteem at T2 was 
substantial (r - -.67, £ < .01), T2 BDI scores were not controlled in 
any of the self-esteem analyses.
Achievement Stress
Zero-order correlations among the self-esteem, achievement stress, 
and event-cognition measures used in the first set of analyses appear in 
Table 52. Note that although internal attributions were not related to 
self-esteem levels, higher levels of achievement stress, as well as 
higher scores on the internal, stable, and global attributional 
composite and on the personal deficiencies, behavioral blame, and 




Intercorrelations Among Achievement Event Inferences. Achievement
Stress, and Self-Esteem (N - 226>
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 . T1 RSES -
2. T2 RSES .76 -
3. ACSTRESS -.17° -.23 .
4. AEQ-INT -.13b -.llb -. 06b -
5. AEQ-ATTR -.19 -.26 .25 .59 -
6. AEQ-DEF -.33 -.43 .30 .24 .42 -
7. AEQ-BBL -, 16a - .20® . 13b .53 . 12b .50 -
8. AEQ-CBL -.21° -. 25a . 08b .49 .20 .64 .76
Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at 
the £ < .01 level. RSES-Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; 
ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress; AEQ-INT-Achievement Events 
Questionnaire-Internal!ty Subscale; AEO-ATTR-Achlevement Events 
Questionnaire-Internal, Stable, and Global Composite; AE0- 
DEF-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale;
AEO-BBL-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; AEO- 
CBL-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
a g < .05. b ns.
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RSES scores were more stable across assessment sessions than were 
BDI scores (see Table 53). Nearly 60% of the variance in T2 RSES scores 
was predictable from T1 RSES scores, compared to the 40% of T2 BDI 
variance that was predictable from T1 BDI scores. This should not be 
surprising though, given that core beliefs about the self are more 
stable than depressed mood. Achievement stress, as well as the 
internal, stable, and global attributional composite, personal 
deficiency, and characterological blame main effect variables 
significantly predicted portions (ranging from 1-7%) of the remaining 
variance in T2 RSES scores. Higher scores on each of these measures 
were associated with Tl to T2 decreases in self-esteem. The internal 
attribution main effect was not significantly related to residualized 
RSES scores.
Only the characterological blame X achievement stress interaction 
was reliably associated with changes in self-esteem, accounting for two 
percent of the variance in residualized RSES scores, A slope analysis 
of this interaction revealed a significant negative relationship between 
characterological blame and self-esteem only among subjects who 
experienced the most stressful negative achievement events. Finally, it 
should be noted that weak and marginally significant effects were also 
observed for the interactions of achievement stress with composite 
internal, stable, and global attributions (p — .10) and with behavioral 
blame (p - .09).
The results of analyses performed separately for subjects who 
perceived high and low levels of control over their most stressful 
achievement events revealed few differences between groups (see Tables
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Table 53
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl1) to Time 2 (T2> Change In 
Residualized RSES Scores from Achievement Stress. Achievement 
Event Inferences. and Achievement Stress X Event Inference 
Interactions (N - 226)
Step Predictors in Set ■p2K inc F.inc df Pr t
1 T1 RSES .57 297.34° 1,224 .76 17.24a
2 AEQ-ATTR -.16 -2.37c
ACSTRESS .02 5.52b 3,222 -.12 -1.76
3 AEQ-ATTR X ACSTRESS .01 2.78 4,221 - .11 -1.67
1 T1 RSES .57 297.34a 1,224 .76 17.24°
2 AEQ-INT -.03 -0.41
ACSTRESS .01 2.74 3,222 -.15 -2.33c
3 AEQ-INT X ACSTRESS .0001 0.07 4,221 -.02 -0.26
1 Tl RSES .57 297.34a 1,224 .76 17.24°
2 AEQ-DEF -.27 -4.20°
ACSTRESS .04 11.67a 3,122 -.08 -1.19
3 AEQ-DEF X ACSTRESS .001 0.45 4,221 -.05 -0.67
1 Tl RSES .57 297.34° 1,224 .76 17.24°
2 AEQ-BBL -.11 -1.61
ACSTRESS .01 3.98 3,222 -.14 -2.14
3 AEQ-BBL X ACSTRESS .01 2.97 4,221 -.12 -1.72
1 Tl RSES .57 297.34° 1,224 .76 17.24°
2 AEQ-CBL -.14 -2.09c
ACSTRESS .02 4.90b 3,222 -.15 -2.23c
3 AEQ-CBL X ACSTRESS .01 4.32° 4,221 -.14 -2.08c
Note . RSES-Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale: ACSTRESS-■Achievement Event
Stress; AEO-INT-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Internallty Subscale;
AEQ-ATTR-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Internal, Stable, and Global
Composite; AEQ-DEF-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Personal
Deficiencies Subscale; AEQ-BBL-Achievement Events Questionnaire-
Behavioral Blame Subscale; AEQ-CBL-Achievement Events Questionnaire-
Characterological Blame Subscale.
a E < .0001. b £ < .01. c £ < 0^5.
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54 and 55 for zero-order correlations among the measures used in these 
analyses and Tables 56 and 57 for regression results). Although the 
attribution and event-cognition main effects were stronger predictors of 
residualized RSES change scores among subjects low in control, a 
significant achievement stress X composite attribution interaction 
emerged among subjects high in control and a marginally significant 
achievement stress X characterological blame interaction emerged among 
subjects low in control. Inspection of both interactions showed that 
event-cognition scores were negatively associated with residual RSES 
change scores at higher levels of stress.
Interpersonal Stress
A very different pattern of results occurred when residual changes 
in RSES scores were regressed on attributions and cognitions about 
negative interpersonal events (see Table 58 for Intercorrelations and 
Table 59 for regression results). Collapsed across levels of perceived 
control, higher scores on measures of interpersonal stress, perceived 
personal deficiencies, behavioral blame, and characterological blame 
predicted residual decreases In self-esteem from Tl to T2. In addition, 
a highly significant interaction, accounting for four percent of the 
variance in RSES change scores, emerged between interpersonal stress and 
internal causal attributions.
Unexpectedly, examination of this interaction revealed a pattern 
opposite to that predicted by the reformulated model. Specifically, more 
internal attributions were associated with increases In self-esteem at 
higher levels of Interpersonal stress. At first glance, the association 
between internal attributions for interpersonal stressors and increased
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Table 54
Intercorrelations Among Achievement Event Inferences. Achievement: 
Stress, and Self-Esteem Among Subjects Hiph In Perceived Control 
£N_=_I261
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 . Tl RSES .
2. T2 RSES .77 -
3. ACSTRESS -.25 -.30
4. AEQ-INT -. 13b - ,07b .04b -
5. AEQ-ATTR -. 17b - ,23a .28 .52 -
6. AEQ-DEF -.45 -.50 .38 . 12b .44 -
7. AEQ-BBL -.21° -. 19a .24 .44 .34 .40 -
8. AEQ-CBL -. 19a -. 19s .12b .41 .40 .56 .67 -
Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at 
the £ < .01 level. RSES-Roseriberg Self-Esteem Scale; ACSTRESS" 
Achievement Event Stress; AEO-INT-Achievement Events Questionnaire- 
Internality Subscale; AEO-ATTR-Achievement Events Questionnaire- 
Internal, Stable, and Global Composite; AEO-DEF-Achievement Events 
Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale; AEO-BBL-Achlevement Events 
Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; AEO-CBL-Achievement Events 
Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
a E < .05. b ns.
Table 55
Intercorrelations Among Achievement Event Inferences. Achievement
Stress, and Self-Esteem Among Subjects Low in Perceived Control
(N - 100)
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Tl RSES
2. T2 RSES .76 -
3. ACSTRESS - .07b -. 13b *
4. AEQ-INT - . 17b -. 21® -. 05b -
5. AEQ-ATTR - .22a -.32 .28 .52 -
6. AEQ-DEF - .18b -.35 .23® , 12b .55 -
7. AEQ-BBL -. 15b -.30 . 18b .44 .48 .70 -
8. AEQ-CBL -.26° - .40a . 15b .41 .51 .81 .80 -
Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at 
the £ < .01 level. RSES-Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; 
ACSTRESS-Achievement Event Stress; AEO-INT-Achievement Events 
Questionnaire-Internality Subscale; AEO-ATTR-Achi evement Events 
Questionnaire-Internal, Stable, and Global Composite; AEO- 
DEF-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale; 
AEO-BBL-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; AEO- 
CBL=Achievement Events Questionnaire-Characterological Blame Subscale.
3 2 < .05, b ns.
Table 56
Repression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl') to Time 2 (T2) Change in 
Residualized RSES Scores from Achievement Stress. Achievement 
Event Inferences. and Achievement Stress X Event Inference 
Interactions Among Subjects High in Perceived Control (N - 126)
Step Predictors in Set R2|nc i^nc df pr t
1 Tl RSES .57 162.62® 1,124 .75 12.75®
2 AEQ-ATTR -.11 -1.25
ACSTRESS .02 2.80 3,122 -.15 -1.63
3 AEQ-ATTR X ACSTRESS .02 6.53b 4,121 -.23 -2.56b
1 Tl RSES .57 162.62® 1,124 .75 12.75®
2 AEQ-INT .05 0.58
ACSTRESS .01 2.15 3,122 -.18 -2.00
3 AEQ-INT X ACSTRESS .001 0.22 4,121 -.04 -0.47
1 Tl RSES .57 162.62® 1,124 .75 12.75®
2 AEQ-DEF -.25 -2.81b
ACSTRESS .04 6.05b 3,122 -.10 -1.08
3 AEQ-DEF X ACSTRESS .0002 0.05 4,121 -.02 -0.23
1 Tl RSES .57 162.62® 1,124 .75 12.75®
2 AEQ-BBL -.02 -0.17
ACSTRESS .01 2.00 3,122 -.17 -1.92
3 AEQ-BBL X ACSTRESS .001 0.17 4,121 -.04 -0.41
1 Tl RSES .57 162.62® 1,124 .75 12.75®
2 AEQ-CBL -.06 -0.71
ACSTRESS .02 2.24 3,122 -.17 -1.94
3 AEQ-CBL X ACSTRESS .003 0.85 4,121 -.08 -0.92
Note. RSES-Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event 
Stress; AEO-INT-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Internality Subscale; 
AEO-ATTR-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Internal, Stable, and Global 
Composite; AEO-DEF-Achlevement Events Questionnaire-Personal 
Deficiencies Subscale; AEO-BBL-Achlevement Events Questionnaire- 
Behavioral Blame Subscale; AEO-CBL—Achievement Events Questionnaire- 
Characterological Blame Subscale.
® E < .0001. D p < .01. d £ - .07.
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Table 57
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl) to Time 2 (Tl'i Change In 
Residualized RSES Scores from Achievement Stress. Achievement 
Event Inferences. and Achievement Stress X Event Inference 
Interactions Among Subjects Low in Perceived Control (N - 1001
Step Predictors in Set R2in(.inc Finc df Pr t
1 Tl RSES .57 132.57° 1,98 .76 11.51°
2 AEQ-ATTR -.23 -2.28c
ACSTRESS .03 3.27° 3,96 -.05 -0.50
3 AEQ-ATTR X ACSTRESS .0004 0.09 4,95 .03 0.30
1 Tl RSES .57 132.57° 1,98 .76 11.51°
2 AEQ-INT -.14 -1.34
ACSTRESS .01 1.54 3,96 -.12 -1.22
3 AEQ-INT X ACSTRESS .001 0.14 4,95 .04 0.37




ACSTRESS .05 3,96 -.05 -0.44
3 AEQ-DEF X ACSTRESS .003 0.64 4,95 -.08 -0.80




ACSTRESS .04 3,96 -.07 -0.67
3 AEQ-BBL X ACSTRESS .01 2.59 4,95 -.16 -1.61
1 Tl RSES .57 132.57° 1,98 .76 11.51°
2 AEQ-CBL -.30 -3.12b
ACSTRESS .04 5.56b 3,96 -.08 -0.75
3 AEQ-CBL X ACSTRESS .01 3.37d 4,95 -.19 -1.84d
Note. RSES-Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; ACSTRESS-Achievement Event 
Stress; AEO-INT-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Internality Subscale; 
AEO-ATTR-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Internal, Stable, and Global 
Composite; AEO-DEF-Achievement Events Questionnaire-Personal 
Deficiencies Subscale; AEO-BBL-Achievement Events Questionnaire- 
Behavioral Blame Subscale; AEO-CBL-Achievement Events Questionnaire- 
Characterological Blame Subscale.
a p < .0001. b E < .01. c R < .05. d E — .07.
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Table 58
Intercorrelations Among Interpersonal Event Inferences.
Interpersonal Stress, and Self-Esteem (N - 226)
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Tl RSES
2. T2 RSES .76 -
3. IPSTRESS -.26 -.31 -
4. IEQ-INT -.08b - ,08b .07b -
5. IQ-ATTR -.23 -.25 .35 .66 -
6. IEQ-DEF -.37 -.44 .36 .44 .48 -
7. IEQ-BBL -.19 -.26 .28 .60 .50 .72 -
8. IEQ-CBL -.26 -.30 .26 .60 .50 .77 .85 “
Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at or 
beyond the £ < .01 level. RSES-Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; 
IPSTRESS-Internersonal Event Stress; IEO-INT-Interpersonal Events 
Questionnaire-Internality Subscale; lEO-ATTR-Interpersonal Events 
Questionnaire-Internal, Stable, and Global Composite; IE0- 
DEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale; 
IEO-BBL-Intemersonal Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale;
IE0-CBI^Interoersonal Events Questionnaire-Characterological Blame 
Subscale.
a p < .05. b ns.
Table 59
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl^  to Time 2 (T2) Change In 
Residualized RSES Scores from Interpersonal Stress. Interpersonal 
Event Inferences, and Interpersonal Stress X Event Inference 
Interactions fN — 226)
Step Predictors in Set d2K inc Finc df Pr t
1 Tl RSES .57 297.34° 1,224 .76 17.24°
2 IEQ-ATTR -.07 -0.99
IPSTRESS .01 3.74c 3,222 -.14 -2.12c
3 IEQ-ATTR X IPSTRESS .01 3.06d 4,221 .12 1.75d
1 Tl RSES .57 297.34a 1,224 .76 17.24°
2 IEQ-INT -.02 -0.30
IPSTRESS .01 3.26c 3,222 -.17 -2.53b
3 IEQ-INT X IPSTRESS .01 6.93b 4,221 .17 2.63b
1 Tl RSES .57 297.34a 1,224 .76 17.24°
2 IEQ-DEF -.22 -3.35b
IPSTRESS .03 9.00b 3,2222 -.10 1.50
3 IEQ-DEF X IPSTRESS .00 0.001 4,221 .002 0.03
1 Tl RSES .57 297.34° 1,224 .76 17.24°
2 IEQ-BBL -.13 -2.Qlc
IPSTRESS .02 5.31b 3,222 -.13 -2.00c
3 IEQ-BBL X IPSTRESS .0002 0.13 4,221 .02 0.35
1 Tl RSES .57 297.34° 1,224 .76 17.24°
2 IEQ-CBL -.14 - 2.04c
IPSTRESS .02 5.38b 3,222 -.14 -2.09c
3 IEQ-CBL X IPSTRESS .0001 0.04 4,221 .01 0.21
Note. RSES«*Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; IPSTRESS--Interpersonal Event
Stress; IEQ-INT-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Internality Subscale;
IEQ-ATTR-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Internalf Stable, and Global
Composite; IEQ-DEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Personal
Deficiencies Subscale; IEQjBBL-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-
Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEQ-CBL^Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-
Characterological Blame Subscale
a e < .0001. b £ < .01. c £ < .05. 0 e - .08.
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self-esteem appears to support the justification that hopelessness 
theorists provided for their revised self-esteem predictions. When 
considered together with a marginally significant (p - .08) 
interpersonal stress X attributional composite interaction that 
conformed to a similar pattern, however, it becomes clear that neither 
the hopelessness model nor the reformulation were supported.11
The results of parallel analyses performed separately for subjects 
who perceived high and low levels of control over interpersonal 
stressors showed that attribution-self-esteem relations similar to those 
found from the full sample emerged only among subjects who perceived 
interpersonal stressors as controllable (see Tables 60 and 61 for zero- 
order correlations among the measures used in these analyses and Tables 
62 and 63 for regression results). Specifically, higher scores on the 
measure of internal attributions and on the internal, stable, and global 
composite were both associated with increases in self-esteem at higher 
levels of controllable interpersonal stress. Among subjects who 
perceived a lack of control over negative interpersonal events, only 
interpersonal stress levels predicted residualized changes in RSES 
scores. Subjects who experienced higher levels of uncontrollable 
interpersonal stress exhibited larger decreases in self-esteem from Tl 
to T2.
Tests of the self-esteem predictions made by the hopelessness and 
reformulated learned helplessness models yielded results that were 
counter to patterns previously observed in the present research. For 
example, tests of other hypotheses highlighted the role of 
uncontrollable interpersonal stressors and cognitions associated with
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Table 60
Intercorrelations Among Interpersonal Event Inferences.
Interpersonal Stress, and Self-Esteem Among Subjects High in
Perceived Control (N — 111)
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 . Tl RSES
2. T2 RSES .76 -
3. IPSTRESS -.34 -.28 -
4. IEQ-INT -.10a -.12° .08® -
5. IQ-ATTR -.34 -.27 .39 .61 -
6. IEQ-DEF -.51 -.53 .41 .27 .44 -
7. IEQ-BBL -.28 -.31 .37 .48 .41 .60 -
8. IEQ-CBL -.33 -.38 .30 .48 .46 .71 .78 “
Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations ares significant at 
the jj < .01 level. RSES-Rosenbere Self-Esteem Scale; 
IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event Stress; IEO-INT-Interoersonal Events 
Questionnaire-Internality Subscale; IEO-ATTR-Interpersonal Events 
Questionnaire-Internal, Stable, and Global Composite; IE0- 
DEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale; 
IEO-BBI^Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; 
lEO-CBI^-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Characterological Blame 
Subscale.
Table 61
Intercorrelations Among Interpersonal Event Inferences.
Interpersonal Stress, and Self-Esteem Among Subjects Low in
Perceived Control (N — 112'>
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Tl RSES
2. T2 RSES .78 -
3. IPSTRESS - . 19b - .33 -
4. IEQ-INT - . 06b - . 04b .08b -
5. IQ-ATTR -. 15b -. 22a .34 .63 -
6. IEQ-DEF -.26 -.36 .34 .45 .44 -
7. IEQ-BBL - . 18b -. 23a .26 .54 .47 .81 -
8. IEQ-CBL -. 23a -. 24a .26 .54 .43 .79 .89 -
Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all correlations are significant at 
the £ < .01 level. RSES-Rosenbere Self-Esteem Scale;
IPSTRESS—Interpersonal Event Stress; IEO-INT-Interpersonal Events 
Questionnaire-Internality Subscale; IEO-ATTR-Interpersonal Events 
Questionnaire-Internal, Stable, and Global Composite; IEO- 
DEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Personal Deficiencies Subscale; 
IEO-BBL-Interoersonal Events Questionnaire-Behavioral Blame Subscale; 
IEO-CBl^Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Characterological Blame 
Subscale.
a E < .05. b ns.
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Table 62
Regression Models Predicting Time 1 (Tl) to Time 2 CT2’> Change in 
Residualized RSES Scores from Interpersonal Stress. Interpersonal 
Event Inferences, and Interpersonal Stress X Event Inference 
Interactions Among Subjects High in Perceived Control fN - 111^
Step Predictors in Set d 2K  inc F-inc d f Pr t
1 Tl RSES .57 146.10° 1,109 .76 12.09°
2 IEQ-ATTR -.01 -0.06
IPSTRESS .001 0.14 3,107 -.05 -0.48
3 IEQ-ATTR X IPSTRESS .02 6.29b 4,106 .24 2.51b
1 Tl RSES .57 146.10° 1,109 .76 12.09°
2 IEQ-INT - .06 -0.65
IPSTRESS .003 0.35 3,107 -.05 -0.49
3 IEQ-INT X IPSTRESS .02 6.04c 4,106 .23 2.46c
1 Tl RSES .57 146.10° 1,109 .76 12.09°
2 IEQ-DEF - .24 -2.59b
IPSTRESS .03 3.50c 3,107 .02 0.26
3 IEQ-DEF X IPSTRESS .0001 0.003 4,106 .006 0.06
1 Tl RSES .57 146.10° 1,109 .76 12.09°
2 IEQ-BBL - .14 -1.51
IPSTRESS .01 1.28 3,107 -.003 -0.04
3 IEQ-BBL X IPSTRESS .00 0.001 4,106 .002 0.03
1 Tl RSES .57 146.10° 1,109 .76 12.09°
2 IEQ-CBL -.20 -2.08
IPSTRESS .02 2.31 3,107 -.01 -0.08
3 IEQ-CBL X IPSTRESS .0002 0.06 4,106 -.02 -0.24
Note . RSES-Roseriberg Self-Esteem Scale; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress: IEQ-INT-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Internality Subscale:
lEQ-ATTR-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Internal, Stable, and Global
Composite; IEQ,-DEF-Interpersonal Events Ouestlonnalre-Personal
Deficiencies Subscale; IEQ-BBL-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-
Behavioral Blame Subscale; IEQ-CBD-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-
Characterological Blame Subscale
a £ < .0001. B £ < .01. c £ < .05.
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Table 63
Repression Models Predicting Time 1 to Time 2 CT2'> Change in
Residualized RSES Scores from Interpersonal Stress. Interpersonal 
Event Inferences, and Interpersonal Stress X Event Inference 
Interactions Among Subjects Low in Perceived Control (N — 112^
Step Predictors in Set ■d 2inc F-inc df pr t
1 Tl RSES .59 155.48B 1,110 .77 12.47°
2 IEQ-ATTR -.06 -0.60
IPSTRESS .04 5.73b 3,108 -.27 -2.96b
3 IEQ-ATTR X IPSTRESS .001 0.16 4,107 -.04 -0.40
1 Tl RSES .59 155.48s 1,110 .77 12.47°
2 IEQ-INT .15 1.60
IPSTRESS .05 6.95b 3,108 -.32 -3.48b
3 IEQ-INT X IPSTRESS .002 0.73 4,107 .08 0.85
1 Tl RSES .59 155.48° 1,110 .77 12.47°
2 IEQ-DEF -.18 -1.86d
IPSTRESS .05 7.44b 3,108 - .25 -2.66b
3 IEQ-DEF X IPSTRESS .004 1.08 4,107 -.10 -1.04
1 Tl RSES .59 155.48° 1,110 .77 12.47°
2 IEQ-BBL -.08 -0.83
IPSTRESS .04 5.91b 3,108 -.28 -3.05b
3 IEQ-BBL X IPSTRESS .003 0.76 4,107 -.08 -0.87
1 Tl RSES .59 155.48° 1,110 .77 12.47°
2 IEQ-CBL -.04 -0.39
IPSTRESS .04 5.62b 3,108 -.29 -3.16b
3 IEQ-CBL X IPSTRESS .001 0.32 4,107 -.05 -0.56
Note. RSES-Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; IPSTRESS-Interpersonal Event
Stress; IEQ-INT—Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Internality Subscale;
IEQ-ATTR-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Internal, Stable, and Global
Composite; lEQ^DEF-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-Personal
Deficiencies Subscale; IEQ-BBL-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-
Behavioral Blame Subscale; lEQ-CBL-Interpersonal Events Questionnaire-
Characterological Blame Subscale
a E < .0001. a E < .01. d E - .07.
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those events in the etiology of dysphoric affect. The results of these 
tests generally favored predictions derived from the reformulation 
rather than those stemming from hopelessness theory. Self-esteem 
deficits, on the other hand, were more predictable from cognitions 
associated with highly stressful achievement events than from those 
associated with interpersonal stressors. Moreover, relations among 
achievement stressors, achievement-event cognitions, and self-esteem 
deficits were more in line with the hopelessness model's revised 
predictions than with the original 1978 predictions. Subjects who 
blamed something about their character (presumably an internal, stable, 
and global factor) for the occurrence of highly upsetting achievement 
stressors were the most likely to experience a loss of self-esteem from 
Tl to T2. In addition, this pattern was relatively stable among 
subjects who perceived high and low levels of control over their 
negative achievement events.
Analyses of interpersonal-event cognitions yielded findings that 
were contrary to the theoretical expectations of both models under 
consideration. Internal causal attributions (and to a lesser extent, 
composite internal, stable, and global causal attributions) were 
associated with Tl to T2 increases in self-esteem among subjects who 
experienced highly upsetting stressors in the interpersonal domain. 
Subsequent analyses showed that these relations were specific to the 
subgroup of subjects who perceived interpersonal stressors as 
controllable. Although the origin of this pattern is unclear,
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cognitions about interpersonal stressors did not relate to changes in 
self-esteem in the ways suggested by either the reformulation or 
hopelessness theory.
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Ill. Conclusions and Implications
The purpose of this research was to examine the etiological 
predictions of Abramson et al.'s (1988) hopelessness model of depression 
and concurrently, to evaluate the divergent postulates of the 
hopelessness and reformulated learned helplessness theories. Although 
the findings did not consistently favor one model over another, Abramson 
et al.'s (1978) learned helplessness reformulation generally received 
greater support than did the more recently proposed theory of 
hopelessness depression.
Perceived Control and Depressive Symptoms 
The results of the present research particularly highlighted the 
importance of perceived uncontrollability (especially for negative 
interpersonal life events) in moderating relations between maladaptive 
cognitions and depressive symptoms. Tests of the hopelessness model's 
diathesis-stress and proximal contributory cause components failed to 
support Abramson et al.'s (1988) assertion that negative life events 
need not be perceived as uncontrollable in order to trigger the 
development of depressive symptoms. Collapsed across levels of perceived 
control, neither interpersonal stress nor achievement stress interacted 
with scores on measures of dysfunctional cognitive styles to predict 
changes in depressive symptomatology over time.
When data from subjects who perceived high and low levels of 
control over recent negative life events were analyzed separately, 
however, significant cognitive style X stress interactions were obtained
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among subjects who perceived a lack of control over interpersonal 
stressors. Higher scores on measures of Overgeneralization, 
Attributional Style (Interpersonal Domain), Irrational Ideas, and 
Dysfunctional Attitudes were each associated with residual increases in 
depressive symptomatology among subjects who experienced higher levels 
of uncontrollable interpersonal stress. Similar patterns were not 
observed among subjects who perceived interpersonal stressors as 
controllable or among subjects who perceived achievement stressors as 
either controllable or uncontrollable.
Scores on most measures of negativistic event inferences likewise 
failed to predict residual changes in depression scores in interaction 
with the stressfulness of negative achievement and interpersonal events 
when the data from subjects who perceived high and low levels of control 
were combined (the one exception to this pattern occurred for negative 
consequence ratings, which predicted increases in depressive symptoms 
among subjects who experienced highly upsetting interpersonal 
stressors). When low and high control groups were examined separately, 
significant event inference X stress interactions emerged only among 
subjects who perceived low levels of control over negative interpersonal 
events (negative consequence ratings once again proved to be an 
exception to this pattern in interacting with levels of interpersonal 
stress to predict depressive symptomatology increases among subjects 
high in control). As the stressfulness of uncontrollable negative 
interpersonal events increased, higher levels of perceived personal 
deficiencies, behavioral blame, and characterological blame became more 
strongly associated with residual increases in depressive symptoms over
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the three week study period.
Diathesis-stress findings similar to those obtained here have not 
been observed in other investigations of the interactive effects of 
dysfunctional cognition and life stress on depression. Although 
Abramson et al. (1978) accorded perceived uncontrollability a prominent 
role in the etiology of helplessness depression, researchers have not 
assessed subjects' perceptions of control over the stressors 
hypothesized to trigger the putative cognitive vulnerability factors.
The neglect of perceived control in this line of research probably stems 
from a number of factors. As Abramson et al. (1989) acknowledge, the 
diathesis-stress portion of the reformulated learned helplessness theory 
was not made explicit in the 1978 presentation of the model. As a 
result, most research focused on main effect relations between 
attributional style and depressive symptoms (cf. Sweeney et al., 1986; 
see Cutrona, 1983; O'Hara et al., 1982; Manly, McMahon, Bradley, & 
Davidson, 1982 for exceptions). It was not until the publication of 
hopelessness theory that this component was clearly articulated. With 
the introduction of the revised model, however, perceived control was 
eliminated from the proposed etiological pathway leading to depressive 
symptoms. Thus, when researchers began more consistently evaluating 
diathesis-stress formulations, perceived control over negative life 
events was no longer relevant to the validity of the theoretical 
propositions under consideration.
In addition, rather than focusing on experiences with individual 
stressors, many diathesis-stress investigations examined interactions of 
hypothesized vulnerability factors and scores on cumulative Indices of
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stress (i.e., the total number of stressors experienced over a certain 
time period) (e.g., Andersen, 1990; Metalsky & Joiner, 1992). It is 
more difficult, and perhaps less meaningful, to examine perceptions of 
control over negative life events when such an approach is used.
Finally, the diathesis-stress component Implicit in Beck et al.'s (1979) 
cognitive theory of depression does not attribute etiological 
significance to perceptions of control over life stressors. As such, 
perceived control has not been examined in tests of Beck et al.'s (1979) 
diathesis-stress formulation (e.g., Olinger et al., 1987; Wise & Barnes, 
1986).
The failure to assess perceptions of control over negative life 
events might partially account for the mixed findings obtained for 
diathesis-stress hypotheses. Supportive evidence has been obtained in 
some investigations (e.g., Andersen, 1990; Cutrona, 1983; Hamilton Sacks 
& Blunt Bugental, 1987; Metalsky et al., 1987; Metalsky & Joiner, 1992; 
Metalksy, Joiner, Hardin, & Abramson, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema, Seligman, & 
Girgus, 1986; O'Hara, Rehm, & Campbell, 1982; Olinger et al., 1987; Wise 
& Barnes, 1986 [college student sample]) but not in others (e.g.,
Barnett & Gotlib, 1988; 1990; Follete & Jacobson, 1987; Manly et al., 
1982; Metalsky et al., 1982; Persons & Roa, 1985; Wise & Barnes, 1986 
[clinical sample]). That is, variations in perceptions of control among 
the subjects in these studies might have played a role in the 
differences in findings across studies. This possibility receives 
support from a growing body of evidence suggesting that event cognitions 
(e.g., causal attributions for specific negative life events) predict 
the onset of depressive symptoms only among individuals who perceive
negative events as uncontrollable. Noting the gradual deemphasis of 
perceived control in learned helplessness theory and research (e.g., 
Peterson & Seligman, 1984), as well as the inconsistent and weak 
relation between event attributions and depression that had emerged from 
previous research, Brown and Siegel (1988) assessed the degree to which 
perceptions of control over recent negative life events moderated the 
relation between causal attributions and depressive symptoms in a sample 
of normal adolescents. The results of their prospective investigation 
showed that, among subjects who perceived their most stressful event as 
uncontrollable (i.e., attributed it to an uncontrollable cause), higher 
scores on a composite index of internal, stable, and global causal 
attributions were associated with increases in depressed mood. In 
contrast, among subjects who perceived their most stressful event as 
controllable, those with higher scores on the attributional index 
exhibited decreases in depressed mood. Moreover, when subjects' 
stressfulness ratings of their most upsetting events were used in a 
similar analysis in place of perceived control scores, no interactive 
relation emerged. The latter suggests that the interactive effect of 
causal attributions and perceptions of control was not merely a function 
of the overlap between event upsettingness and perceived 
controllability.
Whereas Brown and Seigel (1988) measured perceptions of event 
uncontrollability by asking subjects to rate the controllability of the 
causes of their most stressful events, Benassi et al. (1991) included 
direct measures of perceived control over life stressors in two cross- 
sectional studies and observed an identical pattern of results (but see
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Flett, Blankstein, & Kleinfeldt, 1990 for a failure to replicate this 
pattern). Evidence of a moderating role for perceived uncontrollability 
was also obtained by Pagel et al. (1985) in their analysis of depressive 
affect among spouse caregivers of Alzheimer's patients.
In Pagel et al.'s (1985) investigation, internal attributions for 
a spouse's prediagnosis symptoms interacted with control perceptions 
associated with a spouse's current problem behavior and recent illness- 
related life changes to predict both concurrent levels of depressed mood 
and increases in depressive symptomatology over time. Among subjects 
low in perceived control, internal attributions for a spouse's erratic 
behavior were associated with both high levels of current depressed 
affect and temporal increases in depressed mood. Internal attributions 
were either unrelated or negatively related to depressive symptoms among 
subjects who perceived more control over the consequences associated 
with a spouse's illness.
The results obtained in the Brown and Siegel (1988), Benassi et 
al. (1991), and Pagel et al. (1985) studies converge in their support of 
the reformulated theory of learned helplessness and are generally 
consistent with the present diathesis-stress and event-cognition 
findings. These findings also lend credibility to the suggestion made 
here that more consistent support for the interaction of dysfunctional 
cognitive styles and negative life events might have been obtained if 
the perceived controllability of life stressors had been assessed in 
previous diathesis-stress investigations. As Brown and Siegel (1988, p. 
316) note, "...the ability of causal judgments to predict depression may 
be diluted or obscured if the causes of negative events are perceived as
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controllable and perceptions of control are not taken into account."
By analogy, the failure of researchers to examine perceptions of control 
over life stressors might account for the equivocal support that has 
heretofore been obtained for diathesis-stress hypotheses. The results 
of the present study underscore the need to assess perceptions of 
control over the stressors that are believed to trigger the development 
of depressive symptomatology in cognitively vulnerable individuals.
Before leaving the topic of perceived control, it is important to 
note that, shortly after the publication of Abramson et al's (1989) 
original model, hopelessness theory was revised and extended by Alloy, 
Kelly, Mineka, and Clements (1990). As implied by its name, Alloy et 
al.'s "helplessness-hopelessness model of anxiety and depression" seeks 
to account for the comorbidity of depressive and anxious symptoms within 
single illness episodes (intra-episode comorbidity) as well as the 
comorbidity of depressive and anxious episodes across the life span 
(lifetime comorbidity). The revision of particular relevance to the 
present discussion is the inclusion of controllability perceptions in 
the etiological sequence believed to lead to a hopelessness expectancy 
(now described as a highly certain negative outcome expectancy combined 
with a highly certain helplessness expectancy).12,13 Whereas attributing 
important negative life events to stable and global causes gives rise to 
the negative outcome expectancy component of hopelessness (and therefore 
the symptoms of hopelessness depression), Alloy et al. (1990) suggested 
that a perceived lack of control over negative events fosters a 
helplessness expectancy which, in turn, leads to the development of 
depressive symptoms.
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It might appear at first glance that, although troublesome to the
original hopelessness model, the pattern of event cognition findings
obtained in the present study and reported by Brown and Siegel (1988),
Benassi et al. (1991), and Pagel et al. (1985) is consistent with Alloy
et al.'s (1990) helplessness-hopelessness model. A close inspection of
that model, however, shows that this is not the case. The proximal
contributory cause component of Alloy et al.’s model regards control
perceptions and causal attributions as independent rather than
interactive etiological factors. That is, either attributing a negative
life event to a stable and global cause or perceiving a lack of control
over that event is believed to increase the likelihood of hopelessness
expectancies and the subsequent development of depressive symptoms.
Alloy et al. (1990) clearly do not suggest that helplessness
expectancies stem from stable and global causal attributions that are
made exclusively about uncontrollable stressors. As will be shown
below, however, the link between hopelessness expectancies and
depressive symptoms proposed by both Alloy et al. (1990) and Abramson et
al. (1988) is actually better accounted for by an interaction of
maladaptive event cognitions and perceptions of uncontrollability than
by independent effects of event cognitions and control perceptions.
When describing the proximal sufficient cause of hopelessness
depression, Alloy et al. (1990, p. 511) note that
Although helplessness [the expectation that one can not control the 
future occurrence of negative outcomes] is a necessary component of 
hopelessness, It is not sufficient to produce hopelessness. For 
hopelessness to develop, helplessness must be accompanied by a high 
degree of certainty about the expected occurrence of negative 
outcomes (Garber, Miller, & Abramson, 1980) [see also Abramson et 
al. (1988, p. 359)].
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The linkages that Alloy et al. (1990) proposed between causal 
attributions and negative outcome expectancies, and between perceived 
uncontrollability and helplessness expectancies, do not logically follow 
from the above claim. If hopelessness expectancies are defined by the 
joint presence of a highly certain negative outcome expectancy and a 
highly certain helplessness expectancy, it is unclear how stable and 
global attributions can be associated with depressive symptoms via only 
the negative outcome expectancy component or how control perceptions can 
be associated with depression exclusively through the helplessness 
expectancy component.
If the formation of hopelessness expectancies was hypothesized to 
stem from both a perceived lack of control over negative outcomes and 
stable and global causal attributions, such a logical inconsistency 
would not exist. The perception of uncontrollability would account for 
the development of the helplessness expectancy whereas stable and global 
attributions would account for the development of the negative outcome 
expectancy. Thus, only an interactive relation between control 
perceptions and causal attributions is able to adequately explain the 
occurrence of both components of the proposed proximal sufficient cause 
of hopelessness depression.
Although Alloy et al.'s (1990) revision of hopelessness theory 
reintroduces perceptions of event uncontrollability back into the 
learned helplessness framework, it does so in a manner that is 
inconsistent with other central theoretical postulates. Careful 
consideration of the Abramson et al. (1978), Abramson et al. (1989), and 
Alloy et al. (1990) models suggests that the predictions made by the
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former regarding the interactive effects of perceived control and causal 
attributions have not only been validated at the empirical level but are 
more theoretically sound.
One final aspect of Alloy et al.'s (1990) revision of hopelessness 
theory deserves comment here. The diathesis-stress portion of Alloy et 
al.'s model hypothesizes that a generalized tendency to perceive a lack 
of control over negative outcomes may render individuals vulnerable to 
becoming hopeless just as a negativistic attributional style does. Like 
similar predictions within the hopelessness framework, a "depressogenic 
perception of control style" (p. 514) is believed to increase the 
likelihood that particular negative life events will be perceived as 
uncontrollable and should, therefore, foster the development of 
helplessness expectancies only when negative life events are 
encountered. Alloy and Clements (1992) evaluated predictions
derived from Alloy et al.'s (1990) expansion of hopelessness theory's 
diathesis-stress component and obtained generally supportive evidence. 
Specifically, they evaluated the hypothesis that individuals who exhibit 
an illusion of control (i.e., perceive a contingency between a 
particular response and the occurrence of a particular outcome when no 
such contingency exists) will be less likely than those with more 
accurate perceptions of response-outcome noncontingency to become 
hopeless and experience depressive symptoms in response to laboratory- 
induced and real-life stressors.
Subjects completed a standard judgment of contingency problem and 
then worked on an insoluble block-design task during the first phase of 
Alloy and Clements' (1992) investigation. Analysis of pre- to post-task
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changes in scores on the MAACL hostility, anxiety, and depression 
subscales showed that exposure to the uncontrollable failure had no 
adverse effect on the affective experiences of subjects who exhibited an 
illusion of control on the contingency problem. In fact, levels of 
hostility, anxiety, and depressive affect among these subjects actually 
declined slightly following exposure to the insoluble problems. In 
contrast, subjects who more accurately perceived a lack of control on 
the contingency problem displayed residual increases in hostile, 
anxious, and depressive affect after working on the insoluble block- 
design task.
The second phase of Alloy and Clement's (1992) study was conducted 
when subjects returned one month later to complete measures of recent 
negative life events, event-related stress and discouragement (i.e., 
hopelessness), and depressive symptomatology. Phase one contingency 
judgments significantly predicted residual changes In levels of stress 
and discouragement stemming from the recent occurrence of negative life 
events. The more control subjects perceived over the response 
noncontingent outcome, the larger their phase one to phase two decreases 
were in event-based stress and discouragement. This effect emerged even 
after statistically controlling for phase one levels of perceived 
stress, discouragement, and depressive symptomatology.
In line with Alloy et al.'s (1990) diathesis-stress hypotheses, 
the interaction of subjects' phase one judgment of control scores and 
the number of negative life events experienced over the previous month 
was a significant predictor of residual changes in depressive 
symptomatology. Among subjects who recently experienced a large number
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of life stressors, only those who failed to exhibit an illusion of 
control experienced an increase in depressive symptoms. Phase one to 
phase two increases in depressive symptom severity were not observed 
among the subset of highly stressed subjects who fell prey to the 
illusion of control.
Similar support for Alloy et al.'s (1990) contention that the 
tendency to perceive a lack of control over negative events predisposes 
individuals to depressive symptomatology was not obtained in the present 
research. Of the five cognitive vulnerability measures administered to 
subjects, only scores on Levenson's (1981) locus of control scale failed 
to interact with stress ratings to predict residual changes in 
depressive symptomatology among subjects who perceived a lack of control 
over negative interpersonal events (see Table 17). Subjects with an 
external locus of control orientation were no more likely than their 
internally-oriented counterparts to exhibit increases in depressive 
symptoms in the face of highly upsetting uncontrollable interpersonal 
stressors.
An examination of the alpha coefficient reliabilities in Table 1 
shows that the internal consistency of the locus of control composite 
was equal or superior to that of the other cognitive vulnerability 
measures used in this research. Psychometric inadequacies do not, 
therefore, appear to account for the failure of locus of control 
orientation to predict residual depression scores. Thus, despite 
repeated demonstrations of a significant association between an external 
locus of control orientation and elevated levels of depressive symptoms 
(see Benassi, Sweeney, & Dufuor, 1988 for a comprehensive review of this
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research), the current findings did not support an etiological role for 
locus of control orientation in the onset of depressive symptoms.
Specific Vulnerability and the Dsnressogenic Consequences of Life
Stressors
Hopelessness theory's predictions regarding the domain specificity 
of attributional style and life stressor effects were also not supported 
in this study. Stronger tendencies to make stable and global 
attributions for negative interpersonal outcomes and for negative 
achievement outcomes were associated with T1 to T2 increases in 
depressive symptomatology among subjects who experienced highly 
upsetting uncontrollable interpersonal stressors. Neither attributional 
style in the achievement domain nor attributional style in the 
interpersonal domain interacted with the severity of subjects' 
uncontrollable achievement stressors to predict changes in levels of 
depressed mood.
These findings are inconsistent with the results obtained by 
Metalsky et al. (1987) in the only other study that explicitly evaluated 
hopelessness theory's diathesis-stress congruency hypothesis. Metalsky 
et al. found that attributional style for achievement outcomes, but not 
for Interpersonal outcomes, predicted the severity of undergraduates’ 
depressive reactions to a disappointing performance on a midterm 
examination. Tests of analogous specific vulnerability hypotheses put 
forth by Beck (1983) and by various psychodynamic theorists (e.g.,
Blatt, Quinlan, Chevron, McDonald, & Zuroff, 1982) have, however, 
yielded stronger congruency effects in the interpersonal domain than in 
the achievement domain (e.g., Hammen et al., 1985; Hammen, Ellicott, &
186
Gitlin, 1989; Robins, 1990, Study One; Robins & Block, 1988; Segal,
Shaw, & Vella, 1989; Segal, Shaw, Vella, &Katz, 1992).
For example, Hammen et al. (1985) assessed levels of depressive 
symptomatology as well as experience with interpersonal and achievement 
stressors among undergraduates categorized as either dependent (i.e., an 
interpersonal domain vulnerability) or self-critical (i.e., an 
achievement domain vulnerability). Within-group comparisons revealed 
that, among dependent subjects, depressive symptomatology was more 
highly correlated with the severity of interpersonal stress experienced 
over the four month study period than with the severity of achievement 
event stress. The reverse pattern was not observed among the self- 
critical group. That is, levels of depressed mood among self-critical 
subjects were not differentially associated with the severity of 
achievement and interpersonal stress. In addition, the results of 
between-group comparisons showed that the magnitude of the interpersonal 
stress-depression association was larger among dependent subjects than 
it was among self-critical subjects. The magnitude of the achievement 
stress-depression relation did not reliably differ, however, in the 
dependent and self-critical groups.
In a more recent investigation, Segal et al. (1989) found that 
levels of interpersonal stress experienced over a six month period were 
significantly correlated with the severity of depressive symptoms and 
the likelihood of relapse among remitted depressives characterized as 
dependent. Moreover, relapse among these subjects was more likely to 
follow periods of increased interpersonal stress than periods of 
elevated achievement stress. Segal et al. failed to observe
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corresponding patterns among a subset of remitted depressives 
characterized as self-critical.
The results of these and other studies have led researchers to 
speculate about possible differences between achievement and 
interpersonal stressors that might influence the strength and nature of 
their association with depressive symptoms among vulnerable individuals. 
Hammen et al. (1985) suggested that, because the base rate of negative 
achievement events is high in student populations, undergraduates might 
perceive the occurrence of those events as normative. If students do 
not regard negative achievement events as particularly diagnostic of 
their individual self-worth or competency level, experience with such 
events should have little adverse impact on mood. Taking a somewhat 
different perspective, Segal et al. (1992) pointed out that 
interpersonal stressors often take the form of discrete losses (e.g., 
the breakup of a romantic relationship) and result in highly salient 
disruptions in one's life whereas achievement stressors frequently 
reflect more gradual deteriorations in existing conditions (e.g., one 
poor performance on a course exam). As such, the threshold for 
depressive reactions might be lower for interpersonal stressors and/or 
the depressogenic effects of negative interpersonal events might become 
apparent more quickly after their occurrence. Achievement stress, on 
the other hand, might contribute to depressive symptomatology in an 
additive or cumulative fashion.
In the present study, high scores on all vulnerability measures 
(except locus of control) were associated with T1 to T2 increases in 
depressive symptomatology among individuals who experienced high levels
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of uncontrollable interpersonal stress but not among those who 
experienced high levels of uncontrollable achievement stress. Like 
those obtained by Hammen et al. (1985) and Segal et al. (1992), these 
findings also suggest that important contextual and/or perceptual 
differences exist between achievement and interpersonal stressors. To 
better understand the nature of those differences, I compared subjects' 
perceptions of and inferences about their most upsetting T2 achievement 
and interpersonal stressors. Overall, there were no differences in the 
degree to which subjects perceived personal deficiencies, expected 
adverse consequences, or blamed their characters for the occurrence of 
negative achievement and interpersonal events (es ranged from .19 to 
.43). Subjects perceived their negative achievement experiences as more 
upsetting (e — .003) and more internally caused (e < .0001) than their 
negative interpersonal experiences, and were more likely to blame their 
behavior for the former than for the latter (e  < .0001). Interpersonal 
stressors, on the other hand, were perceived as less controllable (e < 
.0001) and as caused by factors that were more stable and global (e < 
.0001).
The results of these comparisons are inconsistent with the 
proposals offered by both Hammen et al. (1985) and Segal et al. (1992). 
With respect to the former, achievement stressors were not less likely 
than interpersonal stressors to be regarded as relevant to one's self- 
worth. With respect to the latter, subjects did not expect the 
consequences of interpersonal stressors to be any more severe than those 
of achievement stressors and actually regarded negative achievement 
events as more upsetting than negative interpersonal events.
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Alternatively, these findings suggest that variations in control 
perceptions and causal attributions for interpersonal and achievement 
stressors were responsible for the differential associations between 
these events and depressive symptoms among vulnerable subjects. It is 
possible that highly uncontrollable experiences that are attributed to 
stable and global factors trigger increases in depressive symptoms among 
vulnerable individuals, regardless of the domain in which those 
experiences fall. This is, of course, consistent with the predictions 
of the reformulated learned helplessness model (expect for the fact the 
1978 theory also discussed internal attributions as important to the 
etiology of depressive symptomatology). The finding that levels of 
dysfunctional cognitive styles interacted exclusively with stressfulness 
of negative interpersonal events might therefore have less to do with 
the interpersonal nature of those events than with the placement of 
those events on the control and attributional dimensions.
This line of reasoning implies that the stressfulness of negative 
achievement events would have combined with levels of dysfunctional 
cognitive style to predict changes in depressive symptoms if those 
events were perceived as uncontrollable as negative interpersonal events 
were. In an effort to evaluate this prediction, cognitive style X 
achievement stress interactions were examined among a subset of subjects 
(n - 56) whose perceived control ratings for their most upsetting T2 
achievement stressors fell above A.5 (the median perceived control 
rating for subjects' most upsetting T2 interpersonal stressors). As 
shown in Table 64, the results of regression analyses provided 
preliminary support for this prediction. Levels of achievement stress
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Table 64
Regression Hodels Predicting Time 1 (Tl") to Time 2 (T2) Change in 
Residualized BDI Scores from Achievement Stress. Dysfunctional 
Cognitive Style, and Achievement Stress X Dysfunctional Cognitive 
Style Interactions Among Subjects Who Provided Event Control 
Ratings Greater Than 4.5 (N — 56)
Step Predictors in Set R2jme F.inc df pr t
1 T1 BDI .43 40.29a 1,54 .64 6.35a
2 EASQ-ACGEN .08 0.58
ACSTRESS .03 1.44 3,52 .22 1.65
3 EASQ-ACGEN X ACSTRESS .003 0.25 4,51 .07 0.50
1 Tl BDI .43 40.29® 1,54 .64 6.35®
2 DYSATT .13 0.97
ACSTRESS .04 1.76 3,52 .21 1.56
3 DYSATT X ACSTRESS .03 2.79d 4,51 .23 1.67d
1 Tl BDI .43 40.29® 1,54 .64 6.35®
2 IRRIDEAS .31 2.36b
ACSTRESS .08 4.19b 3,52 .22 1.60
3 IRRIDEAS X ACSTRESS .02 2.16® 4,51 .20 1.47e
1 Tl BDI .43 40.29® 1,54 .64 6.35®
2 OVERGEN .17 1.22
ACSTRESS .04 2.05 3,52 .21 1.56
3 OVERGEN X ACSTRESS .004 0.38 4,51 -.09 -0.61
1 Tl BDI .43 40.29® 1,54 .64 6.35®
2 LOCUS - .03 -0.19
ACSTRESS .03 1.29 3,52 .22 1.60
3 LOCUS X ACSTRESS .04 4.19c 4,51 .28 2.05c
Note. BDI-Beck Depression Inventory; AC S TR ES S-Ach i evement Event Stress;
EASO-ACGEN-Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire-Achievement Events
Generality Composite; DYSATT-Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale ;
IRRIDEAS-Irrational Ideas Inventory; OVERGEN-Overgeneralization Subscale
of the Attitudes Toward Self Scale; LOCUS-Powerful Others and Chance
Locus of Control Composite
® £ < .0001. b £ - .01. c £ < .05. d E - .10. e E < .15.
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interacted with Locus of Control scores and, marginally, with scores on 
the Irrational Ideas (p — .15) and Dysfunctional Attitudes (p. — .10) 
scales. Further examination of these effects showed that as the 
stressfulness of highly uncontrollable achievement events increased, 
higher scores on all three measures were more strongly predictive of 
residual increases in levels of depressive symptoms. Similar relations 
were not observed for scores on the Overgeneralization and Attributional 
Style (Achievement Domain) measures.
These findings help to clarify the inconsistent results obtained 
for interpersonal and achievement stressors in the diathesis-stress and 
specific vulnerability analyses. They also reinforce conclusions drawn 
earlier regarding the importance of perceived uncontrollability to the 
onset of depressive symptomatology, and in doing so, again point to the 
theoretical superiority of the reformulated learned helplessness model 
over the hopelessness model.
The results of these supplemental analyses might also prove useful 
in efforts to determine why tests of specific vulnerability hypotheses 
have frequently yielded stronger support in the interpersonal domain.
The recent focus on life stressors in achievement and interpersonal 
domains has advanced our understanding of the ways in which negative 
life events precipitate depressive symptomatology. However, the 
confounding of event domain with other characteristics such as 
controllability and causal attributions might ultimately serve to 
obscure the role that the latter factors play in the etiology of 
depression. As in the present study, future research might benefit by 
looking beyond event domain to the contextual and psychological
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dimensions on which negative achievement and interpersonal events vary.
Event Cognitions as Mediators of Diathesis-Stress Effects
In their reformulation of learned helplessness theory, Abramson et 
al. (1978) regarded casual attributions for specific negative outcomes 
as the mechanisms through which a negativistic attributional style 
exerted its effects on depressive symptoms. Although hopelessness 
theorists (Abramson et al., 1989) expanded the domain of proximal 
contributory causes to include personal deficiency and negative 
consequence inferences, they did not modify the reformulation's 
hypotheses about the mediating role of specific event cognitions.
Tests of these mediational hypotheses failed to support the 
predictions from either model. Event cognition scores were not 
predictable from interactions of cognitive styles and levels of 
uncontrollable interpersonal stress. The failure of event cognitions to 
mediate the interactive relations observed among dysfunctional cognitive 
styles, uncontrollable interpersonal stress, and depressive symptoms is 
surprising in light of the fact that higher scores on most event 
cognition measures predicted increases in depressive symptomatology 
among subjects who perceived a lack of control over highly stressful 
interpersonal life events. Rather than playing a mediating role, 
maladaptive event cognitions appeared to have affected depressive 
symptoms independently of dysfunctional cognitive styles.
Most of the published research on hopelessness theory has focused 
exclusively on the model's diathesis-stress hypotheses (e.g., Alloy & 
Clements, 1992; Andersen, 1990; Metalsky & Joiner, 1992; Metalsky et 
al., 1993). Despite their prominent and more proximal association with
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hopelessness expectancies and depressive symptoms, measures of event 
cognitions have only infrequently been included in studies that also 
assess dysfunctional cognitive styles (cf. Hammen, 1988) . Mediational 
predictions specific to Abramson et al.'s (1978) reformulated learned 
helplessness theory have been evaluated, but only in several 
investigations (Cutrona, 1983; Follette & Jacobson, 1987; Metalsky et 
al., 1987). Although more definitive conclusions admittedly await 
additional research, the evidence collected to date provides, at best, 
limited support for these predictions.
For example, Cutrona (1983) examined associations between 
prepartum responses to the six negative outcomes on the Attributional 
Style Questionnaire (Peterson et al., 1982) and causal attributions for 
postpartum "maternal blues," highly upsetting child-care stressors, and 
daily life stressors. Although the ASQ scores of initially nondepressed 
women predicted levels of depressive symptomatology at two and eight 
weeks postpartum, attributional style was not significantly correlated 
with any of the postpartum measures of stressful event attributions. 
Moreover, two of Cutrona's three postpartum event attribution measures 
failed to predict levels of concurrent depressed mood, and prepartum ASQ 
scores remained significant predictors of postpartum depressive 
symptomatology after the effects of event attributions were 
statistically controlled.
Follette and Jacobson (1987) and Metalsky et al. (1987) did obtain 
significant correlations between scores on the Extended Attributional 
Style Questionnaire and causal attributions for exam performance among 
students who were disappointed with their exam grade (failure group).
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However, in neither of these studies was the same correlation examined 
among students who were satisfied with their exam performance (success 
group). Such an approach does not provide a stringent test of 
mediational hypotheses that predict exclusive associations between 
dysfunctional cognitive styles and cognitions about highly stressful 
outcomes (cf. Alloy et al., 1988). Unequivocal support for these 
predictions requires that maladaptive attributions are made only by 
cognitively vulnerable individuals who experience a highly a stressful 
event (i.e., as indicated by a significant cognitive style X stress 
interaction). At a minimum, Follete and Jacobson (1987) and Metalsky et 
al. (1987) should have demonstrated that the magnitude of the 
attributional style-exam attribution relation was stronger in the high 
stress (failure) group than in the low stress (success) group.
In addition, the attributional style X exam stress interaction was 
not a reliable predictor of depressive symptoms in Follette and 
Jacobson's (1987) study. As such, the significant association that they 
observed between ASQ scores and exam attributions does not bear on the 
validity of the mediational predictions proposed by learned helplessness 
reformulators. Metalsky et al. (1987) did find that the interaction of 
attributional style X exam stress was a significant predictor of 
subsequent depressed mood. They also demonstrated that, among failure 
students, exam attributions accounted for a significant portion of the 
variance in depressive symptoms and that the ASQ scores of those 
students were no longer predictive of depressed mood after exam 
attributions were statistically controlled. Although Metalsky et al.'s 
(1987) findings are generally consistent with the predictions advanced
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by the reformulated learned helplessness and hopelessness models, the 
small number of subjects used in their mediational analyses (n - 23) and 
the failure to observe a significant relation between exam attributions 
and depressive symptoms after controlling for ASQ scores weakens any 
conclusions that can be drawn from that research.
The results obtained in the present mediational analyses were not 
supportive of model hypotheses insofar as dysfunctional cognitive styles 
did not exclusively predict cognitions about subjects' most stressful 
uncontrollable interpersonal experiences. However, the fact that scores 
on several dysfunctional cognitive style measures were related to 
subjects' cognitions about all of the uncontrollable negative 
interpersonal events reported at T2 (i.e., irrespective of the 
stressfulness of those events) should not be regarded as theoretically 
unimportant. Subjects with certain cognitive vulnerabilities were more 
likely than their counterparts to make particular maladaptive inferences 
about the highly upsetting interpersonal stressors over which they 
perceived a lack of control. That cognitively vulnerable individuals 
imposed similar interpretations on less upsetting uncontrollable 
interpersonal stressors does not negate this fact. In other words, the 
failure of dysfunctional cognitive styles to confer a specific risk for 
depressogenic inferences about the most stressful of subjects' 
experiences does not diminish the fact that depressogenic inferences 
were made about these experiences.
Although cognitively vulnerable subjects made maladaptive 
inferences about less upsetting stressors, those inferences were not 
associated with Increases in depressive symptomatology. Perceived
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personal deficiencies, negative consequence expectancies, behavioral
blame, and characterological blame predicted changes in levels of
depressed mood only when they were associated with the most stressful of
subjects' uncontrollable interpersonal outcomes. In this sense, the
results of the mediational analyses are not at odds with hopelessness
theory even though they did not conform to the model's prediction that
the interaction of the hypothesized cognitive diatheses and 
negative life events should increase the likelihood that 
individuals will make negative interpretations (i.e., internal, 
stable, and global attributions or biased personal inferences) for 
the particular negative events they encounter (Alloy et al., 1988, 
p. 36).
The results of the mediational analyses also bear on a number of 
subsidiary issues related to cognitive style and event cognition 
associations. Several researchers have expressed doubt about the cross- 
situational consistency of causal attributions, suggesting that 
attributions for hypothetical outcomes bear little or no relation to 
attributions for real-life stressors (Cutrona et al., 1984; Miller,
Klee, & Norman, 1982). Cutrona et al. (1984), for example, reanalyzed 
data from Cutrona's (1983) postpartum depression investigation and 
reported relatively modest correlations between ASQ scores and causal 
attributions for post-delivery stressors. Moreover, the magnitude of 
those associations did not substantially increase when data were 
examined separately for women whose responses to the six hypothetical 
ASQ outcomes were most consistent. Similarly, Miller et al. (1982) 
failed to observe significant associations between the attributions 
depressed inpatients made about a real life stressor and those made 
about either hypothetical or experimentally-created negative outcomes.
In contrast to those findings, the tendency to make stable and
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global causal attributions for hypothetical negative interpersonal 
outcomes was predictive of stability and globality attributions for 
specific (uncontrollable) interpersonal stressors in the present 
research. It is likely that tests of the cognitive style-event 
inference relation have yielded inconsistent findings because cognitions 
about any one event are influenced by a number of different factors. 
Hopelessness theorists are quick to point out that the interpretation 
given to any one stressor will be a function of dispositional factors 
such as attributional style, the specific nature of the event, and the
context within which the event occurs. In light of these
considerations, it becomes clear that the validity of hypothesized 
associations between dysfunctional cognitive styles and maladaptive 
event inferences should not rise and fall based on correlations (or lack 
thereof) between cognitive style measures and inferences made about a 
single real life event. In fact, such an approach represents an 
extremely stringent test of such hypotheses.
Following the lead of attitude-behavior researchers (cf. Ajzen &
Fishbein, 1977; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974; Weigel, Vernon, & Tognacci, 
1974), a more fruitful approach to this question might be to assess 
relations between dysfunctional cognitive styles and inferences made 
about a number of different real-life stressors. For example, Cutrona 
et al. (1984) found that ASQ scores were more highly related to 
attributions averaged over 14 stressors (r - .263, p < .01) than to 
attributions averaged over only three stressors (r - .136, ns) . Thus, 
before more definitive conclusions are drawn regarding the cross- 
situational consistency of causal attributions, researchers should await
the results of tests similar to those suggested here.
Finally, it should be noted that a certain level of specificity 
between dysfunctional cognitive styles and event inferences is implied 
in the hopelessness model. Hopelessness theory seems to suggest that 
tendencies to attribute negative outcomes to stable and global causes 
will be related to stable and global event attributions but not to 
negative consequence expectancies or perceived personal deficiencies.
No such specificity was observed in the present research. Attributional 
style was related not only to event attributions but to negative 
consequence expectancies, perceived personal deficiencies, behavioral 
blame, and characterological blame. The same was true for scores on the 
overgeneralization measure. This pattern of findings is inconsistent 
with the specific cognitive style-event inference relations implied by 
hopelessness theorists and suggests that at least some dysfunctional 
cognitive styles leave individuals vulnerable to making a host of 
negativistic inferences when life stressors occur.
Hopelessness as a Mediator of Dysfunctional Cognitive Style and 
Maladaotive Event Inference Effects
The subtype of depression described by Abramson et al. (1989) is 
defined by the causal precedence of hopelessness expectancies. Yet the 
cognitive style and event inference measures that predicted increases in 
depressive symptoms among subjects who experienced highly upsetting 
uncontrollable interpersonal stressors were unrelated to levels of 
hopelessness among the same subjects. The only exceptions to this 
pattern occurred for interactions of uncontrollable interpersonal stress 
and behavioral as well as characterological blame. Careful scrutiny of
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the latter, however, suggested a closer association with hopelessness 
expectancies than with depressive symptoms. The general failure of 
hopelessness expectancies to mediate relations between depressive 
symptomatology and either dysfunctional cognitive styles or maladaptive 
event inferences has potentially crucial implications for the validity 
of Abramson et al.'s (1989) model (and for the 1978 reformulation of 
learned helplessness theory which makes similar predictions).
Evidence that hopelessness mediates relations between depressive 
symptoms and either dysfunctional cognitive styles or maladaptive event 
inferences has also proven somewhat elusive in other investigations that 
included measures of future outcome and control expectancies. Complete 
mediation has rarely been established. Metalsky et al.'s (1993) study 
of depressive symptoms among undergraduate students who recently 
received feedback regarding their grades on a midterm exam was the only 
study I located that demonstrated such an effect. In that study, a 
three-way interaction of attributional style, self-esteem, and exam 
performance predicted changes in both depressive symptom and 
hopelessness levels following the receipt of exam grades. Pre- to post­
grade increases in depressive symptoms as well as hopelessness 
expectancies were observed only among low-scoring subjects who reported 
relatively low levels of achievement self-esteem and who exhibited a 
tendency to attribute negative achievement outcomes to stable and global 
causes. Metalsky et al. (1993) established the mediational role of 
future outcome expectancies by showing that levels of hopelessness 
reported at one day post-grade predicted levels of depressed mood 
reported at two, three, and four days post-grade. Moreover, the
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attributional style X self-esteem X exam performance interaction that 
previously predicted post-grade levels of depressive symptomatology no 
longer did so after the effects of that interaction on hopelessness 
expectancies were statistically controlled.
Unlike the research just described, most studies have either 
demonstrated only partial mediation (Alloy & Clements, 1992; Metalsky & 
Joiner, 1992) or have failed to demonstrate mediation altogether 
(Andersen, 1990; McEvoy DeVellis & Blalock, 1992; Riskind et al., 1987). 
Alloy and Clements (1992), for example, found that perception of control 
styles (i.e., judgments of control over a noncontingent outcome) 
assessed at Tl interacted with the number of negative life events 
reported at T2 to predict both the degree of discouragement (i.e., 
hopelessness) subjects experienced following the occurrence of those 
stressors and Tl to T2 changes in levels of depressed mood. When 
discouragement ratings were entered as a control variable in the 
regression equation predicting residual changes in depressive symptoms, 
the effect of the control X stress interaction was reduced in strength 
(i.e., the Beta for the interaction decreased from -.20 to -.16) but 
remained a significant predictor of residualized depression scores (p < 
.05). Although Alloy and Clements (1992) interpreted the reduction in 
the control X stress interaction Beta as support for partial mediation, 
it is important to note that they did not test the two Betas to 
determine whether they were significantly different (cf. Williams,
1984; see also present study). The absence of evidence indicating that 
the interaction Betas reliably differed, combined with the fact that the 
control X stress interaction remained a reliable predictor of depression
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scores after discouragement levels were controlled, weakens any 
conclusions that can be made about hopelessness mediation. At best, the 
support that Alloy and Clements obtained for hopelessness theory's 
mediation component appears preliminary.
Only slightly stronger evidence for the mediational predictions of 
hopelessness theory was obtained when Metalsky and Joiner (1992) 
examined the degree to which hopelessness expectancies accounted for the 
interactive effects of life stress and maladaptive cognitive styles on 
depressive symptomatology observed in their research. Of the three 
cognitive style X stress interactions that reliably predicted temporal 
changes in levels of depressed mood, only the effect of negativistic 
inferences about the self appeared to be mediated by hopelessness. 
Subjects who demonstrated a tendency to derogate themselves following 
the occurrence of negative outcomes and who reported a large number of 
stressful life events exhibited Tl to T2 increases in levels of both 
depressed mood and hopelessness. Time 2 hopelessness levels were 
strongly related to depressive symptoms at T2 and the interaction of 
life stress and self-derogation tendencies failed to account for a 
significant portion of the residual variance in depression scores when 
the variance attributable to hopelessness expectancies was statistically 
controlled.
Metalksy and Joiner's (1992) examination of attributional style 
scores showed that they also interacted with levels of life stress to 
predict changes in hopelessness and depressed mood. These effects were 
not interdependent, though, as the attributional style X life stress 
interaction remained reliably related to depression scores after
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accounting for hopelessness expectancies. The variance in residualized 
depression scores explained by this interaction was reduced only by 
about 2% (from 5.8% to 3.6%) when hopelessness was used as a control 
variable in the regression equation. It is not clear whether this 
reduction was a reliable one because Metalsky and Joiner failed to test 
the difference between the two interaction Betas. Less equivocal 
results were obtained for the third cognitive style X stress interaction 
assessed by Metalsky and Joiner. The interaction of generalized 
negative consequence expectancies and life stress was exclusively 
predictive of changes in depressed mood. Furthermore, the magnitude of 
this effect was unaltered when hopelessness expectancies were 
statistically controlled.
Andersen (1990) also observed a significant interactive effect of 
attributional style and life stress scores on a measure of hopelessness 
as well as depressive symptoms, but found neither complete nor partial 
hopelessness mediation. In addition, both Riskind et al. (1987) and 
McEvoy DeVellis and Blalock (1992) failed to demonstrate the predicted 
mediational role of hopelessness expectancies but found evidence for a 
moderating role instead.
Riskind et al. (1987) found no association between attributional 
style scores and scores on a concurrently administered measure of 
hopelessness nor did they find a significant relation between Tl 
hopelessness expectancies and changes in levels of depressed mood over 
the six week study period. They did demonstrate, however, that 
attributional style, by Itself, and in conjunction with hopelessness 
expectancies, predicted residualized changes In depressive
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symptomatology levels. Analysis of the attributional style X 
hopelessness interaction showed that higher levels of hopelessness were 
associated with increases in depressive symptoms only among subjects who 
tended to attribute negative outcomes to internal, stable, and global 
causes. Among subjects who tended to explain negative outcomes in terms 
of external, unstable, and specific causes, higher levels of 
hopelessness predicted decreases in depressive symptomatology.
The pattern of results obtained by Riskind et al. (1987) is
inconsistent with hopelessness theory's mediational predictions but
supports an alternative, moderating model. In the "confluence model"
suggested by Riskind and colleagues, a variety of factors in addition to
attributional style contribute to the development of hopelessness
expectancies; not all individuals with a negativistic attributional
style will become hopeless and not all individuals with negative outcome
expectancies possess a negativistic attributional style. The model also
states, however, that hopelessness will bring about increases in
depressive symptoms only among individuals who possess maladaptive
attributional tendencies. In other words, a maladaptive attributional
style and negative outcome expectancies are independent (i.e., non
causally related) risk factors, which, by themselves, are either
unrelated to or weakly related to depressive symptomatology. It is only
when these vulnerability factors combine, do they contribute to the
onset of depressive symptoms. As Riskind et al. (1987, p. 350) note
According to the confluence hypothesis, the predictive capacity of 
attributional style is contingent on the degree of correspondence 
between attributions and expectations; specifically, it states 
that the working combination of a highly negative attributional 
style and negative outcome expectations represents the worst case 
of risk for future depression. Furthermore, negative
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attributional style or expectations alone are not as indicative of 
higher levels of depression in the future.
Proponents of hopelessness theory might point out that the failure 
to assess the occurrence of negative life events limits the conclusions 
that can be drawn from Riskind et al.'s (1987) research regarding the 
role of hopelessness expectancies. That is, it could be argued that the 
failure to observe a significant relation between attributional style 
and future outcome expectancies was due to the fact that the stress 
levels of subjects were not taken into account. Neither hopelessness 
theory nor the reformulated learned helplessness model predict a main 
effect relation between attributional style and hopelessness; both 
models propose that individuals who possess a negativistic attributional 
style are at risk of becoming hopeless only when they experience high 
levels of life stress. Thus, a reliable association between 
attributional style scores and hopelessness expectancies (consistent 
with hopelessness theory's mediational component) might have emerged in 
Riskind et al.'s study if that relation had been assessed among a subset 
of subjects who had recently experienced important life stressors.
Although the failure to assess life stress might explain why 
Riskind et al. (1987) failed to establish hopelessness mediation, it can 
not adequately account for a similar observation made by McEvoy DeVellis 
and Blalock (1992) in their study of attributions, hopelessness 
expectancies, and depressive symptomatology among rheumatoid arthritis 
patients. McEvoy DeVellis and Blalock used the internality, stability, 
and globality dimensions to code spontaneous attributions that a sample 
of arthritis sufferers made for various aspects of their illness (e.g., 
onset, course, symptom flare-ups, treatment difficulties). Patients
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also completed measures of future control and outcome expectations 
regarding their disease and reported on their levels of depressed mood 
at baseline (Tl) and again four months later (T2).
McEvoy DeVellis and Blalock (1992) used these data to evaluate 
mediating and moderating models of the relations among attributions for 
illness-related events, hopelessness expectancies, and depressive 
symptomatology. Tests of the mediating model were unsupportive. 
Controlling for Tl levels of depressed mood and physical functioning, 
illness attributions (a stability-globality composite and stability 
scores alone) predicted T2 levels of depressive symptomatology but were 
unrelated to Tl hopelessness expectancies. Moreover, the use of 
hopelessness as a third control variable in the model predicting changes 
in depression levels had no effect on the strength of the attribution 
effect.
Assessment of the alternative moderating model yielded significant 
main effect relations between Tl to T2 changes in depressive 
symptomatology and both illness attributions and hopelessness 
expectancies. In addition, the interaction of attributions and 
hopelessness was a significant predictor of residualized depression 
scores. In an effort to clarify the nature of that interaction, McEvoy 
DeVellis and Blalock (1992) examined the relation between attributions 
and depressive symptoms separately for patients who felt relatively 
hopeless and relatively hopeful about their disease prognosis. Time 1 
to Time 2 increases in depressive symptomatology were reliably 
associated with more stable and global illness attributions only among 
patients who felt unable to control the future course of their illnesses
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and who were pessimistic about the long term prognosis of their 
condition. Among the more optimistic patients, illness attributions 
were unrelated to changes in depressive symptom levels over the four 
month study period.
Taken together, the results obtained by Riskind et al. (1987) and
McEvoy DeVellis and Blalock (1992) provide little support for the
mediational links among cognitions, hopelessness expectancies, and
depressive symptoms proposed by hopelessness theory. The effects of
negativistic attributions on depressive symptoms found in these studies
were not explained by attribution-hopelessness and hopelessness -
depression relations. Neither attributional style nor event
attributions predicted subjects' levels of hopelessness. Although
hopelessness theorists in no way claim that attributions and
hopelessness expectancies will be perfectly correlated, they do suggest
a nonzero relation between the two. Alloy et al. (1988, p. 36)
specifically state
The negative interpretations for particular negative life events 
(attributions or biased inferences) that a person makes should, in 
turn, increase the likelihood of forming the expectation of 
hopelessness... Again, because the particular interpretations an 
individual makes for negative events are hypothesized to 
contribute to, but not be sufficient for, the formation of 
hopelessness..., this probability linkage should be greater than 0 
but less than 1.0" (emphasis added).
Rather than operating through a mediating process, attributions worked
in conjunction with hopelessness expectancies to predict changes in
depressive symptomatology. Only the combination of negativistic
attributions and pessimistic future expectancies was related to
increases in depression.
In an effort to determine whether similar moderated relations
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were present in this research, three-way interactions between 
hopelessness expectancies (as assessed by the BHS), levels of 
interpersonal stress, and scores on the cognitive style and event 
inference measures were used to predict residual changes in depression 
among subjects who perceived a lack of control over negative 
interpersonal events. Moderator effects would be demonstrated if 
increases in depressive symptomatology were exhibited only by highly 
stressed subjects who reported both maladaptive cognitions and high 
levels of hopelessness. None of the hopelessness X stress X cognition 
interactions were significantly related to changes in levels of 
depressed mood. Thus, although the moderating effects of hopelessness 
expectancies have now been documented in several recent investigations, 
these findings were not replicated in the present research.
The failure to observe either moderating or mediating effects of 
hopelessness might be due to the fact that generalized future control 
and outcome expectancies were assessed whereas all of the cognition X 
stress findings were domain specific (i.e., pertained only to 
interpersonal stressors). In their discussion of hopelessness theory, 
Abramson et al. (1989) distinguished between circumscribed pessimism and 
generalized hopelessness. The former is said to occur when individuals 
anticipate a lack of control over a specific set of negative outcomes 
(e.g., interpersonal events) whereas the latter describes situations in 
which negative expectancies cut across multiple domains. It is perhaps 
more reasonable to expect that the maladaptive cognitions subjects held 
about uncontrollable interpersonal stressors gave rise to circumscribed 
pessimism regarding future social interactions than to generalized
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feelings of hopelessness about many different areas of their lives.
The BHS, which was used in the present study to assess 
hopelessness, is a measure of generalized future expectancies. If the 
cognition X interpersonal stress interactions that predicted increases 
in depressive symptomatology had specific effects on expectancies 
regarding future interpersonal outcomes, it is unlikely that those 
effects would have been detected by the items on the BHS. Considered in 
this light, the failure of the cognition X interpersonal stress effects 
to either predict changes in BHS scores (consistent with a mediated 
relation) or interact with BHS scores to predict changes in depressive 
symptoms (consistent with a moderating relation), becomes more 
unde r s tandab1e.
A close examination of the hopelessness measures used in other 
investigations however, suggests that the lack of sensitivity inherent 
in the BHS can not completely account for the absence of mediational or 
moderator effects in this study. Moderator effects have been obtained 
by researchers who used both generalized and domain-specific measures of 
hopelessness expectancies. In Riskind et al.'s (1987) study, for 
example, the interaction of attributional style scores and scores on a 
measure of global outcome expectancies predicted increases in depressive 
symptoms among college undergraduates. In contrast, McEvoy DeVellis and 
Blalock (1992) found that illness attributions interacted with 
expectancies regarding disease prognosis to predict changes in 
depressive symptomatology among arthritis patients.
In the Metalsky et al. (1993) investigation, which provides the 
strongest evidence in support of hopelessness mediation, attributional
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style for negative achievement outcomes and self-esteem in the 
achievement-domain interacted with performance on a midterm exam 
(achievement stress) to predict scores on a measure that assessed 
generalized hopelessness expectancies as well as expectancies regarding 
future achievement and interpersonal outcomes. In discussing their use 
of a broad-based hopelessness inventory, Metalsky et al. (1993, p. 103) 
commented that "In contrast to the original Hopelessness Scale..., the 
EHS [Extended Hopelessness Scale] includes 20 achievement-related items, 
20 interpersonal-related items, and the 20 original items. Because we 
were interested in predicting generalized hopelessness. across content 
domains, we used all 60 items of the EHS" (emphasis added). These 
results are at odds with the suggestion advanced earlier that global 
measures of hopelessness are not sufficiently sensitive to detect the 
effects of domain-specific cognitions on future outcome and control 
expectancies. Nevertheless, the level at which hopelessness 
expectancies are assessed remains an important methodological and 
theoretical issue which might account for variability in findings across 
studies.
Self-Blame and Depressive Symptoms 
Although not included among the set of proximal contributory 
causes of hopelessness depression, self-blame has been cited as a 
prominent feature of depressive thinking (Beck, 1967) that co-occurs 
with a perceived lack of control over negative outcomes (Abramson & 
Sackheim, 1979; Peterson, 1979). In discussing the relation between 
self-blame and depressive affect, Janoff-Bulman (1979) distinguished 
between behavioral blame (i.e., blaming oneself for past actions or
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inactions) and characterological blame (i.e., blaming oneself for being 
a particular type of person) and regarded only the latter as a 
maladaptive response to negative outcomes capable of bringing about 
depressive symptomatology.
According to Janoff-Bulman, blaming negative events on one's 
actions or inactions implies that similar events can be avoided in the 
future by simply altering one's behavior. Because behavioral blame 
serves to enhance expectations of future control, it should be 
associated with positive coping outcomes. Conversely, blaming a faulty 
character, which is not as readily amenable to modification, implies a 
lack of control over future negative outcomes and should therefore be 
associated with helplessness expectancies and depressive affect. 
Janoff-Bulman (1979, Study 1) attempted to validate this distinction by 
examining the manner in which relatively depressed and nondepressed 
female undergraduates allocated blame for hypothetical negative outcomes 
between their behavior, their character, other people, and the external 
environment. As predicted, relatively depressed subjects scored higher 
than their less symptomatic counterparts on the characterological blame 
measure. The expectation that behavioral blame would be higher among 
nondepressed subjects was not, however, supported. No significant 
differences emerged between the two groups in their behavioral blame 
scores.
The concurrent association that Janoff-Bulman (1979) observed 
between characterological blame and depressive symptomatology levels was 
replicated by Major, Mueller, & Hildebrandt (1985) in their study of 
abortion patients. Women who engaged in more characterological blame
211
prior to an abortion procedure exhibited higher levels of depressive 
symptomatology immediately after the procedure. Levels of behavioral 
blame were not, however, significantly related to the severity of post- 
procedure depressive symptoms. As a supplement to their cross-sectional 
data, Major et al. obtained longitudinal data on depressive symptoms 
from a subset of the women in their sample who attended a follow-up 
visit three weeks after their abortion. When pre-procedure levels of 
depressive symptomatology were controlled, neither behavioral nor 
characterological blame predicted the severity of depressed mood at the 
three week follow-up. Taken together, Janoff-Bulman's (1979, Study 1) 
findings, and those reported by Majors et al. (1985), provide little 
evidence for an etiological role of characterological blame in 
depressive disorders. Rather, they suggest that characterological blame 
is a concomitant of depressive symptomatology.
The results of the present study suggest a different conclusion 
about the etiological importance of characterological and behavioral 
self-blame. Higher levels of both behavioral and characterological blame 
for subjects' most upsetting uncontrollable interpersonal stressors were 
associated with temporal increases in hopelessness expectancies as well 
as depressive symptomatology (although the latter effects were only 
marginally significant). The findings pertaining to characterological 
blame are consistent with Janoff-Bulman's (1979) expectation that 
blaming negative events on uncontrollable aspects of the self will be 
associated with maladaptive affective outcomes. The effects of 
behavioral blame, however, are at odds with Janoff-Bulman's claim that 
blaming controllable factors for negative events protects individuals
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against the development of future helplessness expectancies and 
elevations in depressed mood.
Because characterological blame was not statistically controlled 
in the analyses involving behavioral blame, it is possible that the 
relations found between behavioral blame and both hopelessness 
expectancies and depressive symptoms were spurious. That is, the 
effects of behavioral blame might simply reflect the strong positive 
association (r - .89) between behavioral and characterological blame for 
uncontrollable interpersonal stressors. To assess this possibility, 
supplementary analyses of residual hopelessness and depression scores 
were undertaken with controls for the main effect of characterological 
blame and its interaction with levels of uncontrollable interpersonal 
stress. The interaction of behavioral blame and levels of 
uncontrollable interpersonal stress was not predictive of residual 
changes in either BHS (pr2 - .07, p « .46) or BDI for2 - .04, p *» .67) 
scores in these analyses.
Several additional points are important to the interpretation of 
these findings. First, in both the hopelessness and depressive symptom 
analyses, the Betas associated with the behavioral blame main effect (Bs 
- .36 and .06 for BHS and BDI scores, respectively) and interaction 
terms (Bs - .12 and .06 for BHS and BDI scores, respectively) remained 
positive when characterological blame scores were controlled. Thus, it 
does not appear that characterological blame served to obscure an 
otherwise negative association between behavioral blame and either 
helplessness expectancies or depressive symptomatology (cf. Janoff- 
Bulman, 1979). Second, when the behavioral blame main effect and
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interaction terms were used as a covariates in the analyses involving 
characterological blame, the characterological blame X interpersonal 
stress interaction no longer predicted changes in either hopelessness 
expectancies for2 — .08, p - .40) or levels of depressive symptomatology 
fpr2 - .06, p - .52) among subjects low in perceived control.
Thus, it was the variance shared by behavioral and 
characterological blame that was responsible for the emergence of the 
interaction effects involving both variables. It may be that a more 
general self-punitive component, which is tapped by both blame measures, 
fosters hopelessness expectancies and depressive symptomatology in 
response to uncontrollable interpersonal stressors. Given the potential 
etiological significance of self-blame suggested by the results of the 
present study, it would seem a worthy pursuit to attempt to replicate 
these findings as well as explicate the operative dimension underlying 
measures of behavioral and characterological blame.
Study Limitations and Future Research Directions
The results of this research add to a growing body of evidence 
suggesting that dysfunctional cognitive styles represent a risk factor 
for the development of depressive symptomatology. They also suggest 
that the specific inferences individuals make about the uncontrollable 
experiences they encounter moderate the severity of depressive reactions 
elicited by those events. The present findings, as well as those 
obtained in related inquiries (e.g., Alloy & Clements, 1992; Metalsky & 
Joiner, 1992; Metalsky et al., 1987, 1993), suggest an optimistic 
outlook for the future verification of learned helplessness models of 
depression. However, such verification ultimately depends on how well
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the predictions advanced in these models fare when subjected to rigorous 
examination in investigations that do not suffer from the methodological 
shortcomings of this and similar studies.
In the present research, for example, depressive symptomatology 
and life stressors were assessed within a three week period. With such 
a brief assessment period, its unlikely that many individuals will 
experience the types of severe events that are most strongly associated 
with the onset of depressive symptoms (Brown, 1981; Monroe & Simons,
1991), Only 107 of the 226 participants in this study reported the 
occurrence of highly stressful uncontrollable interpersonal events and 
only 56 subjects reported the occurrence of equally uncontrollable 
achievement stressors. The loss of this many subjects greatly reduced 
the power of the statistical analyses and, in turn, the strength of the 
effects that emerged from those analyses. The brevity of the study 
period might have also caused the depressogenic effects of some 
stressors to go undetected. Those subjects who experienced a 
significant stressor shortly before the final assessment session might 
not have developed a recognizable cluster of depressive symptoms until 
after the assessment (cf. Depue & Monroe, 1986). "Classroom 
methodologies," like those used by Metalsky et al. (1987, 1993), are 
better able to provide the type of access to subjects that multiple 
assessments and extended observation periods require, as are "daily 
report methodologies" which require subjects to keep ongoing daily 
records of life events and emotional experiences (cf. Vestre, 1984).
Methodologies such as these might also prove useful in reducing 
the interpretive difficulties that arise when individuals
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retrospectively report life events that occurred over a certain time 
period. The subjects in the present study reported on the stressful 
events they experienced over the three weeks since their initial 
participation (see Alloy & Clements, 1992; Barnett & Gotlib, 1990, 1991 
for examples of similar methodologies). Such a procedure is vulnerable 
to a number of reporting biases that can obscure true temporal relations 
between depressive symptoms and life stress. Higher levels of 
depressive symptomatology at T2 (i.e., when subjects completed the life 
event measures), for instance, might have contributed to the selective 
recall of negative life experiences, inflated perceptions of the 
stressfulness (or uncontrollability) of those events, and/or more 
negativistic inferences about those events (Depue & Monroe, 1986; Monroe 
& Simons, 1991). Moreover, these distortions might have been 
particularly likely to occur among relatively depressed subjects who 
also possessed higher levels of dysfunctional cognition (Monroe &
Simons, 1990).
It is also possible that higher levels of depressive 
symptomatology, which arose after the first assessment session from 
factors other than life stress, contributed to the actual occurrence of 
highly upsetting experiences during the three week interim period.
Hammen (1991, p.555) has recently argued that "at least some subsets of 
depressed people are exposed to considerable stress by virtue of their 
condition and their characteristics and behaviors and that to some 
degree, depressed persons generate the stressors that befall them." She 
went on to demonstrate that clinically depressed women experienced more 
"behavior-dependent" stressors and more interpersonal stressors
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(especially those involving conflicts with others) over a six month 
period than did psychiatric, medically ill, and normal female controls. 
Although the depressed women in Hammen's (1991) research reported higher 
levels of overall stress, they did not experience more "behavior- 
independent" events than their nondepressed counterparts.
Monroe and Simons (1991) have likewise suggested that individuals
who are vulnerable to depression (e.g., those who possess maladaptive
cognitive styles) may create stress as a result of either a
dysfunctional interactional style and/or chronic, low-level affective
symptomatology. They make the frequently overlooked point that
... stress is not a random process, but part of a developmental 
sequence systematically influenced by the diathesis. Whereas the 
construct of stress may still play an important role in the 
evolving scheme, it is generated to a considerable degree by the 
person's behavior, which in turn is likely to be influenced by the 
diathesis (p. 411).
Individuals who believe, for example, that they are worthy only to the
extent that they are loved or regarded highly by others may behave in
excessively needy and dependent ways toward others. Such behavior may,
in turn, ultimately lead to the very types of conflicted relationships
and rejection experiences that they feared originally. For those whose
esteem is mastery-based, self-imposed achievement pressures may
debilitate performance to the point of failure, again leading to the
very outcomes those individuals sought to avoid.
With respect to the present research, the reporting of self- 
generated stressors by relatively depressed subjects and/or cognitively 
vulnerable subjects might have artifactually inflated the strength of 
stress-depression associations among those scoring the highest on 
various measures of maladaptive cognitive styles. This set of
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circumstances would lead to the false conclusion that stress played an 
etiological role in the onset of depressive symptoms among those who 
possess cognitive diatheses. It is difficult to unequivocally establish 
the cause and effect sequencing of life stress and depressive symptoms 
in two-wave panel designs that rely on retrospective reports of negative 
life experiences. The use of Tl depression level as a covariate in the 
analysis of panel data only removes the effects of initial symptom 
severity from T2 reports of life stress and depressive symptomatology.
It makes no adjustment for the effects of either maladaptive cognitive 
styles or interim changes in symptom severity on T2 reports of life 
stress. Panel designs, such as the present one, would be better able to 
disentangle the complex relations among vulnerability factors, life 
stress, and depressive symptoms if precise datings of event occurrences 
and symptom changes were obtained (cf. Brown, 1981; Depue & Monroe, 
1986).
The use of a "respondent-based" approach to the measurement of 
life stress might have also contributed to a number of interpretive 
problems. In contrast to an "investigator-based" assessment method in 
which details about the occurrence and context of negative life events 
are systematically collected by trained interviewers, respondent-based 
questionnaire methods rely solely on the subject for information about 
life stress (Brown, 1981). The responsibility for resolving issues such 
as what constitutes a stressful event, what distinguishes interpersonal 
stressors from achievement stressors, or whether or not a particular 
occurrence qualifies for a given event category (e.g., "received a low 
grade on a course examination") falls primarily on the subject. In
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addition, judgments regarding the stressfulness or severity of life 
events are made exclusively by subjects.
Respondent-driven/questionnaire-based methods of measuring stress 
have been harshly criticized, and their use discouraged by a number of 
life stress researchers. Brown (1981), Dohrenwend, Dohrenwend, Dodson, 
and Shrout (1984), and Monroe and Simons (1991), for example, each 
describe numerous reporting biases that threaten the reliability and 
validity of such assessment instruments. Relatively depressed 
individuals, or those who possess highly dysfunctional attitudes, might 
have a lower threshold for life stress, and thus perceive relatively 
minor events as extremely stressful or upsetting. In addition, although 
efforts were made to ensure that the stressors included on the event 
checklists did not reflect symptoms of disorder (e.g., change in eating 
habits), It is possible that this goal was not fully realized. Subjects 
were free to write In other negative events that they experienced during 
the relevant time period and then to choose one of those events as their 
most upsetting stressor. The events that subjects supplied were not 
evaluated to determine whether they represented aspects of disorder. 
These potential distortions and inaccuracies increase the difficulty of 
disentangling stress from diathesis and disorder so that the appropriate 
causal ordering of these factors can be established.
Furthermore, despite explicit instructions about the reference 
period from which they were to report life stressors (i.e., the 3 weeks 
since their initial participation), subjects might have reported on 
events that occurred before that time period if those events were 
particularly salient. Alternatively, they might have reported chronic
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stressors that began in the more distant past but were still present at 
the time of assessment (e.g., interpersonal difficulties with 
roommates). No effort was made to distinguish chronic stressors from 
more acute or discrete occurrences, despite the fact that these two 
classes of events are likely to bear different relations to the 
development and maintenance of depressive symptomatology (Depue & 
Monroe, 1986; Monroe & Simons, 1991). In addition, the lists of events 
provided to subjects were primarily comprised of minor stressors. More 
severe or traumatic events (e.g., severe physical illness) were not 
included because they have low base rates of occurrence in student 
populations and would have been unlikely to occur within the time frame 
of this research. Although acute, major stressors are likely to play a 
larger role In the etiology of depressive symptomatology than are minor 
events (Brown, 1981), their assessment in a prospective study would have 
required following subjects over a much longer time period. The 
inadequate assessment of major life events probably contributed to the 
relative weakness of the effects obtained in this research.
For these and other reasons, investigator-based methods of stress 
assessment, such as the contextual threat interview developed by Brown 
and Harris (1978), have become more common in investigations of stress- 
disorder relationships (e.g., Hammen, Mayol, deMayo, & Marks, 1986; 
Hammen, 1991). Using an event checklist as a guide, contextual threat 
interviewers query respondents about the occurrence of life stressors 
over a prespecified time period. For each event reported, respondents 
are asked to pinpoint as precisely as possible the date on which the 
event occurred. When needed, probes are used by the trained
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interviewers to ensure the accurate dating of events. Detailed 
information is also collected about such things as the circumstances 
surrounding the event's occurrence, the respondent's previous 
experiences with event, and the adequacy of his/her resources (e.g., 
social support) for dealing with the event and its consequences. 
Interviewers subsequently prepare narrative reports of the details of 
each event and the context in which it occurred, omitting all 
information about the respondent's emotional reactions to the event. 
Independent judges then use explicit criteria to rate the level of 
threat associated with each event. This procedure yields data, 
uninfluenced by reporting inaccuracies and distortions, regarding the 
degree of stress to which an individual has been exposed. Combined with 
information about changes in depressive symptom levels and the timing of 
those changes, the contextual threat method enables investigators to 
better determine whether elevations in symptomatology antedate or follow 
life stress. Other approaches, such as the study of Individuals 
presently experiencing high levels of stress (e.g., postpartum women, 
Cutrona, 1983; abortion patients, Majors et al., 1985; individuals with 
chronic or recurrent medical illnesses, McEvoy DeVellis & Blalock,
1992) , also avoid the problems of respondent-based methods of stress 
assessment, and are becoming more common in investigations concerned 
with the psychopathological sequelae of life stress. The fact that 
theoretical predictions of the learned helplessness models of depression 
received partial support in this study despite the shortcomings 
associated with the assessment of life stress, suggests that the expense 
entailed in these more sophisticated approaches is warranted.
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Problems associated with the operationalization and assessment of 
maladaptive cognitive styles might have also served to weaken the 
findings of this research. Measures of dysfunctional attitudes, 
irrational ideas, and overgeneralization were used to assess the 
cognitive styles included in hopelessness theory's expanded diathesis 
component. Although Abramson et al. (1989, p. 362) likened those 
cognitive styles (tendencies to exaggerate the adverse consequences of 
negative life events and to infer personal deficiencies when negative 
life events occur) to the notions of dysfunctional attitudes and 
irrational ideas, the overlap between these concepts is not complete.
It is possible that stronger diathesis-stress effects and/or cognitive 
style-event cognition relations would have emerged if more direct 
measures of these cognitive styles had been used.
Metalsky and Joiner (1992), for example, used the Cognitive Style 
Questionnaire (CSQ; Abramson & Metalsky, 1986) to measure generalized 
tendencies to infer negative consequences and personal deficiencies in 
response to life stress. The CSQ asks subjects to imagine that they 
experienced each of 12 hypothetical negative events (the same events 
used on the EASQ), and then rate a.) the likelihood that the event will 
result in other bad occurrences, and b.) the degree to which the event 
implies some personal flaw(s). Metalsky and Joiner (1992) found that 
scores on both measures interacted with the number of negative life 
events subjects experienced over a five week period to predict residual 
increases in depressive symptomatology. The stress X negative 
consequences interaction accounted for seven percent of the variance in 
residualized depression scores and the stress X personal deficiency
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interaction explained four percent of the variance in symptom changes. 
Only the latter interaction term predicted changes in hopelessness 
expectancies, however, and this effect was independent of (i.e., did not 
mediate) the interactive effects of stress and generalized personal 
deficiency inferences on changes in depressive symptomatology. Thus, 
Metalsky and Joiner's (1992) direct assessments of the proposed 
dysfunctional cognitive styles yielded somewhat stronger, but by no 
means complete, support for hopelessness theory's diathesis-stress and 
hopelessness mediation predictions.
With respect to the present study, it is also noteworthy that 
none of the cognitive style X stress interactions effects were uniquely 
predictive of increases in depressive symptomatology when assessed 
simultaneously in the same regression analysis (see Metalsky & Joiner, 
1992 for a similar result). This finding might simply reflect "shared 
method variance," in that each measure was administered in the same 
format during the same assessment session. Alternatively, it might be 
that the cognitive style measures used in this research assess different 
aspects of the same construct rather than independent constructs. The 
results of a factor analysis of the Attributional Style (Interpersonal 
Domain), Overgeneralization, Dysfunctional Attitudes, and Irrational 
Ideas scores obtained by subjects who perceived interpersonal stressors 
as uncontrollable provided preliminary evidence for the latter 
speculation. Only one factor, accounting for 59% of the score variance, 
emerged from that analysis (an identical result was obtained when 
cognitive style data from the full sample was factor analyzed).
If these results are upheld in subsequent investigations, an
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important objective for future research would be to specify more 
explicitly the nature of this general diathesis. For example, the 
common vulnerability factor being tapped by the different cognitive 
style measures used in this study might partially overlap with the 
constellation of traits believed to characterize the depressive 
personality. The depressive personality encompasses such traits as 
quiet, introverted, passive, and nonassertive; gloomy, pessimistic, 
serious, and incapable of fun; self-critical, self-reproaching, and 
self-derogatory; skeptical, hypercritical, and hard to please; 
conscientious, responsible, and self-disciplined; brooding and given to 
worry; preoccupied with negative events, feelings of inadequacy, and 
personal shortcomings (Akiskal, 1983).
Research by Klein (1990) has shown that psychiatric outpatients 
who met the criteria for depressive personality scored higher on 
measures of attributional style, dysfunctional attitudes, self- 
criticism, introversion, and self-constraint. Klein (1990) did not 
report the correlations between scores on these measures and the 
depressive personality index, nor did he perform a factor analysis to 
determine whether the set of personality and cognitive style scales 
converge onto a unitary dimension. The results of his research 
nevertheless suggest that the depressive personality may serve as a 
useful framework for integrating research on maladaptive cognitive 
styles and other personality variables that appear to predispose 
individuals to the development of depressive symptomatology.
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END NOTES
1 Abramson et al. (1978) were inconsistent in their discussion of the 
role that causal attributions play in the onset and nature of learned 
helplessness. They sometimes suggested that internal, stable, and 
global attributions for uncontrollable negative outcomes were necessary 
for both the onset and the nature (i.e., chronicity and generality) of 
future uncontrollability expectations. For example, Abramson et al. 
(1978) state that,
The old model [Seligman, 1975], however, was vague in specifying 
the conditions under which a perception that events are 
noncontingent (past or present oriented) was transformed into an 
expectation that events will be noncontingent (future oriented).
Our reformulation regards the attribution the individual makes for 
noncontingency between his acts and outcomes in the here and now as 
a determinant of his subsequent expectations of future 
noncontingency. These expectations, in turn, determine the 
generality, chronicity, and type of his helplessness symptoms (p. 
52).
At other times, however, Abramson et al. (1978) implied that the 
perception of negative events as uncontrollable was sufficient for the 
onset of future uncontrollability expectations and causal attributions 
determined only the nature of that expectation and thus the nature of 
helplessness deficits. These suggestions are illustrated in the 
following quote, "In general, the properties of the attribution predict 
in what new situations and across what span of time the expectation of 
helplessness will be likely to recur" (p. 59).
Abramson et al. (1988b) acknowledged this source of confusion in 
the reformulated model. In an attempt to provide clarification, they 
offered the following comments,
The 1978 statement of the hopelessness theory of depression was 
unclear about whether or not certain events (i.e., causal 
attributions) in the hypothesized causal chain contributed to the 
onset of depressive symptoms as well as to their chronicity and 
generality or only to their chronicity and generality. We believe 
that the underlying logic of the 1978 statement suggests that the 
causal events in question contribute to the onset, chronicity, and 
generality of depressive symptoms, and present the theory 
accordingly. Consistent with our interpretation of the underlying 
logic of the 1978 statement, Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, and von 
Baeyer (1979) wrote, 'According to the reformulated hypothesis, a 
certain attributional style, when combined with bad outcomes, 
causes depression' (p. 247).
Unfortunately, these comments leave a logical problem unresolved. If a 
particular pattern of causal attributions is necessary for symptom 
onset, there can be no symptom variability. That is, if future 
uncontrollability expectations develop only when noncontingent outcomes 
are attributed to internal, stable, and global causes, it would follow
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that all cases of learned helplessness or depression would be chronic, 
highly generalized, and would involve self-esteem loss. It is thus 
logically inconsistent to postulate that causal attributions serve the 
dual roles of bringing about future uncontrollability expectations and 
shaping the nature of those expectations.
2 The decision to include Levenson's (1981) Multidimensional Locus of 
Control Scale in this research was made subsequent to the start of the 
study. As a result, data on this measure were obtained for only 228 of
the 247 Time 1 participants.
3 Metalsky et al. (1987) created an "exam stress" variable by taking 
the difference between subjects' midterm grade aspirations and their 
actual exam grade. They then used the multiplicative product of exam 
stress and scores on the Importance subscale of the EASQ (Achievement 
Domain) in conjunction with EASQ-Generality scores (Achievement Domain) 
to predict change in depressive symptoms among the students in their 
sample. To the extent that Metalsky et al.'s stress variable includes 
an element of dysfunctional cognition, the precise meaning of the 
diathesis-stress interaction term that they created is unclear. Given 
this problem, combined with the fact that the weighted approach used by 
Metalsky et al. was abandoned in a subsequent "classroom study" 
conducted by this group (Metalsky et al., 1993), event stress in the
present study was weighted by the perceived importance of those events
rather than by EASQ importance,
4 The assumption of homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices was 
evaluated prior to performing all multivariate analyses of variance 
reported in this research. No violations of this assumption were 
revealed.
5 All multivariate significance tests were based on Wilks' criterion.
6 When a MANOVA is performed on a set of correlated measures, it is 
inappropriate to interpret the results of univariate ANOVAs performed on 
the individual measures following a significant multivariate effect. A 
significant univariate effect might emerge for a given measure, not 
because that measure is necessarily related to the independent variable, 
but because it shares variance with another measure that is affected by 
the independent variable. Moreover, the univariate F's associated with 
correlated measures are not independent and the alpha levels for those 
tests can not easily be adjusted to control overall error rates 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 1989).
Stepdown analysis is the appropriate strategy for evaluating the 
significance of correlated measures following a significant MANOVA. As 
described by Tabachnick and Fidell (1989, pp. 400-401), stepdown 
analysis is similar to hierarchical regression. Each measure is first 
prioritized in order of its importance to the independent variable.
The significance of the highest-priority measure is then assessed in a 
univariate ANOVA. Each remaining measure is tested in an ANCOVA with 
higher priority measures serving as covarlates. The alpha levels for 
the individual tests are adjusted using a Bonferonni procedure to
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control the overall (familywise or experimentwlse) error rate.
Stepdown analysis is a conservative strategy and its use here was 
somewhat problematical because at times there was no clear ordering of 
the individual measures (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 1984, p. 402 for a 
discussion of this problem). An effort was made, however, to impose the 
most meaningful order on the measures within each set. To the extent 
that this goal was not realized, caution must be used when interpreting 
the results of each stepdown analysis.
 ^The homogeneity of regression assumption was evaluated prior to 
conducting all MANCOVAs. Unless otherwise indicated, the assumption was 
met in all cases.
8 A significant subject gender X T1RSES interaction indicated a 
violation of the homogeneity of regression assumption. The results of 
this analysis should be interpreted with caution.
9 Data from only those subjects whose negative achievement or 
interpersonal events occurred within the three weeks prior to the second 
assessment session were used in these and all other analyses.
10 It might be argued that the subset of interpersonal stressors that 
were perceived as uncontrollable differed from those that were perceived 
as controllable on some other important dimension besides 
controllability, and that those other differences contributed to the 
cognitive style X stress regression results. For example, if 
uncontrollable stressors were also perceived as more stressful or more 
likely to result in negative consequences, that might account for the 
fact that significant diathesis-stress interaction effects were obtained 
only among subjects who experienced uncontrollable interpersonal 
stressors. To examine whether this was the case, I compared the stress 
and cognition ratings provided by the 107 subjects who perceived their 
most upsetting interpersonal stressor as relatively uncontrollable with 
those of the 111 subjects who perceived their most upsetting 
interpersonal stressor as relatively controllable. Controllable and 
uncontrollable interpersonal stressors did not differ In perceived 
stressfulness (j> - .81), attributional generality (2 - .27) or 
anticipated negative consequences (2 " .53). As might be expected, 
attributional intemality, perceived personal deficiencies, behavioral 
blame, and characterological blame ratings were higher for controllable 
versus uncontrollable interpersonal stressors (all 2s < .0001). 
Additional comparisons revealed that subjects who perceived their most 
upsetting interpersonal stressor as relatively uncontrollable were no 
more depressed at Tl than were their counterparts (2 ~ .99), nor did the 
former report the occurrence of more stressful life events in the Tl to 
T2 interim (2 " .81). Thus, it does not appear that perceptions of 
control were confounded with another dimension that could also account 
for the diathesis-stress results obtained in this research.
11 It might be argued that this effect occurred simply because the 
attributional composite was comprised in part of scores on the 
internality dimension. To test this hypothesis, an additional analysis
227
was performed on T2 RSES scores after removing the internality dimension 
from the attributional composite. Although the interaction from this 
analysis was nonsignificant (e  - .69), the corresponding regression 
coefficient was positive (b - .004), suggesting a pattern of results 
similar in form to that found for the interaction of interpersonal 
stress and scores on the internal, stable, and global composite.
A similar finding was obtained when the same analysis was 
performed separately for subjects who perceived interpersonal stressors 
as controllable. That is, a positive regression coefficient (b - .02) 
was obtained for the marginally significant (e - .16) interaction of 
interpersonal stress and composite stability/globality scores. These 
findings run counter to the argument that the internality dimension was 
solely responsible for the form of the interpersonal stress X internal, 
stable, and global attributional composite interaction.
12 No mention is made of personal deficiency inferences or negative 
consequence expectancies in Alloy et al.'s (1990) discussion of the 
proximal contributory causes of hopelessness expectancies. Although 
their etiological status in the "helplessness-hopelessness theory of 
anxiety and depression" is unclear, researchers testing hopelessness 
theory (Metalsky & Joiner, 1992) have continued to measure both types of 
event-based cognitions even after the 1990 publication Alloy et al.'s 
model. Thus, it seems appropriate to infer that the hypotheses 
regarding personal deficiency inferences and negative consequence 
expectancies outlined in Abramson et al.'s (1989) original model are 
still valid.
13 Alloy et al. (1990) likewise make no mention of the predisposing 
effects of tendencies to infer personal deficiencies or expect negative 
consequences when negative life events occur. As hopelessness theorists 
(Metalsky fit Joiner, 1992) have also continued to assess these constructs 
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